Aim at Self-sufficiency in Defence
President Obama’s Republic Day visit is making news for two reasons; one, that it is a coup of sorts to get a US president to be the chief guest on the 26 January parade and secondly, it appears that the visit would be used to seal an Indo-US defence agreement on trade and technology.
India and the US had signed the New Framework for US-India Defence Relationship in 2005 but there is little to show in terms of setting up of new industry other than purchase of costly hardware, prominent among them being the C17 and C-130 for the IAF and Boeing P-8I for the Navy. However, there was no transfer or joint development of high-end technology between the two countries; in fact, if press reports are to be believed, the Americans lost the Army’s `3200 crore Javelin anti-tank guided missile contract for refusal to offer the missile for trials and to transfer technology that had been asked for in the Request For Proposal. Will things pan out differently after this Obama visit?
Before this question is answered, it is time for a reality check of the source of major hardware that equips our armed forces. Broadly speaking, most offensive equipment is of Russian origin while the American hardware that has come in is defensive and for combat support operations, which are also vital for war fighting. Barring the 40 Mirages and the Jaguars, the IAF fighter fleet is based on MiG variants and the Sukhoi 30. All tanks and major artillery systems (except Bofors) in the Army are from Russia and so are the Armoured Personnel Carriers. The frontline ships, aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, stealth ships and submarines (including the on-lease nuclear powered INS Chakra) are from Russia, too. On the other hand, combat support assets are now predominantly American viz., the C-17 and C-130 for the IAF and the P-8I for the Navy; Chinook helicopters and more C-130s and possibly C-17s will follow for the IAF and some helicopters for the Navy are in the offing. Has any cutting edge technology been transferred through the huge offsets associated with these high-value contracts is a moot point, but what is for sure is that it would be sheer naivety on India’s part to believe that any country would transfer top of the line knowhow to another nation, no matter what the price offered. And the renewed push that may be imparted to the 2012 Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) during the Obama visit may be no different in terms of transfer of cutting edge technology.
Where does India’s capability to attain indigenous manufacturing capability in the defence sector stand at present? The reality is that even if all the clearances and approvals were to fall in place today, it would still be another decade before this would start taking shape; till then we would have to import and use the interregnum to parallelly set up our own home-grown R&D. Problems would occur if too much faith is placed on the US with the hope that the DTTI would be the panacea for acquiring high-end technology. Frankly, we may be already stepping into the dangerous zone of import dependence, this time on the Americans as was the case with the Russians hitherto.
So what is the way out? One only has to look back to the 1960s and 70s when the sanctions affected countries of South Africa and Israel were forced to innovate to produce armament for their security; now they are arms exporters. Israel has a perennial shortage of water, but is now exporting water technology, including to India. One does not have to go offshore but look at our own country’s indigenous achievements in the nuclear munitions field and in the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, where no foreign help was forthcoming—in fact, a sanctions regime was in place post-Pokhran. And then there is ISRO which has carved a niche in space exploration and is now launching foreign satellites at a fraction of the costs the others charge. All these examples signify the validity of the proverbial necessity being the mother of invention. Much as the American offer of sharing technology is welcome, it is a double-edged sword—the reverse edge being the “manufacture under licence” trap. Caution is the keyword, and needs to be exercised so that India does not fall prey to the easy temptation of going back to the safety cocoon of insufficient or obsolescent technology transfer followed by licence manufacture under the misleading tag of joint production.
What about joint development? In true joint development, both parties have equal rights to the expertise generated and the IPR is common property of both nations. India would gain immensely in such a situation, but we have the ongoing controversy of the Russians not allowing us the 30 per cent joint development in the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) after signing to such a course of action; if this were to continue, India would be bereft of new technology that the FGFA project would generate. And one needs to be careful of being hood-winked by another seductive term “work-share” which is what guides the Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM) and MRSAM multi-billion dollar project with Israel. Work-share means non-involvement in each other’s work, with the IPR of one’s task resting with each party; in the event, no technology developed by the Israelis for the front half of the missile would be shared and, having put in our millions, we would be none the wiser vis-à-vis the critical technology of the seeker head, radar, tracking system et al developed by Israel.
The visit of president Obama and the defence related agreements that may be signed are welcome steps towards greater interaction between the two countries, if it leads to true joint technology development or the transfer of “know-why” and not just “know-how”. We must not forget that the arms bazaar is as cruel and selfish as it gets. The writing is on the wall; India has to develop its own critical technologies—in plainspeak, DRDO has to deliver and live up to its charter of developing technology (and not buying it) and making India self-sufficient in defence equipment.