When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Uzbekistan for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit on September 15–16, he will come face to face with Chinese President Xi Jinping for the first time since the India-China face-off in Ladakh commenced in 2020. Despite continuing bilateral talks at various official levels, the disengagement of troops from the Line of Actual Control on both sides has made only halting progress. Officials of the two countries are downplaying the possibility of a formal bilateral meeting of their leaders. India’s External Affairs Minister recently reiterated that the state of the relationship will be determined by the state of the border. But speculations continue to circulate that there may be a brief courtesy meeting. Time will tell.
Modi will also see Russian President Vladimir Putin in person for the first time after the latter sent his army into Ukraine in February. India took an independent line on the invasion, not condemning it and continuing to do business (figuratively and literally) with Russia. If they meet, the atmosphere would be different from that of a Modi-Xi meeting (should it take place), but India would probably like to gauge what the Russian leader’s endgame is, and his assessment of that of Ukraine and NATO.
There is little doubt that Putin and Xi will meet. The Russia-China embrace has attracted global attention, particularly after the Ukraine war started. Their relationship has blossomed in recent decades after a border settlement enabled them to move beyond a history of fierce rivalry and military clashes. The partnership, which grew from economic complementarities and convergent political interests, was cemented by deteriorating Russia-West relations after the Crimean annexation of 2014 and intensifying US-China acrimony. They now claim a friendship without limits, including political solidarity and defence cooperation in sophisticated military technologies. Perception of Russia’s irreversible dependence on China informs the view of some at home and many outside that India’s foreign policy should make a strategic shift away from Russia and towards the West.
Joining this trio in the SCO are four Central Asian countries wedged between Russia and China, resources-rich, landlocked (together with the Caspian Sea), and dependent on their big neighbours for trade, transit, growth and security.
The SCO was formed in 2001, to promote political, economic and security cooperation among its members. Its development was naturally influenced by the evolving geopolitics of the region and its interactions with the external world. The original idea of articulating a non-West (as distinct from an anti-West) perspective, promoting a multipolar world, had already given way to a less coherent narrative by the time India and Pakistan joined SCO in 2017. Their accession expanded SCO’s geographical reach and economic base, but also brought in divergent approaches to global issues.When Iran joins the SCO at the forthcoming summit, its cohesion will inevitably be diluted further.
Looking at the organization’s international positioning, many wonder why India is in it. SCO supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty, from which India and Pakistan have stayed away. Every member, except India, participates in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With Pakistan and China in it, there is no question of SCO supporting India on its terrorism concerns or in its ambitions for UN Security Council permanent membership. As targets of Western opprobrium and sanctions, Russia and China want SCO to articulate anti-West language that India may consider too harsh. Other contradictions include India’s participation with Pakistan in the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (with the unfortunate acronym, RATS), for intelligence-sharing on terrorist threats in the region. We will see Pakistani and Chinese military personnel participating in an SCO counter-terrorism exercise in Manesar in Haryana next month.
Geopolitical realities do not present black-and-white choices. When you have complex relations with your neighbours, it makes sense to engage with their neighbours. The SCO region is India’s immediate neighbourhood.
A narrow strip of Afghanistan separates Tajikistan from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, Pakistan used its territory for terrorist activities against India. After the US-led troops’ withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is again the threat of terrorism and radicalism being nurtured there. Central Asian countries are concerned about this; India shares that concern.
Central Asia has been dominated by Russia and China. Over the years, Russia’s political and security dominance has been complemented by China’s economic influence. This balance is shifting. As BRI investments grow, China acquires greater political clout and a stronger security presence. The Russia-China regional dynamics impact India’s strategic calculus, as also Turkey’s advancing Central Asian footprint and the interaction of its interests with those of China, Russia and Iran—with each of which it has complex, multi-layered relations.
Central Asian countries are increasingly emphasising their national identities and exploring the limits of strategic autonomy. They welcome the strengthening of ties with India, with which they have an ancient history of economic and cultural links. India has reciprocated this interest. The region is rich in natural resources, which is relevant to India’s efforts to diversify sources of critical resources.
Connectivity is the key to enhancing India’s presence in Central Asia. Geography and politics block the overland route through Pakistan. An alternative is the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC)—from India to Iran by sea and then to Central Asia by land. India has developed a container terminal in Iran’s Chabahar port; the onward land links are a work in progress. There is a reciprocal interest: Chabahar provides Central Asians an outlet to the sea, independent of Russia and China.
The SCO facilitates India-Central Asia interactions and enhances opportunities for monitoring the internal and external influences there, promoting economic connections and deterring hostile activities against Indian interests.
This explains India’s seemingly uncomfortable presence in a grouping often portrayed as incompatible with its global ambitions. Geopolitics is a long, complex and painstaking game.
P S Raghavan
Distinguished Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, and former diplomat