The US Congressional Research Service Report of May 14, 2015, entitled “Pakistan-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 114th Congress” provides an accurate evaluation of the ties between the two countries as well as an insight into the situation in Pakistan. Additionally, it poses a series of questions to Congress which could have implications for the evolution of US policy towards Pakistan.
The report acknowledges that after more than a decade of US sanctions 9/11 transformed Pakistan-US relations “virtually overnight”, with the former becoming a “key ally” of the latter “to combat Islamist militancy and extremism”.
As a consequence, Pakistan has been amongst the leading recipients of US foreign assistance following 9/11, with the US Congress appropriating more than $18 billion in such assistance for the FY2002-FY2015 period, including $10.5 billion in economic, development, and humanitarian aid, and over $7.6 billion in security related aid. In addition, Pakistan received about $13 billion in Coalition Support Fund (CSF) payments to reimburse the country for its logistical and operational support of US-led military operations in Afghanistan.
The hiccup in Pakistan-US relations beginning with the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden was relatively short-lived. Re-engagement commenced in 2013 and following Raheel Sharif’s November 2014 visit to the USA and the January 2015 US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue Session in Islamabad ties between the two countries have been restored to an even keel. For fiscal 2016, the US administration has sought $794 million as aid for Pakistan.
It is also significant that though, as per US legislation, much of the assistance to Pakistan post-FY2009 was contingent on the latter’s delivery on non-proliferation, terrorism and democracy-related issues, these conditionalities were waived.
The report indicates that the returns on the vast amounts of US military and economic assistance provided to Pakistan have been meagre. On terrorism, the report bluntly mentions that several of the most wanted enemies of the US such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and Sirajuddin Haqqani still reside in Pakistan and that the latter’s military continues to distinguish between “bad” and “good militants”. It is also sceptical about the success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. While the operation disrupted and displaced the Haqqani group, lasting success is only possible if their return is prevented.
On Pakistan’s role in the Afghan insurgency, the report does not fight shy of clearly asserting that the former provides sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban in Quetta and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In this context, it quotes the most recent biannual Pentagon report to Congress in the following terms: “Afghan-and Indian-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistan territory to the detriment of Afghan and regional stability. Pakistan uses these proxy forces to hedge against the loss of influence in Afghanistan and to counter India’s superior military. These relationships run counter to Pakistan’s public commitment to support Afghan-led reconciliation.”
On proliferation, while the report suggests nuclear security in Pakistan is much improved in recent years it expresses concern that its nuclear technologies remain prone to “unauthorised leakage”. It also refers to the possibility that parts of the AQ Khan network may still be active. Finally, it expresses disquiet at the energetic development of short-range nuclear armed missiles by Pakistan.
Finally, the report is scathing in its comments on the Pakistan’s economy and the human rights situation. On the former, it states that the rate of growth has been in general decline since 2005, severe power and water shortages are endemic, corruption is widespread, repayment of nearly $18 billion in International Monetary Fund loans places huge constraints on Islamabad’s federal budget, which is burdened by perpetually low revenue generation. Tax collection is a serious issue in the economy; only about 1% of Pakistanis pay taxes and the country has one of the lowest tax to GDP ratios in the world. As to human rights, the report states that “Pakistan is the setting for numerous reported human rights abuses, some of them perpetrated and/or sanctioned by the state itself”. The most serious of these in 2013 were extrajudicial and targeted killings, sectarian violence, disappearances, and torture.
Pakistan’s brazen pocketing of US assistance in more or less complete disregard of the latter’s concerns on issues like terrorism, proliferation, governance, human rights, etc. has belatedly led some to call for reduction, if not termination of such assistance. For instance, Christine Fair, a noted US expert on South Asia, states that given the fungibility of funds, the provision of US aid is tantamount to subsidising Pakistan’s investment in its jihadi and nuclear capabilities. She argues the US must adopt a new policy towards Pakistan that embraces containment and punitive actions unless the latter shuts down the infrastructure of terror created by it. In much the same vein Congressman Ted Poe introduced a bill in 2012 seeking removal of “treacherous” Islamabad’s status as a major non-NATO ally. As recently as February 15, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce wrote to secretary of state Kerry: “The United States should pursue a different approach with the Pakistani Government. We urge you to consider implementing travel restrictions, suspending portions of assistance, and sanctioning Pakistani officials that maintain relationships with designated terrorist groups. Such an approach would make clear that the U.S. and Pakistan cannot have a true strategic partnership until Pakistan cuts all ties with terrorist organisations and renounces its use as an instrument of state policy.”
In the light of the foregoing the report poses several questions to the next session of Congress, the answers to which would shape US policy. Some of the more significant questions are: What should be the levels of US assistance to Pakistan and the proportion between military and economic assistance? Should conditionalities continue to be imposed and if so, do waivers serve national security interests?
Should Coalition Support Funds continue to be provided at a time most international forces are out of Afghanistan?
Do indications and suspicions persist that Pakistan is playing a “double game” with the US by maintaining friendly links with Afghan insurgent and anti-India militant groups? If so, what Congressional actions would best address this?
Is Pakistan making effective efforts to curb religious militancy? What Congressional efforts can bolster such efforts?
Is Pakistan playing a sufficiently positive role in Afghanistan?
Is Pakistan’s civilian government an effective US ally? What Congressional actions might strengthen the process of democratisation?
The writer is a former Deputy National Security Adviser, Government of India.
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