Rebutting claims about ordnance board

The author superficially mentions accidents and is quick to lay the blame on the OFB.
Representational image. (File photo | EPS)
Representational image. (File photo | EPS)

The polemic by Lieutenant General P R Shankar (Retd.) titled Why corporatisation of the ordnance board is a must (Aug 11) makes sweeping statements. The assertion by the former director general of Artillery that almost everyone in the Armed Forces wanted privatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board on a PPP model is not true as is his statement that there is absolute clarity that the OFB is beset with major problems. His “clarity” is shared by only a few.

His allegations of a ‘China hand’ in the proposed workers’ strike is defamatory; the workers of the ordnance factories have always given their utmost during times of war and even now have placed their view on record that they would defer their plans in national interest if the circumstances so demand.
Let us address the claim of poor quality of ammunition raised by the author. A system of early user exploitation of random samples from each manufactured lot of ammunition, introduced in December 2013, has shown a satisfaction level matching international standards. Repeat orders for the export of ammunition, supplied under self-certification, are testimony to the quality of ammunition manufactured by the ordnance factories. It is surprising that the author, who is a former director general of Artillery, is unaware of these facts.

The author superficially mentions accidents and is quick to lay the blame on the OFB. Accidents are complex phenomena attributable to a number of causes such as weapon design, maintenance and storage of ammunition. Of the Defect Investigations completed by CQA(A) in five years, the cause was attributable to failure of ammunition in only 26% of the cases and in more than 11% of them, the ammunition had already outlived its original shelf life. As per information available during the period 2010-2019, more than 100 accidents have taken place with imported ammunition as well as those purchased from private companies. On a percentage basis, the defects in ammunition imported or sourced from private industry is much higher.

The author also claims that the ammunition manufactured by the OFB has “lower-than-specified shelf lives”. “Shelf life” depends on design parameters and conditions of storage. Storage is the responsibility of the Armed Forces in their depots. The assessment of shelf life is done by the designated agency and is not always determined by objective studies, or based on the documents or the declaration of OEMs. There have been instances where the same ammunition has been assigned more than one shelf life by the agency. A committee was formed to systematise this process based on standards and scientific methods and has since submitted its report, which emphasises that shelf life is equally dependant on the storage conditions.

Over the years, steps to improve productivity and quality, and strategic make-or-buy decisions have led to improved cost competitiveness for OFB products. A comparison of the issue prices of products supplied to the Armed Forces in 2018-19 and 2019-20 reveals a reduction of around 4%, 2% and 6% for the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively.

The gains in quality, cost competitiveness, increasing exports, an overall indigenous content of 90% and 97% in ammunition, the twin successes of the 155x45 artillery guns, “Dhanush” and “Sharang”, and the fact that currently 25% of the revenues of the ordnance factories come from products of in-house indigenous R&D can hardly be the attributes of an organisation with “a poor work culture” as alleged.

The author conveniently glosses over some of the major reasons for delay. Supplies are related to the availability of clear indication of requirements. Since 2009, a system of Roll on Indent for five years has been put in place where the annual requirements are indicated, though they are firmed up only when the budget is available about six months prior to the commencement of the financial year.

The first five-year Roll on Indent was received after its first year had run its course. The second Roll on Indent (2014-19) saw a drastic reduction in targets vis-a-vis Roll on Indents/Targets leading to large-scale disruption in supply chain management. The third Roll on Indent (2019-2024) is also beset with similar problems. In such circumstances, there are bound to be disruptions and delays in supplies as no plan, however flexible, can cater for such scenarios. It would, therefore, be appropriate to understand the reasons for delays in their totality instead of apportioning the blame on OFB alone.

While it is undeniable that the country and the tempo of economic activities and the nature of the accompanying policies continue to evolve as India takes her rightful place in the world, one should avoid an adamantine certitude that brooks no intervention from other voices.

Gagan Chaturvedi

Deputy Director General, Corporate Communications, Ordnance Factory Board

(gaganchaturvedi.ofb@ofb.gov.in)

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