China’s 20th Party Congress and the road ahead
The Chinese Communist Party will hold its 20th Party Congress later this month. During the seven decades and more it has ruled China, the country has transformed from a relatively poor, backward (GDP in 1952 estimated at US$ 30 billion), strategically vulnerable, economically isolated State, culturally separated from its traditional roots, to one that has overcome extreme poverty, increased its GDP 600-fold (nominal GDP in 2022 estimated at US$ 19.91 trillion) and achieved living standards well above the world average. China today is also the largest trading economy. This spectacular achievement was principally due to the Reform and Opening up policy initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
While pursuing reform, China was not unmindful of the cautionary lessons of history. The collapse of the Soviet Union was a wake-up call for CCP leaders who realised they must strengthen the Party apparatus, adhere to Marxist-Leninist principles and resist Western liberal ideology. For a brief period during the 1980s, the parties of the Soviet Union and China had reportedly reached “consensus” that the “old system had failed and new leaders were needed to drive reform”. Former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang even wished to emulate Mikhail Gorbachev’s idea of expanding the internal election process within the CCP. But the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown put paid to any such change that could endanger the Party’s grip on power.
While Deng internally insisted steadfastly on the leadership of the Party, the socialist path and Mao Thought, this did not detract him from continuing to build economic ties with the Western countries, seeking accession to the WTO, and encouraging western companies to invest in, bring technical innovation and strengthen supply chains within China. Within the Party, he stressed on institutional stability and systemic predictability by imposing age and term limits for office and succession processes, principles of collective leadership as well as power sharing between groups. While these policies contributed to the explosive growth of China’s coastal regions and transformed the major cities through foreign investment, they also gave rise to an unconscionable gap between rich and poor as well as to rampant corruption and crony capitalism across the country.
With the arrival of Xi Jinping on the political horizon in 2012, a major qualitative change in China’s domestic environment as well as its equation with the external world began to take place. By that time, China had already displaced Japan to become the world’s second largest economy. Xi’s assumption to power was different from his predecessors. As the son of a “first-generation revolutionary”, Xi saw himself as a legitimate successor of the CCP “red dynasty by blood”. His acquisition of power was both politically astute and brutally thorough, and his election was represented as reflecting a deeper generational and social shift within the country. Xi was able to so deeply consolidate his hold over the Party and build a personality cult around him along Maoist lines that the 19th Party Congress in October 2017 amended the party constitution to “preserve” Xi as the “core” leader forever.
Xi also systematically modified Deng’s policies to fit China’s emerging “new era”. The “hide and bide” strategy was abandoned and China claimed an active role as “builder of world peace, contributor to global development, protector of international order and provider of public goods’’. Domestically, he promoted balanced attention to all regions, brought stricter Party control over private business, strengthened domestic innovative capabilities and reduced China’s external dependence. His “dual circulation” strategy aimed precisely to strengthen the economy by bringing steady growth to the domestic market, while creating synergies through continued openness to the outside world. Xi’s launching in 2013 of the flagship Belt and Road initiative grew to cover over 70 countries, 60% of the world’s population, and 30% of its GDP. In the current turbulent global situation, however, China will increasingly proof itself against economic disruptions, sanctions and trade war threats from the West, while not losing sight of the larger goal of continuing to seek global leadership of transnational supply chains.
Notwithstanding rumours of major splits dividing the leadership, there is little dramatically new or unexpected that will emerge from the Congress. Members will rubber-stamp a proposal for a third term for Party General Secretary Xi Jinping as well as pack the Central Committee, its Politburo and Standing Committee with his nominees.
There is still anxiety and fear of mishap. Such anxiety must stem from the absence of any kind of inclusive consultations characteristic of the earlier Deng era. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Xi has made no show of collegiality or any pretence of power sharing. In consequence, the number of people estranged in the system has increased. If at a future date he is faced with issues of inadequate feedback, the need to tackle policy errors or emergencies, there will be little sympathy or support from these quarters. Pressure points in the future are likely to arise in three areas: domestically from policies towards private business as well as on taxation and regulation of the property market; pressures will also continue to be felt on the effects of his zero-Covid policies; and continued external pressures in the east (Taiwan and South China Seas), the west (Afghanistan, terrorist threats against Xinjiang and border tensions with India) as well as the hemorrhaging of BRI projects including the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
At a global scale, Xi Jinping seems convinced the US-led West is in terminal decline and that the space for global leadership has opened up for an Eastern coalition led by China, now in a “no-limits” alliance with Russia. When Deng had earlier spoken of the 21st century as an Asian century, he was clear that it must include a developed and self-confident India. But the new Chinese leadership has scoffed at this idea, given China’s exponential growth over the past decades that has had a six-fold increase compared to India. What they refuse to note is that the gap is steadily narrowing and that by mid-century, by most parameters, India will not be far behind China. Will Xi Jinping remain leader of China during this crucial coming decade? Most observers think so. But one must not rule out the possibility, within the next decade, of China abandoning its personality cult and reverting to the institutional norms and processes laid down by its most visionary former leader.
Vijay K Nambiar
Former Indian Ambassador in China