Although I have never been to Moscow, the creation of Lenin’s Mausoleum has always fascinated me. Why would a regime of Marxists, who do not believe in a soul, create such a structure? After all, a body is just a body, it’s just chemicals.
Well, as American historian Arch Getty argues, the connection between the body and the state in Russian history is that the ‘body’ is the state. The sovereignty and legitimacy of the state flows through the body. In the Soviet period, slogans such as ‘Lenin lived, Lenin lives and Lenin will live’, transformed the bodily figure of Lenin into a charismatic, immortal and transcendental image of the state. To protect the body was to protect the state and hence Lenin’s body was more than chemicals, it was their power. It was their authority, as Max Weber could describe it.
The personification of individuals is, however, not new to Russian culture. From Nicholas II, the last Czar of Russia, to today’s Putin, we see such imagery. Check out any meme of Putin and you will see him riding animals, playing with machines, singing songs or swimming in lakes. His image is of an authoritative leader who can defend the state and act tough to anyone—even to his ministers or officials. A tough Putin means a tough Russia.
This personal embodiment of power is also reflected in the way meetings were conducted by Putin in recent months. Anyone who wants to meet Putin must isolate 14 days before the meeting, take RT-PCR, or sit at a very long table far away from him. When French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrived in Moscow in early February, they both declined to take the Russian Covid-19 test citing fears of DNA theft; hence, they had to sit at a distance from Putin. This table politics was also visible when Russia’s own ministers met the leader. While it can be seen as a power play on international politics or personal paranoia, the body politic under Putin can be seen as patrimonial, as it was with Stalin.
Putin has been in the realm of power since 1999 and by any political yardstick, age is on his side, meaning he could contribute more to politics by remaining in power. Further, an authoritative and a patrimonial figure is seen as bringing stability to the state. Hence, the recent constitutional amendment nullifying the presidential term limit shows us the continuity of such bodily politics. ‘Putin lived, Putin lives and Putin will live’ can be said to be the new slogan of Russia.
This iconography and creation of a cult-like figure are central to the image of the body as the state. The personal is political.
What is unique to Putin, however, is the way he derives his power and authority. Stalin or Khrushchev used to derive their authority by reviewing the military parade atop the Lenin Mausoleum. The ‘party’ served as the basis for their legitimacy. For Putin, the creation of a macho image and his charismatic leadership gave people the stability missing since the 1980s. Gorbachev or Yeltsin were seen as weak leaders. They were seen as leaders who brought humiliation to the state. Putin’s approval ratings, on the other hand, if they are any indicator of popularity, stood at 71% (just before the Ukraine crisis).
What is however unclear with Putin is the line of succession. One saw a clear line of succession, at least pictorially, with the Czars or with Lenin and Stalin, and even briefly with Medvedev. But with Putin, neither line of succession or proximity to power can tell us about his successor. His power struggle with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and others, which was seen to be personal, was converted into a tax or fraud matter of the state.
The embodiment of Putin as the state and continuation of old practices does not mean that structures, economies, ideologies have not changed over time. Rather it gives an indication of certain culturally embedded practices that operate today.
Seen from this perspective, the expansionist pursuit of NATO is bound to hurt Putin. It is, as a piece in Foreign Policy puts it, “a denial of Russian status in the region and beyond”. Historically, Russia has faced humiliation since the 15th century, most recently with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But Putin is not irrational. His attack on Ukraine is not to make Russia ‘great again’, as David Brooks puts it. The reason is precisely the opposite.
Putin attacked Ukraine so that Russia can save itself from humiliation. It is possible that invasion may have never been the point of the Russian. But only history will tell us if he is to be remembered like Ivan the terrible or something else.
(Views are personal)
Gaurav Daga
Associate Vice President at Guidance, Government of Tamil Nadu
(gauravdaga@ymail.com)