There was a sickening sense of déja-vu as one witnessed the violence perpetrated by Dera Sacha Sauda followers in Haryana and in neighbouring Punjab after the conviction of the dera chief. It showed once again the abject failure of the state government in taking firm pre-emptive action despite telltale signs of impending trouble and the judiciary’s firm directive to act, reminding us of violent drama that was played out three years back after the arrest of another ‘Guru’ Rampal, the Satlok Ashram head.
The mayhem has drawn attention once again to the growing clout of deras in the greater Punjab-Haryana region. The state government in this case with all the forces at its command and armed with judicial directive to use them if needed, seemed to be most reluctant to take firm action against the dera followers who had assembled unlawfully in Panchkula with criminal intent to indulge in violence.
The gory incidents besides highlighting the colossal administrative failure and the lack of political will, raises pertinent questions related to the growing dera phenomena in the region.
How to explain the rise of the deras/devisthans and the gurus/sants/babas? Why do such a large number of people become attached to these ‘alternative’ socio-religious/spiritual spaces, which seem to be taking the places of temples and gurdwaras? Also, why do majority of the dera followers belong to the socially and economically marginal classes? And, as is evident from the studied silence of the active political class in the region, why do politicians of all hues seem to be in awe of these deras and why do they keep flocking to the deras all the time?
Most of the followers of the non-Sikh deras like Dera Beas and Dera Sacha Sauda as well as the Dalit dera like Dera Sachkhand Ballan belong to the numerically strong lower castes. Scheduled castes alone constitute 19 and 32 per cent of population in Haryana and Punjab. What apparently appeals to the marginal castes is that the deras emphasise on ending caste-based discrimination and advocate an egalitarian philosophy.
Some deras invoke scriptures like those of Kabir, Namdev and Ravidass, the Dalit icons, and exhort followers to shun liquor, drugs and to protect the environment. In the region inhabited in the past by gurus and sants, these ‘modern’ techno-savvy babas succeed in projecting themselves as the messengers of god or the living medium accessible to them with the help of whom their followers can achieve salvation.
They also project themselves as being divinely endowed with miraculous power of healing and bestowing fortunes or good luck upon their followers. Many of these resourceful deras whose income come from donations or occasional grants from the government, malls, shops and huge lands also earn general goodwill and legitimacy by running charities, educational institutions, hospitals and planting trees.
The role of deras in influencing the electoral choices of their followers is not only recognised but also apparently encouraged by almost all parties, including the ‘panthic’ parties like Akali Dal. The wooing of deras can be attributed to the fact that the traditional social basis of political power in the two states has remained unaltered.
The dera clout is directly connected to the unwillingness of the elite castes in the political leadership to share political power with the marginal social groups, yet compelled to seek their crucial support in the region known for high levels of electoral participation and contestation. The elite caste politicians prefer taking recourse to the ‘softer’ option of cultivating and patronising the dera chiefs to ‘deliver’ en bloc the crucial lower caste/classes votes.
Thus in the absence of any significant democratic assertion from the marginalised, it is the identity politics through the ‘dera route’ that is routinely played out in a lopsided polity. As terrains for mobilisation and recruitment of the marginalised, deras have thus functioned into a manner that facilitates rather than challenge the continued dominance of elite castes. Such a dera-led ‘vote bank’ politics in fact is very much in line with the populist/patrimonial mode of politics based on direct ‘patronage’ and ‘protection’ being in vogue in the region.
Dera Sacha Sauda is arguably the most influential among the deras in the region and has followers also in neighbouring Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The dera has a political affairs wing, which is approached by the political parties at the time of every election. They supported the BJP in Haryana in 2014 and the Akali Dal-BJP combine in Punjab in 2017 elections. The dera earlier had extended its support to the Congress in Punjab in 2007 Assembly polls helping the party to gain in the Malwa region despite losing the elections in the state.
Political marriages also cement the nexus between the dera chiefs and the politicians. Congress leader Harminder Jassi, a former MLA, is a close relative of Dera Sacha Sauda chief. Bikram Singh Majithia, a prominent leader of ‘panthic’ Akali Dal and related to Badal family, is married to a close relative of the Dera Beas head.
In the face of mounting criticism, would political parties and their leadership shun their proclivity to take the ‘dera route’ to subaltern votes rather than addressing the substantive issues related to the marginalised in the region? Would these mushrooming deras ever be able to emerge as alternative spaces for social reforms or cultural assertion by sticking to the teachings of Sikhism, Bhakti and Sufi traditions that they claim to preach? As of now these dubious deras and their godmen seem most likely to continue flourishing with the tacit support and protection of vote-seeking and self-serving political class.
Ashutosh Kumar
Professor, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh
Email: ashutosh_chd@hotmail.com