Cambodia as ASEAN Chair & the Myanmar Crisis

Cambodia’s views on Myanmar do not seem to be on the same page as the rest of the ASEAN nations. This could further undermine the legitimacy of the body’s agenda.
Illustration: Soumyadip Sinha
Illustration: Soumyadip Sinha

As the new year began, Cambodia took over as the Chair of ASEAN, which heralded an almost deja vu sense of uncertainty as critical issues impacting the region are driven by the Chair of the grouping that shapes the agenda for the coming year. In setting the theme for this year under Cambodia’s chairmanship, the nation titled the year’s agenda as ‘ASEAN ACT’—with the ‘ACT’ as the abbreviation for Addressing Challenges Together. Towards the end of last year, Prime Minister Hun Sen declared his intention to visit Myanmar in the first week of January, setting the regional grouping into a tizzy as Naypyidaw remains one of the core focus areas for the ASEAN since last February’s coup d’etat. The efforts made by the ASEAN to form a consensus on Myanmar and move ahead with the five-point framework for a resolution of the political crisis within the nation made little headway, as General Min Aung Hlaing returned from the April 2021 ASEAN special meeting and rejected the consensus on the grounds that peace and order have to prevail before a ceasefire can be reached.

Following this, the ASEAN decided not to invite the Myanmar military to the October 2021 meeting, leaving room open for driving the ASEAN agenda forward while trying to instil a sense of urgency in the political leadership to move towards a broad-based reconciliation that has still not occurred. Cambodia at that time was not in support of keeping the Myanmar military from the summit but went ahead with the decision collectively. As chair of the ASEAN, there have already been some indicators that Cambodia does not see it wise to keep Myanmar out of the ASEAN meetings in the coming year. While this may not have any significant impact on the political issues shaping Myanmar in the immediate future, what it can do is further undermine the legitimacy of the ASEAN agenda. As Chair for the current year, endorsing the continuity of ASEAN’s broad-based agenda provides both legitimacy and coherence in the decisions taken during the previous year.

During the first week of January, the visit by PM Hun Sen to Myanmar saw the ASEAN members divided over different sides. While the visit was put forth as an effort to boost bilateral ties with Myanmar, the overarching signals that it sent to the region and observers were more ambiguous. The visit saw Hun Sen donate a huge amount of pandemic relief supplies to the beleaguered nation, which has been caught in the throes of both the pandemic and the political conflict. At the culmination of the visit, Sen stated that the Myanmar junta was invited to the ASEAN summit if it met the necessary conditions of the five-point consensus worked out by the body. However, this remains tenuous as neither Sen nor the ASEAN have any formal leverage to compel Myanmar to adhere to the proposal. Moreover, with the non-intervention clause being sacrosanct, the ability to pressurise Myanmar remains purely a moral one that the nation has no obligation to follow. Following Sen’s visit, the Myanmar military has resorted to using the air force against the protesters and Aung San Suu Kyi has received a sentence of four years in detention, leaving little negotiating space within the political impasse.

What is disconcerting is that Cambodia has often been viewed as supporting China’s leverage in the region, even at a cost to ASEAN’s priorities for shaping the regional agenda. The 2012 summit, where matters related to the South China Sea split the regional grouping apart, was clear evidence of China’s ability to leverage Cambodia in support for its own position. On the Myanmar issue, China has categorically stated that it was a matter of internal concern and that political resolution has to come from within. Hun Sen’s statements are to be seen in light of this overarching support to the military given by China, inasmuch as he himself is categorically opposed to any exclusion of Myanmar, regardless of the rhetorical statements in support of the ASEAN position. This clear dichotomy in the ASEAN Chair will be a huge faultline that can be difficult to address as the year ahead will be challenging in dealing with Myanmar.

Within ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore have shown unstinting support to push Myanmar towards a reconciliation process, wherein the grouping’s agenda is not undermined. In early January, during a video conference meeting between the Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Hun Sen, there was reference to the Myanmar issue as a regional challenge, with Joko Widodo indicating the need to maintain the ASEAN resolve on the crisis, pushing the proposed tenets, which also had the backing of the international community, particularly the United Nations. Any efforts to support the military by Cambodia will be seen as a de facto recognition of the changed political leadership in Myanmar. Moreover, supporting the military will lead to further political entrenchment of the region where democracies and authoritarian states will clearly be on two sides of ASEAN’s political faultlines. Cambodia as chair will need to tread lightly to carry all of ASEAN along through the coming year.

Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi

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