On November 8, 2023, the British government introduced draft legislation in the House of Commons, which added India (and Georgia) to an expanded list of ‘safe states’, a move that would curb the possibility of seeking asylum in Britain for Indians who enter illegally and make “unfounded protection claims”. Facilitating illegal migration and fake asylum claims has been a significant mobilizing tool for Khalistanis in the Sikh Diaspora, not only in the UK but also across Europe, the US and Canada. It is also useful to recall that Sangrur (Punjab) Member of Parliament and Khalistan supporter Simranjit Singh Mann, in a 2022 video interview, admitted he had given letters to some 50,000 asylum seekers going abroad, for Rs 35,000 per letter, declaring that they were “victims of state persecution” in India.
No direct connection can be drawn between the UK initiative and the raging diplomatic row between India and Canada over Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s unsubstantiated statement regarding “credible allegations” of a “potential role” of “agents of the Indian government” in the killing of a “Canadian citizen”, Hardeep Singh Nijjar (in June), the self-proclaimed ‘chief’ of the Khalistan Tiger Force. Nevertheless, this is certainly prominent in the background. India had retaliated strongly to Trudeau’s statements, demanding evidence for the claim and expelled 41 Canadian diplomats, even as it exploited the opportunity to expose the global Khalistani network and its deep linkages to organised crime. At the same time, raucous demonstrations by Khalistan supporters in countries across the West—including some violence, vandalism at Indian consulates, and clashes with opposing Indian groups—have awakened some of their governments to the dangers of pandering to Khalistani extremism, though Canada remains a conspicuous exception.
On October 11, the Punjab Police identified 56 Pro-Khalistan Entities operating globally, including 13 in the US, 12 in Canada, seven in Germany, six in the UK, six in Pakistan, and two each in the Philippines, Armenia, Portugal and Malaysia. Some of these, in collusion with gangsters based both in these countries and in India, were implicated in at least 15 targeted killings and terrorist operations in Punjab—including grenade and RPG attacks and IED explosions—since 2017.
Further, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs has categorized 11 Khalistanis as terrorists. It has identified Babbar Khalsa International, Khalistan Commando Force, Khalistan Zindabad Force, the International Sikh Youth Federation, Khalistan Liberation Force and Khalistan Tiger Force as terrorist organizations, and Sikhs For Justice (SFJ) as an unlawful association. Six more proposals are under assessment, even as India seeks the deportation of 11 pro-Khalistan activists, the issuance of red-corner notices for another 13, and the confiscation of properties in India owned by four individuals under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). Red-corner notice proceedings for another 40 individuals have also been initiated.
Western governments have historically been indifferent—and for long years during the peak of Khalistani terrorism in the 1980s and early 1990s and the Islamist jihad in J&K and across the country through the 1990s and early 2000s, actively hostile—to India’s concerns. While there has been a shift with regard to Islamist terrorism since the 9/11 attacks in the US, Khalistani extremism has remained at the margins of international attention. The proposed legislation in the UK, while not Khalistan-specific, suggests the beginnings of a change that has substantially been provoked by rising domestic security concerns, including the criminal affiliations and activities of the Khalistani diaspora.
These affiliations came into further focus in Canada, with unconfirmed reports indicating Nijjar’s successor as the head of the Khalistan Tiger Force had been named: Amritbir Singh Cheema of Vancouver, Canada. He is allegedly a gangster affiliated with the Sukhbir Singh Kahlwan aka Sukha Kahlon gang. The Indian government is working to increase international pressure for host countries to act effectively against the Khalistani diaspora and plans to bring up the matter during the 91st General Assembly of the Interpol, to seek more effective action against international fugitives.
India is also planning to take up Canada’s failure to address terrorist funding operations on its soil with the Financial Action Task Force. While these initiatives are unlikely to bear any immediate or dramatic fruit—the Western powers dominate both entities and can be expected to stonewall any action to bring one of their own into the sphere of accountability—they will certainly help bring renewed focus on Western double standards. In the long, attritional struggle to contain the Khalistani diaspora, such limited gains would themselves be significant.
Ajai Sahni
Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal
ajaisahni@gmail.com