There are books by the dozen on South Asia, with experts weighing in particularly on the field of security and terrorism. Prem Mahadevan tackles a far more difficult subject so little written about, that it is surprising he even dared. His book, Islamism and Intelligence in South Asia, is no easy read. It is aimed at specialists and those who want an answer to the question as to how jihadis operate with such apparent ease.
A related question is why Pakistan remains the crucible for groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami or the Tableeghi Jamaat, who while involved in violence and mayhem inside Pakistan, usually follow a peaceful trajectory in countries like India or the UK. He provides that answer almost immediately within a discussion on the Deep State and its intermeshing with jihadi groups, with an example being the 1999 Kargil Crisis. Mahadevan points out that this was planned by four Generals, of whom one was a Jamaat-e-Islami supporter, another linked to Osama bin Laden, and a third a committed Taliban supporter. This can happen only in Pakistan.
The book launches into the reasoning that underpins the army-jihadi relationship, that includes shift in state support from Jamaat to the Jamiat Ulema Islam headed by the brightly henna’ed Fazlur Rehman for Afghan operations, due to the latter’s access to a large uneducated young population in the tribal lands of Pakistan.
The core of the book is where the author digs deep into information denial operations of terrorist groups as well as their ability to manipulate information to suit their and their patrons’ needs. An illustration of this is a nine-hour gun battle between the police and a rabidly sectarian group that controls enclaves in Pakistani Punjab where it operates in total secrecy.
The cherry on top is that the leader himself was a former Army Major, with two sons in the police and ISI respectively. Then there is the virtual takeover by Al Qaeda of villages along the border, where their largesse, combined with the villagers’ distrust for the ‘mainland’ police, gives them information dominance in their areas, and beyond. Al Qaeda in particular shows strong operational and communications security, traits that are passed on to local armed groups, thus increasing their circle of security.
The fact that an elite counter-terrorism unit is unable to get local police to work with it showcases the demoralisation of the force, worsened by the obfuscation of the Deep State. The overlap between criminality and jihadis which assists in information collection is illustrated by another fascinating story. Pakistani authorities to their dismay find that government employees have set up a photocopying shop to replicate original identification papers for a hefty sum, providing terrorists with fake identities. The chapter on information manipulation is the most interesting of all, where the author outlines how Americans are deceived repeatedly by the Deep State.
The almost superb ISI ability to manipulate information not just in Pakistan—where think tanks are overflowing with retired army generals—but also abroad has been pointed out by other reliable analysts like Christine Fair in the US. A recent instance was the Pakistani state’s plea that allowing a Lashkar-e-Taiba front to fight elections against Nawaz Sharif was an effort at ‘mainstreaming’. Information manipulation also involves shifting blame on to the victim. Claiming ‘insufficient evidence’ against perpetrators of the 26/11 attack, and blaming the US for its refusal to ‘trust’ its ally when American personnel or premises are attacked, are examples.
There is much more in terms of analysis and citing of fascinating incidents that makes this book virtually a textbook for intelligence analysts and others with an interest in the subject. It is a little longer and more detailed than today’s short text messaging generation may like, but then, those are unlikely to be the recruitment pool for any intelligence agency fighting to keep this insidious threat at bay.
Islamism and Intelligence in South Asia By: Prem Mahadevan |