Disagreements and grievances between traditional partners should not be allowed to fester, just as good relations should not stagnate. The way out is constant dialogue. India and Russia seem to be engaged. However, the relationship is not trouble free. The postponement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trip to India shows that each point of friction needs to be analysed as to how this impact this very special relations and broader international politics.
The starting point of Indian-Russian bilateralism is embedded in the politics of empathy built over the years. Whether it is India’s external or internal security, global aspirations, weaknesses in domestic politics, Russia has supported the Indian position. India has similarly not been judgmental on Russia’s ideological, political and economic transitions and borne the impacts of each of these phases. This enables the two ride over the more stormy aspects and periods of the relationship.
Defence imports dominate Indo-Russian ties. The repeated time delays in the delivery of the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, renamed INS Vikramaditya, is of concern to India. Not only have the cost more than doubled to nearly $2.9 billion but Indian strategists are also raising doubts if they will get the most modernised technology that they have a fix for. Similarly, questions about the safety of the MiGs and the value of other Russian military equipment are being raised.
Russia is worried if it will retain its place as the biggest supplier of military hardware because India is diversifying and new competitors like the United States and Israel are more than eager to enter this market, India has plans to spend billions of dollars every year for the next 10 years on modernising its military. Between 2007 and 2011 Russia supplied India military equipment worth $10.6 billion of the total $12.65 billion that India spent. Russia wants to maintain this. India, on the other hand, needs to have a strategic review and accountability audit of this huge defence expenditure and match it with social expenditures.
Russia and India signed the deal for the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) in 1988, but the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident and the real concerns on nuclear safety have changed equations. India has passed a nuclear liability Bill. The next phases of the KKNPP face severe opposition from local people and activists, and strictures from the courts on safety issues. This means that the Russians have to give additional assurances and factor in a satisfactory liability clause. This again leads to price escalations. The recent talks between deputy prime minister Rozagin and external affairs minister S M Krishna indicate the negotiations are on, but remain inconclusive and President Vladimir Putin’s visit will be on hold for a while. Meanwhile, India will have to consider if the extra billions are worth the risks for such nuclear energy, especially when countries like Germany, Japan and others are considering closing down their nuclear plants, especially in the context of the Fukushima disaster.
Similarly, Russia’s investment by state-owned Sistema of $3.1 billion in the Systema Shyam Tele Services Company licence was cancelled along with 122 other companies as part of the 2G scam, as the Indian Supreme Court ordered that these licences be auctioned. Russia has complained that India has changed the rules of the game midway and that this is a setback for investment. However, Russia should be prepared for these consequences as the rule of law should apply equally to capital as it does for labour.
Trade between the two reaching only to about $10 billion currently is much below par despite the efforts of both governments and business chambers and the regular meetings of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission to achieve a target of $20 billion by 2015. However, much will depend on de-bureaucratisation, balanced with transparency and accountability.
India and Russia’s greatest strengths lie in the several points of commonality in geopolitics. Both interpret the world as multi-polar and would like to strengthen this construction because it gives them the opportunity to influence international economic and political decisions in their favour. In this context Russia’s developing relations with Pakistan is a positive development. Russia’s interest in Pakistan is its role in Afghanistan, as the United States withdraws in the face of a stalemate and Pakistan continues to influence and use the Taliban. Russia’s interest is in its influence in Central Asia and the Caucuses. Instability and terrorism in Afghanistan spills over, as does the illegal trafficking and drug trade. Russia and India both have to be part of the regional solution without which a stable Afghanistan is not possible. India should thus welcome any further leverage that Russia can exert over Pakistan.
Russia understands that India’s relations with the US would not destabilise its relations and that India is committed to an independent foreign policy. It is much like Russia’s multi-vector policy where it engages with multiple partners. India and Russia continue to need and depend on each other in multilateral forums like the G20, the BRICS (a consortium of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and leverage with countries like China. Russia is putting forward India’s claims in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). They have similar approaches to regions of conflict like West Asia.
Points of friction can be negotiated for mutual interest and thus both countries need to ensure that the postponed meeting between the two heads of state be held soon. The traditional and historic relations between India and Russia have some hiccups, but these are not insurmountable. Both countries need each other closely in a globalised world.
Anuradha Mitra Chenoy is professor at the School of
International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
E-mail: chenoy@gmail.com