Two things are clear from the way Vladimir Putin has acted in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine crisis. First, Putin is not a communist. While he harps on restoring the glory of the Soviet Union, he, at the same time, criticises it for creating constituent republics, such as Ukraine.
Second, Putin’s territorial politics is much more nuanced than it appears on the surface. For instance, Ukraine’s tête-a-tête with the NATO may irk Russia and go against Moscow’s security interest, but one can better understand Putin’s current modus operandi from history.
In the late 1930s, Hitler had threatened to unleash war in Europe unless Sudetenland, an area of Czechoslovakia with a German ethnic majority, was surrendered to Germany. In September 1938, leaders of the UK, France, and Italy signed the Munich agreement with Germany agreeing to Hitler’s proposal, in exchange for peace in Europe.
While Russia did not explicitly threaten to unleash war in Europe unless Donetsk and Luhansk, an area of Ukraine with a Russian ethnic majority are surrendered to Moscow, it tried the Hitler strategy by seeking what it wants from the international community without going to war.
The meetings held with Macron and Scholz in early February was an attempt by the world leaders hoping there will be a ‘Munich moment’ with Russia—close but no cigar.
Now that we know Russia has sent troops to the Ukrainian territory, Putin tried to pull a Munich bluff like how Germany did with Europe in the early 1940s.
It is clear that Putin is no Hitler nor today’s Russia is not the 1940s Germany, but he took a clue from the latter in adopting an open diplomacy cum troops-at-standby strategy to negotiate with the West. The element of surprise, as seen in mid-February, was crucial to Putin’s strategy if a Munich was to be pulled off.
While the lesson for the West from the post-Munich agreement was that peace cannot be bought through appeasement, it is yet to understand that peace, in this ongoing case, cannot be bought through sanctions either.
Eight years ago, when Russia annexed Crimea, sanctions were imposed and the West condemned the assault. Today again, as the West rolls out a similar arsenal of economic sanctions, there is little understanding that these actions may not work. For instance, the gas supplies to Europe, after Crimea was annexed, continued to flow except for a few months and with limited disruptions. Further, the shock and awe style of sanction will hurt Europe equally as it intends to do for Russia. Sanctions, as we know, work best when it forces the other to change its behaviour, but in Russia’s case, such chances are slim. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson too has argued that “sanctions have never been a fundamental and effective way to solve problems”.
Even if the sanctions were to hurt Russia, the recently concluded joint statement with China gives us a hint that to alleviate the economic effects, Beijing could step up. As Jude Blanchette and Bonny Lin have argued in the Foreign Affairs piece, “Beijing’s purchase of more Russian energy and the increased use of the Chinese renminbi (instead of the US dollar) for bilateral transactions could insulate Russia from US sanctions”. Further, the upside for China would be that Russia will return the favour by supporting the former’s territorial claims or in enabling a counter global governance architecture. This is not to say China will unliterally support Russia, as Beijing too will have to walk a tight rope, it can however gain an ally in geopolitical issues.
Both from an economic and diplomatic standpoint, there are slim chances that the punitive actions taken by the West could hurt Russia deeply.
The Asian geopolitical constellations can keep the Russian economy in a relatively stable position and keep their markets afloat. From a geopolitical standpoint, Russia is willing to pay the price for its interest in Ukraine, even if militarily. It is also clear that the US and EU will not directly defend Ukraine on foot or offer collective security under the umbrella of the NATO. What might be a ‘politics of asymmetry’ for Ukraine, such asymmetry works for Russia as there will be no zero-sum game. What remains to be seen is how long will the ‘strange, vague and bleak’ nature of battle continue and how ‘war and peace’ be achieved.
(Views are personal)
Gaurav Daga
Associate Vice President at Guidance, Government of Tamil Nadu
(gauravdaga@ymail.com)