India-China | Why the glass brought back from Tianjin is half-full

After the success of Modi’s China visit comes the hard part of following up. Two consequential issues playing along are the border talks and the India-US poker game over tariffs.
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Surveying Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two-day visit to Tianjin, most China experts and ex-bureaucrats are sceptical whether an India-China rapprochement is possible. India’s ‘permanent establishment’, with its tunnel vision, is wary of China’s intentions. Like in Bertolt Brecht’s existential play Waiting for Godot, they would rather await Donald Trump’s arrival. Thus, it is largely left to the global audience to take note of the geopolitics of Modi’s visit.

If Modi travelled to China with hopes of rebuilding the India-China relations from ground zero, he returned home with a glass half-full. That is not because the visit and the meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping weren’t meticulously planned. On the contrary, highlevel discussions in New Delhi between top officials of the two countries had preceded the visit up to the eleventh hour.

First, the impact of the visit on bilateral cooperation. Xi told Modi that achieving a ‘dragon-elephant dance’ is the right choice for the two neighbouring countries. Modi argued that peace and tranquillity at the border are prerequisites for bilateral ties. While Xi flagged that the bilateral ties cannot be defined merely by the boundary issue, Modi added, and Xi agreed, that India and China are partners, not adversaries, and would have far more consensus than differences. Both agreed that differences should not turn into disputes.

Both India and China see the potential to leverage the external environment of tariff walls to build greater mutual understanding to advance commercial ties. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri stated at a media briefing that this is a discussion going on at many levels between the two governments, and businesses and entities that are involved in trade in the two countries, “and we will have to see how it evolves”.

China is very much interested in the expansion and deepening of business ties, and more importantly, is conscious of the role that the Indian and Chinese economies can play in stabilising world trade. Thus, Modi and Xi agreed, once again, that there is need to proceed from a political and strategic direction to reduce India’s trade deficit, facilitate bilateral trade and investment ties and inject transparency and predictability into business conditions.

Another significant outcome is to accelerate implementation of the understandings reached between the two countries’ special representatives at their 24th round of talks on the boundary held in New Delhi just a fortnight ago. There was understanding on the need to maintain peace on the border using the existing and new mechanisms, and to avoid disturbing the overall relationship.

Misri disclosed that an immediate follow-up can be expected in the coming days and weeks to flesh out the recent decisions of the special representatives with regard to setting up an expert group to “explore early harvest in boundary delimitation” in the border areas; setting up a working group “to advance effective border management”; creating general level mechanisms in the eastern and middle sectors; and discuss de-escalation.

Overall, there is no question that the meeting at Tianjin injected new momentum into the bilateral relations. Both leaders actively signalled cooperation. The involvement of Cai Qi, a senior politician in Xi’s inner circle for many years, is noteworthy.

The importance of being Cai Qi should be understood. He is the first-ranked member of the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), fifth-ranking member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and director of the CCP General Office—making him the de facto chief of staff to CCP General Secretary Xi. In his capacity as director of CCP’s General Office, Cai supervises the implementation of top-level decisions, internal and external alike.

The ministry of external affairs readout said that Modi “shared with Cai his vision for bilateral relations and sought his support to realise the vision of the two leaders”. According to Xinhua, Cai said China “is willing to work with India to enhance friendly exchanges and mutually beneficial cooperation, properly manage and resolve differences, and promote further improvement and development of China-India relations”.

Presumably, such robust political signalling and the new formulation that India and China are “development partners and not rivals” go to convey that Beijing and New Delhi are making strategic choices based on their own interests. However, the paradox remains that the cup is still only half-full. What will happen remains to be seen.

In the recent past, Global Times featured two commentaries on the “confrontational nature” of the Quad. The more recent one coinciding with the Xi-Modi meeting noted, “Regional countries should approach alliance relations with a more cautious and pragmatic mindset. A regional architecture based on strategic autonomy and win-win cooperation, rather than blindly following others, serves the interests of stakeholders better.”

The bottomline is that Beijing, like most world capitals, is awaiting the denouement that will inevitably appear to the US-Indian alienation. But the pantomime playing out at different levels involves multiple actors. The tidings from Tianjin, for instance, and the one-hour intense conversation on Sunday between Modi and Russian president Vladimir Putin inside the latter’s limousine—that is insulated from eavesdropping by spy agencies—hinted at an extraordinary Russian-Indian convergence. That said, the fate of Russian oil in the Indian market as such remains uncertain.

A day later, Anant Ambani, son of billionaire Mukesh Ambani, revealed in his first address at Reliance’s annual general meeting of shareholders that there is pressure in purchasing Russian oil. Make no mistake that when Washington criticises India for buying Russian oil, the implication is that it wants India to ‘pick a side’—the same logic behind drawing India into the Quad. And that goal is nothing more than to turn India into a pawn in Washington’s socalled Indo-Pacific Strategy. But Delhi is still confused whether such small political cliques align with its pursuit of full strategic autonomy.

The talks in Tianjin provide a rare window of opportunity for improving the China-India relationship. Challenges do remain, but the two countries’ willingness for pragmatic cooperation introduces a positive variable into global strategic balance. That beginning augurs well, but Modi needs to follow up.

M K Bhadrakumar | Former diplomat

(Views are personal)

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