Synergise for Security

At a conclave organised by a leading news channel in New Delhi last week, India’s comparatively new albeit proactive defence minister, Manohar Parrikar, said that he would be sending his recommendations shortly regarding the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff/Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CDS/COSC) to the government for its final decision. That the creation of this post has been extensively debated yet inordinately delayed brooks no repetition. Reasons given by successive Indian governments, of differing political hues, have been lack of political consensus within the country and differences in professional acceptability of the institution among the three services themselves. It is but natural that these governments have never acknowledged the major reason, namely of bureaucratic machinations which fears—for reasons only known to themselves—the creation of the vitally required CDS. Thus, for years, strategic wisdom has been kept on the backburner by those in power in India.

Noted American scholar George Tanham had pithily observed, way back in 1992, in his seminal work on Indian strategic thought that “Indian elites show little evidence of having thought coherently and systematically about strategy… strategic innovation will not come from within the traditional governmental bureaucracy”. In the Kargil Sector in 1999 when the nation was strategically and tactically surprised, glaring deficiencies in our higher command structure, intelligence and the lack of synergy between not only the services but amongst various apex organs of the state was more than apparent.

The then NDA government had wisely constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) under former defence secretary, the widely respected K Subrahmanyam, to go into the entire gamut of the nation’s failure symbolised by Kargil. Subsequently, after the submission of the KRC report in 2000, the Group of Ministers (GoM) directed a task force led by Arun Singh to analyse the functioning of the higher defence organisation and suggest measures for its improvement. Among the major recommendations of this task force, subsequently accepted by the GOI, was the creation of the post of the CDS supported by a tri-Services joint planning staff. While the latter in the form of was created the Integrated Defence Staff, nothing came about of the establishment of the CDS. However, the then government must be commended for implementing other recommendations of the KRC and GoM reports regarding accretions to our defence set-up, namely the Defence Intelligence Agency and the NTRO.

As regards the creation of the CDS, it is more than imperative for the nation to know the scathing remarks of the KRC and GoM recommendations in 2000-01. The GoM report had observed: “the functioning of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) has, to date, revealed serious weaknesses in its ability to provide single point military advice to the government, and resolve substantive inter-service doctrinal planning, policy and operational issues adequately. This institution needs to be appropriately revamped to discharge its responsibilities efficiently and effectively, including the facilitation of ‘jointness’ and synergy among the Defence Services”. It further recommended that “the CDS is required to be established… to provide single point advice to the Government to administer the strategic forces, to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra and inter-Services prioritization, to ensure the required ‘jointness’ in the Armed Forces.” That says it all!

In mid-2011, with 10 years having elapsed after the Kargil conflict, the UPA-II government, in a surprise decision, suo moto, directed the convening of another committee under the chairmanship of former senior bureaucrat Naresh Chandra to review national security challenges and recommend measures to improve the overall security preparedness. Among many recommendations the committee made, it importantly suggested the creation of a permanent 4-star Chairman COSC instead of the CDS—thus recommending a watered down and relatively toothless appointment for the helmsman of the Indian Armed Forces. Were there any bureaucratic ploys in such a recommendation?

The Modi government, now finally considering what would be desirable at the apex level for the three Services, should deliberate using its own wisdom without getting swayed by the all-powerful Indian bureaucracy. The only imperative needing consideration is to which structure at the apex levels lends itself for the combined might of the armed forces to be optimally and cost-effectively utilised in the pursuit of national goals—all other reasons are extraneous to the sacred mission of India’s strategic objectives.

Strategic security challenges to the nation embrace the entire spectrum of conflict. India has to be prepared to thwart threats originating from conventional warfare in land, sea and air domains as also from asymmetric warfare, terrorism and insurgencies, nuclear, space, cyber and emerging newer non-traditional threats. The armed forces have also to streamline procedures for billion-dollar purchases in defence procurement, R&D, technology upgrades and as and when called upon, to handle effectively internal security situations. All of these require a coordinated synergetic approach at the apex level of decision-making of the armed forces. This is a serious lacunae existing as of today.

Success in wars will primarily accrue from the planning and formulation of a joint military strategy emerging from a well-conceived National Strategy and, importantly, actions embellished by integrated and joint action. During crises requiring more than one service’s commitment and particularly in the nuclear dimension, possible inter-services operational differences will require the strategic leadership of a 5-star CDS who then administers non-partisan single-point advice to the government. Churchill’s observation that “committees cannot fight wars” is relevant today. It is high time the GoI bites the bullet and establishes the institution of the CDS. As regards other connected aspects of theatre commands and establishment of newer tri-service commands, it could be a calibrated approach for the overall thrust and re-structuring of our Higher Defence Management should be evolutionary and not revolutionary.

The writer was the first Chief of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency and Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff. Email: kamal.davar8@gmail.com