Close on the heels of the US-ASEAN summit that took place last month, President Joe Biden’s visit to two of his country’s most significant allies in East Asia last week set the tone for furthering the Indo-Pacific strategy of his administration—a key priority for America. The visits to both South Korea and Japan are critical, even as tensions in East Asia are an important indicator of the unabated US-China rivalry and its impact on the immediate region.
The visit to Seoul looked at several key areas such as deepening military ties between the two countries and enhancing initiatives on resilient supply chains. It also focused on North Korea, a critical priority in the bilateral ties. The question of enhancing credible deterrence against an increasingly belligerent North Korea remains a key priority for the US insofar as the security of the Korean peninsula is concerned. An important indicator of this has been the missile tests in North Korea immediately after the Biden visit, reiterating Seoul’s importance in Indo-Pacific security.
Similarly, the visit to Japan needs to be viewed from two angles. Bilaterally, the Biden-Kishida Summit signifies a sustained focus on increasing Japan’s defence budget and boosting its own capabilities. While the discussions on the Japanese approach to becoming a ‘normal’ state is not new, its defence capabilities have to be revamped to address the new threats to its security, both regionally and to its allies, globally. By looking at strengthening Japanese capabilities externally, the visit further asserted the importance of US-Japan ties as a core bilateral plank in the regional security architecture.
At the multilateral level, the Japan visit saw the second in-person summit of Quad leaders, even as the group began to show greater institutionalisation. As opposed to the last Quad meeting that led to some differences on issues relating to the Ukraine crisis, this summit saw more willingness to accommodate the differences of the member countries, while forging a more practical approach to the shared convergences among them. The Joint Statement of the Quad leaders meeting continued to reiterate the group’s agenda as a “force for good”, highlighting the significance of the normative order and the importance of international law, and recognising both sovereignty and territorial integrity as core principles of interstate behaviour. While there is a clear mention on the differing perspectives with regards to the Ukraine crisis, the core issue of how this affects the Indo-Pacific is evident, even as joint exercises carried out by China and Russia took place when the Biden visit was drawing to a conclusion. This clearly emphasises how great power relations in the region are being reshaped with China-Russia ties impacting the future of the global order. The relevance of the Quad as a mechanism in the context of the Indo-Pacific is best understood by recognising that China and Russia are shifting the rules of the normative order unilaterally, making the group that much more relevant from a regional perspective.
The most significant outcome of the Quad meeting was the unveiling of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), a critical step in trying to evolve a rules-based trading order that is inclusive and open to all the member states in the region. It is this part of the deliberations that brings in the ASEAN states and other countries into the framework of the IPEF’s negotiations on trade matters.
While several observers have highlighted the IPEF as a Quad-plus initiative, this needs to be viewed from a distinct perspective—as being tangentially unique from the Quad itself. While initiatives like the Quad and even the AUKUS in recent times have been looked at more from the perspective of enhancing security-driven aspects, the IPEF brings in a clear economic dimension that makes it relevant to the ASEAN states in particular. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) reiterates the importance of an economically open region. This is where the IPEF meets the agenda of the AOIP, which is why the ASEAN is on board. The IPEF focus remains solely on issues of trade practices—it consists of four pillars covering supply chain resilience, digital economy rules, provisions for enhancing infrastructure and clean energy, and non-corrupt taxation processes.
The IPEF’s relevance evolves from the practices of other countries where trade has been used as a means for revenge. China’s punitive economic measures against nations like Australia and its economic sanctions backlash after South Korea’s THAAD controversy are clear examples. The use of trade as a punitive measure is a critical factor that threatens the smaller regional states from taking a concerted stand against the unilateral actions of China regionally. An effort to balance trade relations across a wider spectrum and to evolve mechanisms for greater and more open participation is at the core of the IPEF. Among ASEAN states, the countries that are left out are Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, while the remaining seven have come on board. Unlike the CPTPP or the RCEP, the IPEF is not an FTA, but it provides a carte blanche to the member countries to choose what best suits their needs from the four pillars. So, there is a huge manoeuvring space within its parameters, which finds compatibility with the members of the ASEAN. While the verdict on the IPEF is still pending, it is undoubtedly an incremental step in the move towards a regional economic framework.
Shankari Sundararaman
Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)