Every time a person applies to become a voter, seeks correction of details in the electoral roll, shifts residence or applies for deletion of a name, the application enters a digital system used by election officials. For years, much of this work was handled through ERONET, the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) electoral-roll management system. Its functions have now been incorporated into the ECI’s umbrella ECINET platform.
The two systems have come under scrutiny amid reported concerns raised by Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi about the centralisation of the electoral-roll database and the extent of access available to election officials in the States, who are legally empowered to do the job.
So, how exactly do these systems work? Who ultimately decides whether a voter’s name is added to or removed from the rolls? And why has software control become an issue? Here, we take a deep dive into what it’s all about.
What is ERONET?
ERONET was developed and rolled out in February-March 2018 as a centralised digital system for managing electoral-roll applications and related processes. Before its introduction, electoral rolls were managed through a range of State-level systems.
It was built by the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC) under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology.
At the time of its launch, the ECI said in an official statement that there were 36 separate systems, ranging from spreadsheets to State-specific software. ERONET sought to standardise these processes by creating a common database and a common method for processing electoral-roll applications.
In practical terms, ERONET was the back-end system through which election officials processed applications for registration of new voters, migration or shifting of voters, correction of electoral-roll entries, deletion or objection to entries, and other electoral-roll-related processes.
The ECI had described the system as a “centralised form processing system” and a decision-support system for Electoral Registration Officers, or EROs.
Does ERONET itself decide who becomes a voter?
According to the ECI, it does not. This is central to understanding the current controversy. The legal authority to prepare and revise the electoral roll of an Assembly constituency rests with the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) under the Representation of the People Act, 1950.
The software can process applications, compare information, flag possible duplicates or inconsistencies, and provide information to the officer. But a computer-generated flag is not, by itself, a legal decision that a person is ineligible.
For example, if the system finds two voter records with similar names, ages and other details, it may flag them as possible duplicates. Election officials can then examine the records, seek documents or conduct field verification before deciding what action should be taken.
In other words, the system is meant to assist the statutory decision-maker, not replace that decision-maker.
What is ECINET?
In January 2026, the ECI integrated ERONET’s core functions into a broader unified platform called ECINET. It is the ECI’s umbrella IT platform, bringing together more than 40 applications and websites that the Commission had developed over the years for voters, candidates, political parties and election officials.
The ECI’s current technology page describes ECINET as the platform through which several of its applications and services are being delivered. The Commission refers to this as the “Electoral Roll module of ECINET Portal (previously ERONET)”.
For ordinary voters, the platform provides access to services such as voter registration, electoral-roll searches and various application-related facilities. The ECI’s voter portal currently provides Form 6 for new voter registration, Form 7 for deletion or objection, and Form 8 for shifting residence, correction and related requests.
The important point is that ERONET and ECINET are not two completely separate electoral databases. The electoral-roll functions earlier handled through ERONET have now been integrated into ECINET.
Why has the centralisation of these systems become controversial?
The centralisation itself is not new. Digitising electoral rolls and bringing different State-level systems onto common infrastructure has been an ongoing process. The current issue is more specific: who controls access to the system, and whether the software allows State-level statutory officials to exercise the powers assigned to them by law.
According to reports, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had repeatedly raised concerns about the centralisation of electoral-roll data and access to ERONET/ECINET. Media reports said Sandhu had pointed to concerns that some Chief Electoral Officers, District Election Officers and EROs did not have what he described as proper and complete access to the system.
The concern, therefore, is not simply about having a central database, but about the relationship between legal authority and technical authority.
If an ERO has the legal power to take a decision but the software does not allow that decision to be entered, reversed or implemented, a question arises: how does the technical architecture affect the authority given to the ERO by law? This is the central issue raised in the current debate.
What does the ECI say on the centralisation issue?
According to the ECI, Booth Level Officers (BLOs), Assistant Electoral Registration Officers (AEROs), Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), District Election Officers (DEOs) and Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs) continue to perform their respective functions through individual IDs and passwords on ECINET. It said that no one else, including another officer of the Commission, can perform the statutory function assigned to the designated officer on ECINET.
The ECI further clarified that centralisation is primarily for database management and cybersecurity, which have to be managed centrally to protect the system from unauthorised access, manipulation and cyberattacks. It has also cited about 68 lakh attempted cyberattacks on counting day during Assembly elections earlier this year.
The ECI, therefore, rejected the suggestion that central technology replaces ERO authority.
What further changes does the ECI plan for ECINET?
Following the controversy, the ECI on September 26, 2026 announced a review of its ECINET system to examine whether it meets the requirements of the relevant Acts and Rules.
“Field officials currently have role-based access to the platform in accordance with their statutory powers. The review will be conducted by a committee headed by a Senior Deputy Election Commissioner and will include an independent expert from an IIT or IIIT,” it said.
The ECI said several upgrades to ECINET had already been made based on inputs received from State Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs). It added that further flexibility and changes sought by field officials would also be considered.
Going forward, initiatives relating to IT modules and portals will first be discussed by the Committee of Officers before being placed before the Commission for approval, it noted.
What exactly is a “logical discrepancy”?
A “logical discrepancy” is essentially an inconsistency detected when voter information is compared with other electoral-roll data.
For example, the system may identify an apparently unusual age difference between a voter and a parent or relative; differences in names between older and newer electoral rolls; inconsistencies in family or relational details; or possible mismatches arising from changes in spelling or transliteration.
Such a discrepancy is an alert for further examination, not a final determination.
This distinction is important because automated matching systems work with patterns in data, while electoral eligibility ultimately requires a legal and factual determination by the competent election authorities.
What has changed with the new Aadhaar-based e-sign feature?
The ECI has also introduced an e-sign-based identity verification process on ECINET for certain electoral-roll applications, aimed at strengthening authentication for forms relating to voter registration, deletion and corrections.
The process takes the applicant to an external platform operated by C-DAC, where the applicant enters an Aadhaar number and receives an OTP on the mobile number linked to Aadhaar. The applicant then gives consent for Aadhaar-based authentication before returning to ECINET to submit the application.
The change is intended to establish a stronger link between the person submitting an application and the identity used for that application.
Why does this matter for voter deletion?
The issue has gained importance because of allegations that applications to delete names from electoral rolls can be submitted fraudulently.
One notable example is the Aland Assembly constituency in Karnataka, where election authorities said 6,018 Form 7 applications seeking deletion of names were submitted online.
After verification, only 24 of these applications were found to be genuine. The remaining 5,994 were found to be incorrect and rejected. The authorities said that, as a result, no voters’ names were deleted on the basis of those applications.
The case later became part of a wider investigation into the circumstances surrounding the applications.
It also highlights an important point: submitting an online application to delete a voter does not by itself remove that voter from the electoral roll. The application has to be verified, followed by a decision by the competent authority.
What are the administrative benefits of centralising electoral systems through ECINET?
Centralisation can simplify election administration by bringing different systems onto a common platform. According to ECI officials, this can standardise forms and procedures across States, reduce duplication between databases, make applications easier to track and improve consistency in the data.
It can also give election officials access to common tools and make electoral services available through a single platform.
Centralisation can further speed up the publication and transmission of election-related information. The ECI has said that ECINET helped it upload voter-turnout trends and other election information faster. More broadly, the platform is intended to bring dozens of applications and services that were previously separate under a single technological framework.
What is the main concern about the way the system is designed?
The main concern is not simply whether electoral data is digital or centralised. It is whether the technology accurately reflects how electoral law assigns powers and responsibilities.
A centralised system can make election administration faster and more consistent. But electoral rolls involve individual rights as well as statutory procedures, including hearings, objections and opportunities to correct errors. That makes the design of the software important.
For example, if an automated system flags a voter, there must be a way for a human official to examine the case. If an ERO decides that a voter should remain on the roll, the system must be able to record that decision. If a deletion is found to be wrong, officials who have the legal authority to reverse it must have a functional way to do so.
The larger issue, therefore, is how technology should operate within the framework of electoral law. The controversy now centres on whether the system’s architecture and access controls consistently preserve the statutory role of officials on the ground.
What should a voter understand from all this?
For an ordinary voter, the most important takeaway is that ERONET was not simply a machine that decided who could vote. It was a technological system used to process and manage electoral-roll information, and ECINET is now the broader platform into which those functions have been incorporated.
The important institutional questions are who has the ability to act on the data, who can correct an erroneous entry, who can reverse a deletion, and whether the software gives statutory election officials the access necessary to perform those functions.
As India moves towards an increasingly centralised digital election administration, the reliability of the electoral process will depend not only on accurate databases and algorithms, but also on clear legal authority, auditability, human verification and effective safeguards against both wrongful deletion and fraudulent applications.
