With the damage caused to the Kerch Strait Bridge to prevent the Russian logistics approach to the Crimean Peninsula, Ukraine may have achieved a short-term tactical plus but has escalated the war into a new domain. The event has had a psychological effect that will affect the future course of the war. Russia has suddenly upped the ante in artillery engagements as a response. Whether this is thought through or a knee-jerk military reaction to cater to home-based Russian morale remains unclear. The chances of Special Forces getting into the act for sabotage of infrastructure becomes a greater possibility.
For a long time, I had been warning that Ukrainian offensive operations are not large enough to be classified as classic counter-offensives, which will extend Ukraine’s frontages to depths from where artillery engagements will be difficult to achieve by Russia. Those in the know of modern artillery capabilities would explain how extended ranges have made artillery an even more important arm than it has been throughout the history of warfare. With missiles and satellite surveillance, gunners need no physical observation of the battlefield either; virtual is good enough. Then there are drones to which we could devote a chapter.
So, the war, which was expected to last a few days or a few weeks, is slowly getting into its ninth month, and there are few signals of it ending. Many factors are at play; each needs a brief dissection for its potential effect. It starts with Russia’s assessed military defeat, which appears to have the least credibility. Calling up of reserves and returning many of them by Russia does not appear to indicate any signs of defeat; setbacks and non-achievement of war objectives should not construe defeat at this stage. The conduct of the Donbas referendums reflects the Russian hold over that region, the results being unimportant. Unacceptable as they may be to NATO and Ukraine, they reflect that Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia remain Russian for now. The entire coast of the Black Sea is being denied to Ukraine, whose economy depends on the sea outlets for its massive grain trade and the output of its heavy and precision hardware industry that make up its economy. The Russians are unlikely to compromise on the maritime front.
The Black Sea’s strategic psychological value for Russia has remained under-assessed for long. It’s the access into the heart of the Euro–North Africa–West Asia maritime complex girdling the Indian Ocean–Mediterranean connection, which is a great strategic advantage for Russia. The long and the short of it is that President Vladimir Putin may have failed to attain offensive objectives on land, but his defensive fronts are not entirely compromised.
Much depends on that one term that rarely finds place in the repertoire of military terminologies—‘war stamina’. Europe is under pressure with rising fuel prices and wilting economies. The foundations of security and energy infrastructure are being shaken. Germany, the richest nation there, had invested in making its reliance on energy from Russia a part of its economic imperatives. It is now straining, as are others. US funds are being pumped into the efforts to maintain the Ukrainian arms, ammunition and training supply chains which have been largely responsible for Ukraine’s survivability and now the operational gains. These will have to be sustained over time should Putin continue with his strategy of bleeding Europe—ironically, a reversal of the effect of European and other sanction protocols.
However, NATO is reaching the end of its tether, with stockpiles having eroded and manufacturing of modern weapons not keeping up with the consumption end. This is having an adverse effect on the minimum stocks that NATO requires for its own security. Putin is aware of this. Threats, deception and unpredictability are his allies in such a situation, forcing Ukraine to expend out-of-proportion resources, which has a telling effect on the origins of the supply chain. Reports also indicate that demands could be made on India, despite India’s well-known neutrality in this war and its dependence for its own heavy weaponry on Russia.
The nuclear factor is now beginning to become more serious. Firstly, the use of even a tactical nuke initiated on a battlefield is likely to change the face of this war. Remember the last time an impending nuclear confrontation was brought to heel was the 10-day crisis of the Bay of Pigs, also called the Cuban Missile Crisis, in 1962. Putin is brazenly using nuclear blackmail and knows it’s a risk. Yet he is taking it because he knows that this is one threat that can dismay developed European societies who lived through it during the Cold War. The US continuously monitors this threat and has substantially concluded that, thus far, it is a credible bluff, but US President Joe Biden has not been conservative with his words which promise a massive response.
For public knowledge, it’s good to know that in the nuclear weapon environment, it’s not a question of retaliation with equal yields. A tactical nuclear weapon may have a very limited target effect, but the larger strategic message of its use is the existence of brazenness and throwing of caution to the winds that lead to escalation. Eminent strategic thinkers in India are beginning to look upon PM Narendra Modi’s advice to President Putin—“Now is not the time for war”, as the initiator which can help intervene and put an end to the wielding of the Russian nuclear sword. There now appears to be a larger-than-life effect of that meeting and those few words that PM Modi spoke.
So, is this war likely to end anytime soon? NATO appears confident that Russia cannot win and knows this well enough. The Russians are convinced that European unity cannot last and that the compromise in economic and energy security will bring Europe to its knees. These are the ingredients for a no-decision syndrome. Warfighting may reduce substantially through winter, but the targeting of infrastructure and military bases to erode capability will continue. The targeting of the Kerch Strait Bridge seems to have opened up a new dimension of the proxy war. Conventional war could take a back seat, and irregular operations form the bulk of the contacts. That would be entering an uncharted realm one could only contemplate at the beginning of the war. It has been largely forgotten since then, and its return only enhances unpredictability, which will elongate the war and find dirtier ways to fight it.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University