Contrary to popular perceptions, summit meetings that our leaders have had with their counterparts in Pakistan and China have been, more often than not, counterproductive, and only left us with fewer cards to play on the diplomatic table. At the end of the Bangladesh conflict, India had liberated Bangladesh, held 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war and captured nearly 9,000 sq km of Pakistani territory. At the Simla Summit in July 1971, the normally hard-nosed Indira Gandhi was persuaded to return all the prisoners and territory captured by us, merely in return for a verbal assurance from President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that he would agree to a settlement of Kashmir issue by converting the LoC into an international border. Needless to say, Bhutto denied he ever agreed to any such settlement.
We invited the architect of the Kargil conflict, General Pervez Musharraf, for a summit at Agra, just after the attack on the Red Fort by the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Hafiz Saeed publicly proclaimed that he had “unfurled the green flag of Islam on the ramparts of the Red Fort”. The summit was a disaster and marked by a vicious attack on Indian policies in a breakfast meeting that Musharraf had with Indian editors and journalists. Musharraf returned a hero to Pakistan. Shortly after the summit, the Jaish-e-Mohammed attacked our Parliament. Manmohan Singh held several meetings with Musharraf, where he announced that terrorism against India would not affect the dialogue process with Pakistan. He was forced to change this position following the 26/11 attack. But, in subsequent meetings, we have agreed to not only resume the “composite dialogue” unconditionally, but also not rebutted baseless Pakistani allegations about our involvement in Baluchistan.
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi paid the first summit visit to China after the 1962 conflict in December 1988. Barely a year later, China commenced supply of M-11 short range ballistic missiles to Pakistan. After the visit of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to China in 1993, China commenced the supply to Pakistan of medium-range ballistic missiles, capable of targetting India’s metropolitan cities, and assisted Pakistan’s Uranium enrichment programme by supplying essential components. China made no compromises on its border claims, or on its refusal to recognise Sikkim as a part of India, during these visits. India, however, progressively weakened its position on Tibet.
In 1988, India acknowledged for the first time after the 1962 conflict, that “Tibet is an autonomous region of China”. Worse still, in 2003, India went further and acknowledged that “the Tibetan Autonomous Region is a part of the People’s Republic of China”. In doing so, New Delhi seemed to have forgotten that Chinese maps show Arunachal Pradesh and parts of Ladakh as part of their “Tibetan Autonomous Region”. As a result, China now even objects to visits by the Prime Minister, other Indian dignitaries, and the Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh as constituting interference in its affairs. What our leaders failed to recognise was that in dealing with China, one should never unilaterally concede any demand on territorial issues, till China made equivalent concessions.
What are the lessons India should learn? First, our leaders should undertake summit meetings only after substantive preparatory work and behind the scenes negotiations. The Agra Summit proved a disaster because we did not observe these fundamental principles. Second, never make unilateral concessions in the hope that they will promote “goodwill”, which may be reciprocated at a later date. Bhutto made empty promises in Simla, and China remains recalcitrant on territorial issues. One hopes we learn that sentimentalism is no substitute for realism in dealing with recalcitrant neighbours.
;The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own