The need to bring Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) entry into force is being felt more today than any time in the past considering the increasing rhetoric on nuclear weapons. Except for North Korea, a majority of 43 other countries listed in Annex 2 (nuclear technology holder nations) are observing a voluntary moratorium against testing.
However, the United States recently announced it would be conducting sub-critical ‘nuclear’ tests and ramping up infrastructure facilities at its Nevada National Security Site. Will this derail the prospects of the treaty’s entry into force and discourage countries like India, which has so far not signed or ratified the Treaty? In an interview, CTBTO (CTBT Organization) Executive Secretary Dr Robert Floyd speaks to S V Krishna Chaitanya.
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The US has been open about conducting subcritical ‘nuclear’ tests and Jill Hruby, Administrator of the National Security Administration of the US announced during inaugural ceremony of CTBT Organization’s Science and Technology conference that they are actually building test beds, which some countries say is in contravention of the CTBT preamble. Your reaction.
The US is a signatory state so they are a party to our organisation and they are an incredibly committed party. The question around subcritical testing is essentially a legal question and I think the legal answer is pretty straightforward. The subcritical testing is not specifically ruled out or banned by the Treaty. So, what the under-secretary was describing is their activities and plans are permissible under the scope of the Treaty after it is entered into force. The other important aspect is the transparency and openness exhibited by the US needs to be appreciated whether we are happy with their decisions or not.
If that is the case, how do you convince a country like India, which refused to sign CTBT precisely because of its ambiguity over sub-critical tests?
In September 2021, the then Indian foreign secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla, while addressing the UN Security Council, categorically said CTBT does not address a number of core concerns raised by India.
We are very keen to have a dialogue with India about the CTBT. It is something I would dearly love to have. India can explain its position to me clearly and then we can look how to move forward from there. I have been in this office for two years and I haven’t had that opportunity.
Has CTBTO made any efforts to reach out to India? When was the last time formal talks were held with the Indian government authority at any level?
There has always been keen interest to engage with India. As you would be well aware, I am very keen to engage with all States that have not yet signed or ratified this Treaty. India absolutely included.
Eight countries have not ratified the Treaty. These include 3 countries -- India, Pakistan and North Korea -- not even signing it for a very long time. Are we staring at an intractable problem?
I don’t believe the problem is intractable, but first, it’s best we step back and consider the value of this Treaty. The CTBT is actually an astounding success already when we consider that before its opening for signature in September 24, 1996, over 2,000 nuclear tests took place. Since that date, fewer than 12 nuclear tests were conducted. And, it’s also a Treaty that almost every country in the world, including India, agrees with in terms of its object and purpose.It is a wonderful thing that almost every possessor-state has taken a decision to commit to a moratorium against testing. And that’s a unilateral and political decision by each of those States.
If the Treaty is already a success, what is the need for it to come into force?
It is certainly a success. The verification system has already been established. Over 90% of the International Monitoring System (IMS) is in place. The International Data Center is established analyzing processing, dispersing the data to all State signatories. But there are some aspects of the verification regime that cannot be put in place until the Treaty’s entry into force. One of those is the On-Site Inspection (OSI). So, it is critical that the Treaty does enter into force to allow the full spectrum of verification activities to be able to be used.
On-Site Inspection is another contentious aspect, which countries including India find it intrusive. If IMS is strong enough to detect any nuclear tests, what is the need for OSI?
The International Monitoring System is certainly very strong. For absolutely definitive evidence, it would be best to be able to address a potentially vexatious claim by another State to allow on-site inspection. In a way, It’s actually protection.
After 27 years, Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar was in Austria earlier this year. Have there been any overtures from your side?
I remain absolutely willing, keen and open to meet anybody from the government of India to discuss and to understand their position on this Treaty. We have spoken with a number of (Indian) diplomats. India can at least consider an observer status of the Treaty.
(Our correspondent was in Vienna on the invitation of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation to cover Science and Technology Conference)