When our representatives in the UN Security Council, Hardeep Puri and Manjeev Puri, step out of the Council chamber at the end of this month after completing our two-year term, they will be leaving a mixed legacy. Diplomats and analysts will take long to figure out a pattern in their diplomatic moves, speeches and votes. Many will be left bewildered by the complexity of the explanations they have given of the Indian position. While their diplomatic skills and charm were beyond question, India appeared to be hedging constantly, being unsure of the choices made from time to time.
When it comes to the United Nations, many Indians have illusions of grandeur about its place in the world and India’s role in it. We idolise it and imagine that we are its architects, its guides and guardians. We do not use it as major powers do, as an instrument of our foreign policy or as smaller countries do, as a symbol of our equality with other nations and a guarantee for our sovereignty. For us, the UN is the embodiment of our international aspirations and a catalyst of our economic development. This unshakeable faith in the UN prompts us to make permanent membership of the Security Council the Holy Grail of Indian diplomacy and to rejoice every time we are elected as a non-permanent member.
Two years ago, when we were elected with a large majority, a foregone conclusion after we received the endorsement of the Asian Group, much was made of the huge number of votes we secured, without an opponent. Some even declared that this would be the beginning of our permanent membership and we would not need to go out again. As we leave the Security Council, we are no nearer to permanent membership than before. If anything, we have aroused the suspicion that India would occasionally regress into nonaligned rhetoric, rather than engage in realpolitik, making it hard for the Security Council to reach agreement on international peace and security issues.
India has, however, reason to be gratified that we have tackled the many issues that came up before the Council adroitly and in the best interests of the country. The constraints were obvious, as India was torn between its fierce attachment to strategic autonomy and its desire to prove worthy of permanent membership. On the one hand, India had to keep an eye on ruffling the least number of feathers and, on the other hand, demonstrating our independence of judgment and action. Ours was an unusual diplomatic dance in the council for two years. In the process, we also discovered the perils of permanent membership without veto. We now know that repeating our performance year after year, without the power of veto, will be a drain on our resources and energy without matching benefits.
The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) was the dominant theme in the Security Council during our term and it was put to the test repeatedly in different circumstances. We insisted on certain objective criteria to be applied to determine the desirability and feasibility of intervention. But even when criteria, such as regional consensus and inability of the authorities concerned to prevent bloodshed were fulfilled, we stopped short of endorsing use of force. Having supported the sanctions resolution against Libya earlier, our abstention on the resolution, authorising “all possible measures” appeared illogical. Moreover, India recognised the rebel Government in Tripoli. With our own ambiguous approach to this concept, India was accused of being meek, lazy and fearful, depending on the vote we cast and the explanation we gave in each case.
At the UN, India has always endeavoured to contribute to the common good, rather than seek advantage for itself. At the same time, we have not hesitated to stand alone on certain issues if they militate against our fundamental positions. We entered reservations on the Council Declaration at the summit level on non-proliferation in 1991 and did not support the humanitarian intervention move in Iraq. Now that the intervention in Libya turned out to be nothing more than a regime change exercise, our position was vindicated.
On Syria also, India seemed to be buffeted by contradictory considerations of principle and pragmatism. In July 2012, India voted in favour of a resolution, which was vetoed by Russia and China. If it were passed, the resolution would have led to external intervention, which we did not favour. The explanation was that India was merely supporting the Kofi Annan Plan for Syria. In August, however, India abstained in the General Assembly resolution, which demanded that Assad should step down. In several cases, India did not follow the lead of the Arab League as we used to do in the past.
India’s actions outside the Security Council were also seen as supportive of its efforts within the Council. An India-Pakistan drama was staged in New York in the early days of our term. Hardeep Puri struck up an equation with his Pakistani counterpart and much bonhomie was generated. Former Foreign Secretary Mani Dixit had once instructed that the reality of India-Pakistan relations should not be camouflaged at the UN through personal friendship between diplomats. The exchanges in the latest session of the UN General Assembly showed that no amount of personal equation could blunt Pakistani animosity towards India. As Prabhakar Menon observed recently, successive Prime Ministers of India (Narasimha Rao, I.K. Gujral and Manmohan Singh) have “recognised that neither charm nor reason, let alone linguistic elegance, could undo decades of mistrust, wariness and antipathy.”
Our vote in the Human Rights Council on Sri Lanka reflected our helplessness over President Rajapakse’s handling of the Tamil situation in his country. For India, having to resort to a vote in the Human Rights Council was a sad commentary on our standing in our neighbourhood. We may have had internal compulsions to demonstrate our support to the Tamils, but we could have been more effective with direct carrot and stick action.
India was frustrated over lack of progress in expanding the Council. But Puri should seek comfort in succeeding to navigate the world, steering clear of icebergs and whirlpools.
T P Sreenivasan is a former ambassador of India and governor for India of the IAEA.
E-mail: tpsreenivasan@gmail.com