Wars are no longer fought only on land, at sea, or in the air. They are also fought in the invisible domain of information—where speed, precision and narrative shape outcomes even before a shot is fired. This has triggered a subtler, equally potent dimension: deterrence by information. A nation well-networked, agile in managing narratives, and proficient in handling information can create such a perception of dominance that adversaries hesitate to act.
The 1991 Gulf War was a revelation. The US stunned the world by fusing space-based intelligence, precision-guided munitions, real-time surveillance and live command networks into a seamless war machine. Iraqi forces were paralysed not only by physical destruction, but also by the overwhelming information superiority of the coalition forces. For the first time, ‘embedded journalism’ was relayed from the heart of the battlefield.
China was the keenest observer. It saw not just advanced weapons, but the systemic integration of sensors, shooters and decision-makers into a cohesive information grid. This was not a traditional war—it was warfare under informationised conditions. By 1993, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army enshrined this as a doctrine. By 2003, it progressed to the innovation of the ‘Three Warfares’—media, psychological and legal.
Media warfare meant controlling domestic and international narratives, influencing how conflicts were reported and shaping global perception of legitimacy. Chinese state media used these as strategic weapons. Psychological warfare was about sowing doubt, fear or hesitation in adversaries; while bolstering confidence of the allied audiences. Legal warfare created justifications for territorial claims and delegitimised adversary positions.
Crucially, China never saw these domains as separate from military power. Instead, as complementing the traditional force, and preparing the ground for kinetic operations. The effectiveness of China’s approach became visible during regional confrontations. In Doklam (2017), and more starkly during the Galwan standoff and broader Ladakh tensions in 2020, the PLA demonstrated tight control over strategic communication—a deliberate media blackout, carefully curated leaks, and a disciplined silence.
Pakistan, too, has long understood the role of information in conflict. As early as 1949, it established the Inter-Services Public Relations, recognising information as a weapon system. Over decades, ISPR has evolved into a formidable narrative machine, blending military messaging with media engagement and international outreach. In 2025, during Operation Sindoor, Pakistan attempted to showcase its narrative-management capabilities following the Chinese template.
Rivals, not necessarily adversaries, may employ information offensively when it suits their strategic purpose. The current downturn in India-US relations is a case in point. Donald Trump’s repeated claims that India is “profiteering” from discounted Russian oil, or that the Indian economy is “dead” are targeted messages intended to shape global perception and pressurise India. Trump’s advisor Peter Navarro even called the Ukraine conflict “Modi’s war”. More recently, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent dismissed the rupee’s potential as a reserve currency. The idea here is to create narratives that deter India’s strategic choices. It underlines that information dominance is not only a weapon of adversaries, but can be used by friends and partners, too.
For India, the challenge has been both doctrinal and structural. The Shimla Agreement of 1972, to which India adheres strictly, insists that the issue of J&K must be resolved bilaterally. In theory, this has moral strength. In practice, it has limited India’s ability to internationalise its narrative, while Pakistan has worked relentlessly to globalise its propaganda.
Pakistan has, for decades, flooded international forums, think tanks, media houses and diaspora networks with narratives of victimhood, delegitimising India’s position. Meanwhile, India’s engagement has often been cautious, episodic and reactive. This gap becomes glaring in moments of crisis, especially after terrorist attacks orchestrated by Pakistani state or proxy actors, when India’s counter-narratives lack prior institutional groundwork. The issue is one of reach. Without a scaffolding of sustained narrative presence, truth will struggle to compete with propaganda.
What then does ‘deterrence by information’ mean for India? It means transforming the way we view, prepare for and fight in the information domain. It requires embedding information as a core element of national security strategy, rather than as an afterthought. Always, the narrative must precede the event.
Our missions abroad must become informationised hubs. Diplomats cannot merely issue statements—they must be equipped with dedicated-communication specialists, real-time fact-checking cells and AI-driven engagement strategies. Each mission abroad should be capable of instantly countering Pakistani propaganda, proactively pushing India’s case. This is especially necessary in West Asia and India’s immediate neighbourhood.
Deterrence by information demands a whole-of-nation approach. Government, military, academia, media and the Indian diaspora must act in concert. Narratives are most effective when they echo across different channels, reinforcing each other. India must embrace technological leverage. AI, big data and digital monitoring tools can identify hostile narratives early, enabling rapid, credible responses. Strategic communication must be as technologically advanced as cyber warfare.
When adversaries recognise that their attempts at information dominance will not only be countered, but overwhelmed, hesitation sets in. When they see that our narrative dominance garners more international support, provocation will be considered with deep care. This is the essence of deterrence by information.
Information is not just an adjunct to warfare, but is a frontline. We may have delayed our understanding of this over the years due to lack of institutional realisation. It does not replace military power but amplifies it, ensuring that truth, credibility and narrative control serve as force multipliers.
India must reimagine its embassies, empower its institutions, and unify its voices to create a seamless information shield. No better way than by taking diverse domains on board, and adopting an institutional approach to information. Nations that command the narrative will, in future, command the battlefield itself. And deterrence will not belong to those with the biggest weapons, but to those who wield the most powerful information.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)