On 5 August 2019, the Indian government took two momentous decisions. The long-standing Constitutional provisions providing exclusivity to the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) within the Union of India were diluted and the state was divided into two administrative units as Union Territories (UTs) of J&K and Ladakh. The decisions were expected to produce considerable turbulence in J&K, but precautions taken well in time prevented that. A proactive diplomatic campaign succeeded in neutralising Pakistan’s attempts to internationalise the issue. Its narratives allege that India’s unilateral decisions to fully integrate J&K are illegal in light of the UN Resolutions of 1948. It continues to follow this line and is unlikely to accept the new status quo.
On the first anniversary of the bold decisions, J&K is largely quiet, stable and progressively improving in governance. The socio-economic environment has had a raft of measures undertaken by the Central and UT governments. Although there can never be a reversal of the decision, nothing should be taken for granted; lasting peace and tranquility requires more than just peripheral stability. After all, 30 years of sponsored instability has certain roots that cannot be removed in a year. India’s geostrategic location, the neighbourhood it exists in, its demographic divide and, more than anything else, the strategic confidence it has undoubtedly gained through these decisions, all open up a Pandora’s box of threats. An assessment of these in the strategic and, to an extent, operational domain is thus necessary.
At the time when the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was under review in 2011, I had asked a question of those who were hankering for its removal. I inquired whether the removal was being sought on the grounds that Pakistan had withdrawn its claims to J&K, the 42 terror bases in PoK had been dismantled, the attempts at infiltration had stopped and the over ground worker (OGW) networks had all been neutralised. Since none could allude to anything positive on this, I expressed my reservations on any review of AFSPA because a bounce back by inimical elements was inevitable given the existence of all the enablers that existed with the proxy campaign.
The situation is similar today, except that there has been a strong political initiative. Every step will be taken by those opposed to it to ensure that India does not succeed in converting the initiative into fully integrating J&K with India. Many of the assets that the adversaries had in support remain in place, awaiting rekindling with the larger understanding that J&K is all about three-year cycles of the positive and the negative.
The deep divide between the Jammu and Kashmir regions and the longstanding trust deficit facilitates anti-nationalism in Kashmir. All the good governance and redressing of grievances cannot overcome the suspicion that exists, with no attempt at overcoming this. Political competitiveness between the two regions will ensure sufficient fodder for Pakistan and the separatists unless immediate measures are undertaken to rapidly neutralise the negativity. The very sensible decision to keep the two regions as a single administrative unit is reflective of good strategic thinking but that needs to be taken ahead now.
The common belief among the public in the rest of India is that J&K’s only threats are Pakistan-sponsored terrorists and separatists; neutralise them and the game is over for Pakistan and its radical cohorts in J&K.
This could not be further from the truth. Deeply entrenched in J&K is an ‘ecosystem’ for the existence of those who promote the idea of Azaadi (Independence) to eventually integrate J&K with Pakistan. It’s a well-networked mesh of financiers, business people, media, lawyers, bureaucrats, civil society members, religious leaders and politicians; one could add people from a couple more domains, all linked in different ways with Pakistan and long-term separatism.
They remain within an obfuscated environment where it isn’t easy to peg anything against them. It needs a campaign to unravel all this and neutralise the Pakistani deep state’s even deeper networks in J&K. To the credit of the NDA government, the realisation towards the necessity of neutralising these OGW networks dawned in 2016, perhaps for the first time, and the campaign to root out the anti-nationals began. It is a long process that has partially succeeded, but much more needs to be done.
It has put Pakistan on the back foot. With networks in disarray, infiltration and fresh recruitment along with availability of leadership almost non-existent, Pakistan is likely to focus on the external domain to keep the tensions alive and prevent normality. When the internal enablers weaken, the external ones are exploited to rekindle them. India’s diplomatic efforts have paid dividends in terms of general acceptance by different segments of the international community that the 5 August 2019 decision was India’s internal affair, but there is nothing permanent about it. The Covid-19 pandemic has created an environment in which fresh ways of garnering strategic advantage are being sought by different players. Pakistan’s best bets lie in being a part of the emerging China-Russia-Iran-Turkey equation.
Manifest in this is its intent to play close to China to offset India’s strategic confidence about reintegrating Gilgit-Baltistan and PoK with J&K. It is a situation that probably has China as worried as Pakistan, particularly about the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Ladakh’s current Sino-India standoff has its linkages to the strategic confidence being exuded by India after the August 5 decisions. China too would not be comfortable with J&K’s eventual internal stabilisation promised by the political initiatives.
Its strategy to keep India rooted to the land borders in hotspots of turbulence in order to avoid a rise in its maritime capability is not served by the return of order and stability to J&K. Strangely, it could be China which may need Pakistan as much as the other way around; balanced mutuality of interests appear to have come to a head. In light of the turn of events, Pakistan is likely to make fresh efforts in the Islamic world to neutralise some of India’s gains; the China-Iran opening may offer yet unknown opportunities.
India will need to maintain agility in foreign affairs and security of the LoC and LAC besides ensuring internal security. The reduction of grievances of both segments of Jammu and Kashmir and of the new administrative unit of Ladakh needs higher priority if lasting peace is to be achieved. The first anniversary of the constitutional and administrative decisions is a good time to look at the challenging times ahead.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd).
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(atahasnain@gmail.com)