A new season for military analyses is fast approaching. Indicators from Ukraine signal triggers towards the termination of the physical part of the war. A tendency to declare ‘victory and defeat’ will be difficult to eschew, although, in complex modern warfare, there are no notions of such black-and-white stakes in warlike situations. Yet the Ukraine war offers situations, contingencies and future scenarios for which the classification of conflict termination would be a challenge.
Let us bring an Indian angle into this quite early. In September 2022, I was assessing that the war in Ukraine would stretch into the winter of 2022–23, that Europe would suffer misery due to a lack of preparedness to cater for alternatives to Russian energy, and that there would be rifts within NATO. Vladimir Putin could then be tempted to elongate the war and continue to use his ploys and bravado, including the threat of employment of tactical nuclear weapons, to cause confusion and split response. The very transactional situation towards any end of hostilities in September 2022 could only have been overturned with the introduction of sage advice, which would catch the attention of both sides and aid in developing a positive environment. The world was surprised when that advice came from Narendra Modi, India’s internationally respected prime minister.
“Today’s era is not an era of war,” said Modi to Putin in a bilateral on the sidelines of the SCO summit at Tashkent on September 16, 2022. The PM added that food, fertiliser and fuel security were among the major concerns of the world. The Western media spread this message as a victory for NATO, with India having left its neutrality. In effect, this was one of the sanest politico-diplomatic messages of the last nine months and timed extremely well, displaying true strategic autonomy, which India has been successful in garnering for itself. It triggered a series of activities behind the scenes. Putin’s response itself did not indicate anything negative. The setting for the termination of the kinetic aspects of the war can truly be traced to this exchange.
A brief recall of why the war occurred at all sets the tone for a ‘victory and defeat’ analysis. The proxy war in Ukraine being pursued by Russia since 2014 had the potential of becoming bigger and miring NATO into it. NATO did not wish Russia to gain space from where it could dictate Ukraine’s future. As the second largest nation in Europe, NATO’s control over Ukraine was perceived as mandatory to deny a future Russian return to strategic control of Eastern Europe. At a lower level of priority, the US was also aware that an impending focus on the Indo-Pacific would leave little time and effort for this crucial part of US interests, for which it underwent 45 years of the Cold War.
Cowing down on Ukraine’s intent of joining NATO and relenting to Russian pressure would mean a reversal of many policies on the progressive containment of Russia post the Cold War; it’s not as if the breakup of the former Soviet Union meant that a stable East Europe would immediately emerge. In early 2022, NATO-backed Ukraine in response to Russian belligerence and stuck to that strategy. A comprehensive strategy of economic warfare (through sanctions), psychological/information warfare and warfighting was employed by NATO. Quite unpredictably, Russia withstood the economic sanctions, and its economy became stronger through Chinese and Indian energy purchases on the one hand and the overall resistance against sanctions on the other.
This would appear to have a confidence-enhancing effect on the Russian leadership. It did, but the Russian military let the nation down. Dated technologies, except for some iconic equipment such as the S-400 Air Defence system, inability to keep track of modern doctrine and attempting to fight today’s war with yesterday’s doctrinal thinking did the Russians no good. To add to it, an ageing population, a dearth of young people, hesitation in employing ground forces in assault roles, a virtual absence of logistics and a completely flawed concept of employing airpower led to Russian inability to make headway and finally, to a situation where it is being forced to withdraw from areas it had captured at much cost. The information warfare techniques employed by NATO have included targets such as the Russian population, the Russian military and Europe itself and they have been one of the major success stories of the war.
Russia has yet to cave in militarily, nor has Ukraine run riot on the battlefront. The latter is restoring its original battlefronts. There is still life left in this war, but it appears that the writing is on the wall. Putin has desisted from attending the G-20 meeting in Bali, but his absence should not be taken as the sulk of the defeated. If a ceasefire does come into being in the very near future, the course towards comprehensive stabilisation will yet be challenging. A win-win for both sides would be the restoration of energy to Europe.
It is up to Ukraine to decide what terms are acceptable for negotiations to bring an end to the war Russia is waging against the country after all the suffering it and its people have endured. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “Moscow’s strength should not be underestimated despite Kyiv’s recent battlefield successes.” That remains a truism. Russia will not accept any compromise on the Black Sea ports, given its lack of accessibility to warm waters elsewhere. The old formula of dual use of the Black Sea ports may have to be restored, but with an angry Ukrainian leadership and people, there will be reluctance towards such an arrangement and a potential trigger for a return to conflict.
It’s early yet to assess how Putin exercises control over a dwindling situation. He is not going to abdicate; it’s highly unlikely. Yet, his ability to think through the situation rationally with advisers (especially from the military) would be an important consideration in all assessments. NATO has to draw upon many lessons of history, commencing with the Treaty of Versailles, 1919, the invasion and withdrawal from Iraq (2003 and 2011), and the broad principles of dealing with defeated dictatorships. Success can be completely flawed and self-converted to failure if sensitivity about victory and defeat is missing from the final considerations. We will hear a lot more on this in the days to come.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University