As soon as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) decision was announced that Pakistan was now out of the informal grey list, I was getting numerous calls from Kashmir. Analysts just wanted to know whether it was correct that with the strictures no longer over Pakistan, the revival of all networks could resume, and it would be business as usual in Kashmir before the hard decisions taken on August 5, 2019. Not too many were yet paying attention to the serious deliberations going on in Beijing at the other end of the world, where the 20th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was meeting to review the performance of the leadership and the Party in the last five years and to decide the next leadership and priorities; people in India are much more tactical in thinking and look without exception at the immediate future. Despite Galwan and the continuing standoff with the PLA in Ladakh with mirror-like deployment, as also the various manoeuvres and air exercises and steps being undertaken by the PLA to dodge the various nuances of the LAC, it’s the Pakistan Army’s actions and the scope for problems created by Pakistan that draw the attention of the common mind. With significant geopolitical events happening simultaneously across two borders, the implications for India’s strategic security should be obvious. We must take stock, linking these with other events beyond the borders.
There is no need to prioritise; both events have their definite place in the threat spectrum. In the West, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan created a vacuum, leaving the Taliban with a relatively uncontrolled nation. The Afghan strategic space has been found to be the core ground for the gravitation of diverse terror groups evicted from elsewhere after the world’s strong counter-terror response. While we may assume that the first cycle of global terror has ended with the defeat of ISIS in Syria and then Marawi (The Philippines), another cycle could well be on the cards. Nothing much has changed in the Middle East except Mohammed bin Salman’s intent on altering Saudi Arabia’s social character. The Israel-Palestine discord continues intermittently despite the patchy Abraham Accords, and the women’s movement in Iran has the makings of something which could invite serious misgivings against the old order which came into force in 1979–80.
The war in Ukraine has come as a spoiler for the US intent and plans for the Indo-Pacific. It has also impacted the smaller countries’ economies and energy security, leaving them vulnerable. The US thought that its actions through the Abraham Accords were sufficient to stabilise the Middle East even as it looked for ways to shift focus to the Indo-Pacific and commenced setting up the mechanism for the same, which would ultimately see the unfolding of the full pushback against China’s aggressive posturing. Perhaps its one unstated disappointment has been the independent policy of neutrality that India has played through the crisis. The reasons are many and all valid too, but it may have left the US uncertain of the future configuration it has in mind. Yet, why reinvest in Pakistan at this stage through such reprieve via the mechanism of the FATF? There is a reason for this, and I do believe that it could find acceptance in Indian strategic leadership circles too.
Let me explain. The last cycle of global terror commenced from Pakistan’s western borders, where three million refugees were housed in shanty camps due to the war in Afghanistan between 1979–89. This time, approximately two million displaced people have been created by the devastating floods in Pakistan, which have destroyed $30–40 billion worth of assets and left the population in despair. Such vulnerable populations comprise impoverished and uneducated, displaced people who suffer year after year, living in squalid conditions with their livelihoods snatched away, vulnerable to extremist influence, a kind of blowback against society. It’s going to happen more often with climate change, and Pakistan does not have the economic status to overcome this unless assisted. China’s assistance has been iffy.
The IMF promised a $9-billion loan with such conditions that disbursal is not yet complete. So how does Pakistan overcome $30–40 billion in damage if the FATF does not certify it to receive more? In many ways, the US is investing to prevent radical practices and networks from becoming dangerous enough to push for what happened in the early millennium. It could be a step to keep Pakistan with it even as the latter strategically veers towards China and gets wooed even by Russia. The SCO focus on Eurasia has not drawn sufficient attention. Iran and perhaps Turkey entering it creates a different ‘power equation’. Is the US attempting to cultivate the Eurasian region to counter a Sino-Russian surge in influence here? It’s probably covering all angles in a continental continuum before the shift to the Indo-Pacific, on a presumption that the war in Ukraine will eventually end sometime this winter. The nuclear bluff by Putin is as unconvincing as the feasibility of a Russian military victory.
Where does this leave India with the trends across the two main borders?
The 20th Congress of the CCP could embolden Xi Jinping to experiment on the Sino-India border, which it intends to play out against Taiwan; alternatively, it could keep up the pressure on the LAC without any meaningful measures which would up the ante. Brinkmanship would be the key, but it is unlikely to be aimed at any outcomes; perhaps just a series of disturbing border drills made to look like mobilisation and a serious application of forces. India, however, will need to keep all options open with preparedness, deployment and response surge capability.
The Indo-Pak border may need to be watched more carefully in the interim. Pakistan is wily enough to sign accords, but implementation is never its strong point; denial is a key weapon in the scabbard. Finding ways to sidestep from strictures of the FATF may not be difficult for the complex networks which exist. An expansion towards Punjab and linking J&K with it would be the concept.
At the end of the day, preparedness for all-out conventional operations at the LAC, diplomatic measures to remain committed to the US-led strategic equations, stabilisation of J&K to counter a second potential hybrid war situation, and preparedness for a proactive strategy against Pakistan if the rubicon is crossed; all this should form the concept of India’s readiness and response.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University
(atahasnain@gmail.com)