Last month’s general elections in Cambodia did little to secure the country’s domestic political processes, leaving the country open to international criticism even as the mantle of political leadership passed from the hands of Prime Minister Hun Sen to his son Hun Manet, keeping the family firmly in control of the country’s political fortunes. The recent elections are also significant as three decades have passed following the UN-sponsored electoral process which ended the Cambodian conflict, ushering in what was believed to be a period of democratic reforms.
However, in less than five years after the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission ended in Cambodia, the country has literally reverted to a one-party rule under the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). The recent elections have further highlighted how the CPP has remained in control and there have been few efforts to allow for opposition voices and members to participate in the electoral process. The two main opponents of Hun Sen’s political leadership—Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha—have been politically marginalised to such an extent that Rainsy has lived in exile since 2005, with only brief interludes in the country. Meanwhile, Sokha is under a 27-year house arrest after he was found guilty of treason in March 2023.
This brings to light a more generic problem: Southeast Asia’s democracy deficit. This actually makes the region more vulnerable to major power rivalry; where internal cohesion remains weak, external factors will have the capacity to drive wedges between states, pulling them further away from each other. The ASEAN as a regional grouping has often underscored the need for democratic transition in the region, and while some countries like Indonesia and the Philippines have shown a greater commitment towards democracy, the challenges even in these have been evident.
Over the last year, there have been elections in four ASEAN countries, all of which have indicated that there is no consensus within. In the case of the Philippines, the elections in May 2022 saw a shift from the Duterte group’s rule to the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., popularly known as Bongbong Marcos. The recent political fortunes of the Marcos family in the Philippines reflect the electorate’s remarkably short memory of how the family lost its position during a democratic shift in 1986.
Less than four decades after its downfall, the Marcos’ family is back again at the helm of affairs, albeit through an electoral process. The period of the Marcos family’s authoritarian military rule has not been completely forgotten, but the capacity to move towards a genuine form of democracy through significant changes in governance processes and power-sharing remains weak in the highly centralised presidency.
In November 2022, the electoral process in Malaysia ushered in a new government, but the preceding two years had witnessed severe domestic political turmoil. Following what was popularly known as the Sheraton Move—when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stepped down after just 22 months in office—Malaysia had a tumultuous period of uncertainty, with three prime ministers over the course of four years, and all three led very tenuous coalitions which threatened to rock domestic stability.
In recent times, the breaking of the coalitions and formations of newer groups have been dominated by the need to keep the Malay-Muslim vote share, which has crucially affected the agenda of governance within the country. Even the electoral victory of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, while a welcome shift, still remains dependent on coalition groups, which may very well affect the agenda-setting in terms of concrete reforms in the political system.
Then there is Thailand. In May 2023, the country went into general elections after the king dissolved Parliament in March. While the electoral victory of the Move Forward Party (MFP) under Pita Limjaroenrat was critical, his suspension from Thailand’s Parliament in line with the ruling of the Thai Constitutional Court raises a serious question on respecting the electoral verdict. In the two preceding general elections in 2011 and 2019, the stage had been set for the clash between those who were seeking genuine democratic reforms and those who suppported the monarchy-military leadership.
The military has been in power since 1932 with the support and backing of the royal family. The democratic shift in 1992 was short-lived and by 2006, the country slid back into military rule and this has continued almost uninterrupted. Protests have literally brought the country to a standstill on several occasions, and have been met with firm resistance from the government each time.
The coup d’etat of 2014—under the military leadership of General Prayut Chan-o-cha—ended months of a political standoff between pro- and anti-government protesters, and resulted in the installation of the National Council for Peace and Order. This was almost on the same lines of the State Peace and Development Council in Myanmar, which was a military organisation that had power over the government. The Thai Constitution of 2017 also provides for the military to have a continued role in the government and does little to bring about genuine democratic reforms in the country.
While these four countries are clear indicators of the degree of democratic deficit in the region, none is as brazenly apparent as the Myanmar case, where the continued violence between the State Administration Council (Myanmar’s junta) and the People’s Defence Forces and ethnic armed groups has continued unabated for over two years now. While the ASEAN charter of 2008 indicated the need for democratic transition in the region, the recent political developments in Southeast Asia do not seem to give any such assurance.
Shankari Sundararaman
Professor at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi