Regime-change operations often stray from the script, particularly when orchestrated violence becomes a policy tool. Bangladesh is fast becoming a classic case. Both the US and Pakistan were aggrieved at Sheikh Hasina’s cold-shouldering, independent foreign policy stance and her friendship with India. The current bonhomie between these two countries is, inter alia, an expression of the US’s gratitude to Pakistan.
The first step of the regime-change operation—that began during the Biden administration but was seamlessly adopted by Trump—was to install Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as the head of an unelected interim government. In its 17 months in power, the dysfunctional Yunus regime has presided over mob violence, economic decline and growing extortion from business houses. There has been a flight of capital, a steep fall in investment, and GDP growth has fallen from 7.5 percent at a recent peak to below 3 percent.
Undeniably, Hasina’s own policy miscalculations contributed to her ouster. Apart from the usual charge of corruption, cronyism and manipulating elections, one crucial error was her coddling of selected hardline Islamic groups and crackdown on others. Madrasas mushroomed, creating a new class of indoctrinated youngsters. Many of them are fronting violent mobs today.
In this mix, the arrival of Tarique Rahman—acting chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the eldest son of former PM Khaleda Zia—after 17 years in exile in the UK changes the political matrix before the February 2026 election, which so far seems to be on track. His arrival is likely to improve the BNP’s chances of winning a majority.
Tarique’s return, after acquittal in all cases in which he was convicted, points to a compact with the interim government and Yunus. This compact may have the backing of the regime-change planners, but doubts remain about Tarique’s considerable political baggage. Still, India can expect another BNP-Jamaat e Islami (JeI) government emerging from the 2026 elections. Whether it will have a ‘reformed’ policy agenda with India is the million-taka question.
Tarique will have to navigate pressure from Pakistan and the US. He may find it useful to balance such pressures by improving ties with India. With the Hasina’s Awami League banned, it could extend support to the BNP to ensure that the bigger ‘devil’, the JeI, does not become the bigger partner in a future government.
Meanwhile the JeI, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist organisation, is projecting a moderate image and desperately trying to discard its reputation as the Pakistan army’s collaborators in the brutal genocide and rapes during the 1971 war. It is closely aligned with Pakistan and the US—and the same trio that were on the same page in 1971 have come together again. The JeI sees the current situation as its best-ever opportunity to grab power.
The National Citizen Party formed by student leaders is also in the fray, though without much prospect. Under the Yunus regime’s patronage, the JeI and other radical Islamist groups have aggressively captured institutions and dictated terms to the interim government. The military and the police have been cowed into submission.
Anti-Indian rhetoric has risen to new levels. Hasina’s continued refuge in India, India ignoring extradition demands after the death sentence on her, and her public criticism of the Yunus regime have irritated the interim government. Recently, a student leader threatened to isolate India’s northeastern states and provide sanctuary to insurgents from India. It reflects a well-planned effort to fan the flames of a hardened nationalist rhetoric. As a military conflict with India will be self-destructive, surrogates are being used by these new political players.
The death of a young anti-Hasina activist, Sharif Osman Hadi, who founded the cultural platform Inqilab Manch—known for spewing hatred against the Awami League and India—ignited public opinion. This rabble-rouser par excellence was shot in Dhaka and died in Singapore, where the interim government sent him for treatment. Dhaka was overrun with people mourning his death—a crowd that was partly spontaneous and partly orchestrated by the interim government. His burial site is significant—next to national poet Kazi Nazrul Islam in the Dhaka University campus—an unprecedented honour.
In what seems a planned move, social media was flooded with allegations that the alleged killer had fled to India. Police investigation failed to produce any evidence. Such deliberate provocations have led to another round of testy diplomatic exchanges between Delhi and Dhaka. Mobs burned down and looted two leading Bangladeshi newspapers—Prothom Alo and The Daily Star. Chhayanaut, a leading cultural organisation, suffered the same fate. Islamists appear to have declared war not only on India, but also on their own country’s premier institutions, culture and history.
Another mob attacked Dipu Chandra Das, a Hindu garment worker, on the false allegation of blasphemy, snatched him from police custody, beat him to death, hung his lifeless body from a tree and set it on fire. Police investigation confirmed that the deceased had not said anything blasphemous. India called the incident “horrendous” and “barbaric”; Dhaka reacted by saying the killing should not be “conflated with the security of minorities” and that several culprits had been arrested. Yunus expressed heartfelt condolences for the death of the student leader, but had no words of comfort for the Hindus killed.
Mobs also attacked India’s high commission in Dhaka and consulates in Chittagong, Khulna, Rajshahi and Sylhet, compelling India to temporarily stop issuing visas. India has officially reminded the Yunus government about its international obligation to provide security to India’s diplomatic missions, as well as visa centres. Protests in Delhi are continuing and Indian public opinion is inflamed. Meanwhile, Bangladesh has stopped issuing visas, whereas India has restarted issuing visas in Bangladesh on “humanitarian grounds”.
The UN country office, embassies of the US, Germany, France and the EU, and advocacy organisations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were quick to condole the death of the Inqilab Manch leader. The German embassy went further and flew its flag at half-mast. But the brutal killing of the Hindu garment worker and burning of Hindu villages elicited a stunning silence. This selective response is noteworthy. Meanwhile, faced with backlash, the interim government expressed regret and offered funding to the garment worker’s family.
India’s neighbourhood challenge is being redefined by events in Bangladesh, hitherto a close political and economic partner. India has adopted strategic restraint so far, taking the long view and hoping that the forthcoming election will lead to political stability and a more productive engagement. There are, however, compelling geopolitical factors related to the activities of Pakistan, the US and China that will force India to reassess its policy.
A Bangladesh-Pakistan military pact seems to be on the anvil. Unverified reports have surfaced of Pakistan and Turkey’s intelligence agencies collaborating to create a ‘special force’ comprising members of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, with the target of using it against India and Myanmar. Indian intelligence agencies view the ISI’s efforts at cultivating Rohingya networks as a low-cost and deniable tool that can be used for logistics support and narrative warfare. Keeping anti-India operations at a low boil is assessed to be more sustainable than spectacular attacks.
All these developments have heightened India’s security concerns. Bangladesh must realise that rhetoric and geopolitical reality rarely converge on the same page.
Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty | Former High Commissioner to Bangladesh and Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs
(Views are personal)