The stormy media debate on the so- called Ishrat Jahan case has raised questions like—how good was the working of our national intelligence agencies? What was the legitimacy of the response of the action-takers to the information on a prime threat like terrorism catered by these agencies? And whether the national security paradigm was kept above compulsions of domestic politics in this case? A clinical analysis of the first two may help throw light on the third.
In India, since Independence, Intelligence Bureau (IB) has insisted on bringing only the best available officers on its rolls—who were willing to opt for a career in anonymity by choice. The agency, while working under the political executive, performed the sovereign function of taking a judgment call on what constituted a threat to national security and initiating its coverage. Finally, it has followed the unaltered tradition of giving out only ‘reliable and confirmed’ information to the consumers of intelligence. It is this combination of professional parameters that kept national security above politics.
In the Indian scheme of things, there is a clear divide between the turf of ‘intelligence production’ and the sphere of carrying out ‘action’ on information. Information collection often involves ‘covert’—though authorised—means, but ‘action’ against any suspects falls within the open domain of police. Not all intelligence qualifies as ‘evidence’—often it has to be developed further to secure grounds for ‘action’. No piece of intelligence can be disregarded on the plea that it was not ‘actionable’ or not admissible as ‘evidence’. Intelligence on a threat like cross-border terrorism does not stand diminished just because ‘action’ on it had been legally questioned.
Security by definition is protection against ‘covert’ threats. Information on the moves of an ‘invisible’ adversary can be unearthed only by an incessant effort by the professionals trained in intelligence-gathering skills. That is why all nations invest heavily on their intelligence agencies. Intelligence often comes in bits and pieces, none of which can be cast aside or underrated. In a case where the sourcing of information itself becomes public, it has to be left to the judicial authority to decide upon its evidentiary value.
In the Ishrat Jahan case, the public perception is that the government of the day ran down intelligence on terrorists, coming in from its own agencies, which is strange. The story of the two affidavits, it is said, indicates this. For some time now the threat of terrorism has been allowed to get enmeshed in communal issues and, in turn, in domestic politics. The election campaign of 2014 brought this out. Judicial scrutiny of the case must establish clarity on this entire episode as soon as possible so that the fundamentals of how our national security set-up functions are restored.
The Ishrat Jahan case is an indicator of the complexity of internal security situation in India associated with cross-border terrorism and the challenges facing its handlers. Over the years, the ISI-controlled outfits such as LeT and HuM have been able to raise significant number of collaborators in India through such militant bodies as SIMI and IM. Counter-terrorism operations have to deal with the communal repercussions of a problem that is rooted in the deliberate exploitation of faith- based motivations. The cause of national security demands that a serious threat like terrorism is not allowed to be caught in the web of identity politics.
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Pathak is former director, Intelligence Bureau