The US military operation in Venezuela signals a shift in how American power is being exercised in an unsettled international environment. The action was tactically efficient, meticulously planned and executed with overwhelming superiority. Yet, strategic success cannot be assessed by an event’s immediate outcome alone. What matters equally is the precedent created, and the message it sends to allies, adversaries and the strained global order.
In the three decades following the Cold War, American power has often been exercised forcefully, but within differentiated political boundaries. While Washington showed little hesitation in intervening militarily in distant theatres such as West Asia, Af-Pak and parts of Africa, there remained a tacit caution about overt regime-targeting interventions in the western hemisphere and about actions that visibly disregarded alliance sensitivities.
Sovereign capitals were not immune to pressure, but direct enforcement in Latin America had largely receded as an instrument. The Venezuela operation disrupted this pattern. It demonstrated a readiness to cross political thresholds that many had come to regard as settled practice.
Operational success often carries its own dangers. When force delivers results quickly and at limited visible cost, it fosters the belief that similar tools can be applied elsewhere with comparable effect. Venezuela has already widened the speculative discourse in Washington, drawing attention towards Colombia, Cuba, Greenland and Iran. Each presents a distinct strategic context. Yet, all are viewed through the same lens—that decisive action can reshape unfavourable political realities.
This belief rests on the familiar fallacy that overwhelming technological superiority guarantees success. The US does enjoy a clear technological threshold—precision weapons, integrated intelligence networks, air dominance and electronic warfare—that can compress decision cycles and impose rapid control in the opening phases of conflict. Venezuela illustrated how such superiority can deliver swift operational advantage against weaker opponents.
Iran is often cited as the next test case, but the comparison is misleading. Unlike Venezuela, Iran is a deeply institutionalised state with layered power centres, regional proxies and a strong sense of civilisational identity. Any US-Israel intervention aimed at regime change would almost certainly trigger prolonged instability, internal fragmentation and regional escalation, rather than decisive political transformation. Tehran’s vulnerabilities are real, but externally-imposed solutions rarely translate into durable outcomes.
History offers consistent caution. Once a conflict moves beyond initial kinetic phases, human will, asymmetric adaptation, logistics and political endurance begin to dominate outcomes. Iraq and Afghanistan remain stark reminders that battlefield dominance does not translate automatically into durable political results. As low-cost disruptive technologies—drones, cyber tools and precision munitions—become widely accessible, even inferior actors can find ways to offset raw superiority. Iran represents an even greater escalation hazard, missile capability and nuclear thresholds that bear no resemblance to Venezuela.
A more enduring concern lies in the manner of decision-making. President Trump’s highly personalised, force-forward approach to national security introduces volatility that allies find difficult to manage. Power is not inherently destabilising; unpredictability is. Strategic partners can adapt to strength, but they struggle to hedge against abrupt shifts in tone and priorities. Greenland illustrates the risks of alliance rupture, where coercion would test Nato’s internal cohesion.
This volatility carries long-term implications. A future US administration less inclined towards coercive enforcement may inherit strained alliances, eroded trust and adversaries emboldened by the belief that American policy oscillates with electoral cycles rather than strategic consensus. What appears today as decisive leadership could tomorrow translate into diminished credibility and reduced diplomatic elbow room.
China and Russia interpret this moment differently. Beijing may see an opportunity in the US’s distraction. Reduced diplomatic bandwidth and episodic engagement make parts of Latin America more receptive to sustained Chinese involvement in infrastructure, energy and critical minerals. These are components of a long-term strategy that exploits inconsistency rather than confronting power directly.
Russia’s gains are more perceptual. Constrained by its own strategic overextensions, Moscow benefits from narratives portraying the US as arbitrary and destabilising. Each unilateral intervention complicates Western efforts to uphold a rules-based order, dilutes moral authority and introduces friction within alliances.
The Indo-Pacific sits uneasily within this picture. Official US commitments remain intact, but political attention and strategic capital are finite. A US increasingly absorbed by hemispheric enforcement and West Asian contingencies may find it harder to sustain the depth of engagement required to deter assertiveness in Asia. Even temporary distraction can create lasting openings.
Economic undercurrents add complexity. With the US economy showing signs of plateauing and discussions of de-dollarisation gaining traction, control over energy flows and resource access assumes sharper importance. Venezuela’s oil reserves are not merely regional assets; they are levers in a global contest marked by sanctions fatigue and shifting financial alignments.
Domestically, muscular displays of power carry political appeal. A narrative of restored American dominance resonates with key constituencies and could translate into electoral advantage for the Republicans in upcoming congressional contests. History, however, offers a sobering counterpoint. Overreach often matures into fatigue. Institutions may absorb short-term shocks, but they remember precedents long after personalities change.
Whether Venezuela marks a durable resurgence of American power or the beginning of a more volatile era will depend less on military capability and more on restraint, consistency and alliance management. The lesson is clear: coercive templates cannot be universally applied. Each strategic environment is unique, and misreading that complexity risks replacing one problem with several more dangerous ones.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)