NEW DELHI: On 19 September 2025, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) marked its 65th anniversary. India weaponised it for the first time by putting the treaty in abeyance following a terrorist attack at Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam this year that killed 26 people.
Established amid the tumult of Partition and a deep-seated mistrust vis-a-vis Pakistan, the IWT is often hailed as one of the most successful water treaties in the world, having survived multiple wars.
The Indus basin, culturally significant to the Indian identity for thousands of years, features an extensive network of rivers. They originate in the Himalayas and flow into the Arabian Sea, covering a journey of 3,218 km. The basin spans northwestern India and Pakistan, with approximately 13% of its total catchment area located in parts of Afghanistan and the Tibet Autonomous Region of China.
A new book, Trial by Water, revisits the treaty’s formation during a politically turbulent period and against the backdrop of the Cold War. Pakistan viewed the treaty through a strategic lens, often trying to internationalise the issue, whereas India, as the upper riparian state, regarded it primarily as a water agreement in its pursuit of elusive peace. The book documents the complexities and challenges that arose in negotiating the treaty amidst a fraught geopolitical landscape.
Pakistan approached the negotiations strategically, deploying nearly 160 lawyers and one engineer, while India sent only three top engineers to the first meeting in Washington, DC, at the World Bank’s invitation in 1953. Pakistan hired the American law firm Covington and Burling, whereas India relied on the expertise of German legal consultant F J Berber alongside its engineers Khosla, Nirajan Gulhati, and Balram Das.
Negotiations officially began on 6 May 1952 in Washington, DC, and concluded on 19 September 1960 in Karachi, where the then prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and General Ayub Khan of Pakistan signed the treaty. In defending the treaty in Parliament, Nehru remarked, “We purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries.”
Experts consider the treaty a product of meticulous engineering solutions developed in an environment rife with mistrust and the scars of Partition.
Political scenario in both countries
To understand the complex transboundary water negotiations, it’s essential to consider the political landscape of the 1950s. Pakistan was experiencing significant political upheaval, in contrast with India’s stable democratic government. After the assassination of Pakistan’s first prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the country witnessed a whirlwind of political changes, with six prime ministers taking office between 1952 and 1960, culminating in a military coup in 1958.
Nehru, an ardent democrat, found himself negotiating with a military leader, expressing his frustration in Parliament over the political instability in Pakistan, which made it difficult for him to identify suitable counterparts for discussions. In addition to political instability, Pakistan sought to align itself with various Western military blocs, such as NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, to counter India. Later, as the world entered the Cold War phase, Pakistan’s strategic importance grew for Western powers looking to influence Asia to counter the USSR.
Both countries explored various approaches to resolve the disputes over water resources. These ranged from joint technical studies and judicial determinations to arbitration, including a tentative proposal inspired by the US-Canada model of a joint water disputes commission. However, Pakistan consistently approached the negotiations from a strategic standpoint, insisting on referring the matter to the International Court of Justice. Stung by the unresolved situation over Jammu and Kashmir and the UN’s proposed plebiscite solution, Nehru was unwilling to entertain such demands.
Negotiation dynamics
Both countries assessed water quantities with minimal variations and adopted maximalist positions. During the early years of the World Bank-mediated negotiations (1952-54), attempts at a deal on basin-wide distribution of water faltered as both sides sought a larger share for themselves. After a revised proposal, India suggested using 100% of the eastern river flows and 7% of the western rivers, while Pakistan argued for 70% of the eastern rivers and 100% of the western rivers. Later, the World Bank proposed allocating India 100% of the eastern rivers and Pakistan the entirety of the western rivers, except for a small amount from the Jhelum river allocated for Jammu and Kashmir. While India accepted these proposals, Pakistan expressed dissatisfaction. Tripartite negotiations eventually collapsed, and the World Bank began negotiating bilaterally with India and Pakistan. Negotiations were further paralysed between October 1957 and December 1958 due to the fragile political situation in Pakistan, but Pakistan continued to blame India for the delays.
Pakistan’s focus during the negotiations was on internationalising the issue rather than settling the dispute. In 1956, a violent clash occurred at the Hussainiwala headworks, and Pakistan threatened to take the issue to the UN Security Council, which unsettled Nehru. Even years after Partition, the 523 km border in the Punjab sector existed mainly on paper, complicating settlement efforts. By 1959, approximately 406 km of the border was settled, with an agreement on the remaining 117 km reached on January 11, 1960, paving the way for a treaty between the two countries.
Why involve World Bank
The World Bank (WB), formerly known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, was actively funding various projects in India and Pakistan and elsewhere across the world at that time. That made it a crucial tool for the United States to create a sphere of influence after World War II and during the Cold War era. Both India and Pakistan required funding to support their development initiatives and sought assistance from the WB, as the bank had experience in providing engineering solutions to complex transboundary political scenarios.
The WB had previously conducted similar work in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project in the United States, where it successfully helped seven US states along the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers develop effective water-sharing frameworks.
Additionally, it was easier for countries to approach the bank for treaty negotiations, as they could assist in generating funds for the construction of various irrigation projects after the negotiations or treaty is finalised.
On the evening of September 19, 1960, in Karachi, the Indus Water Treaty was signed after nearly eight years of arduous negotiations. The treaty consists of 21 pages, including 12 articles, 8 annexures, and 4 appendices. It was ratified in January 1961, with retrospective effect from April 1, 1960.
Ultimately, both countries agreed that India would have exclusive rights over the eastern rivers and that India could store 3.6 million acre-feet of water, allowing it to irrigate over 7,00,000 acres from the western rivers. Experts believe that India’s significant advantages in previous proposals were largely due to the superior hydraulic knowledge of Indian engineers, who presented their case based on meticulous calculations of every cubic foot of water. This left Pakistani experts with few effective counterarguments, as much of their position relied on rhetoric and emotions rather than factual realities on the ground.
The treaty outlines provisions and restrictions regarding the use of river waters. To facilitate its implementation, a Permanent Indus Commission was established. Procedures and a graded response system were defined to address water issues: ‘questions’ would be handled by the Indus commissioners, ‘differences’ by neutral experts, and ‘disputes’ by the Court of Arbitration.