Reticence and reluctance are two words that most apply to the Indo-US relationship that is now emerging as a strategic partnership. As large democracies, their togetherness is something that will hold the democratic world together. Yet, the relationship has been pummelled by the changing dynamics of the world order. The pattern, expectations, structure, gravity of threats, and most importantly, the assessed timelines of the future—are all so dynamic that it is almost impossible to have a common perception of these. The background of these changing dynamics is well known. Ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington next week, it is important to reiterate just a few of these for clearer thinking.
First, the US strategic approach towards India always appears to be based upon the perception that India is a foil against China in the fast-rising competition between the world’s two most powerful nations. Second, the US has displayed immense patience in developing the Indo-US relationship and taking it to the level of a strategic partnership. I recall the 1991 Kicklighter proposals and the 1992 commencement of Exercise Malabar; these were the two beginnings.
The 1998 overt nuclear tests at Pokhran caused a setback for some time until President George Bush Jr put the relationship back on track with the proposed nuclear deal. Preceding that were the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), 2002, and the proposals towards three other agreements, the acronyms of which are very well known—LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA.
It took the period 2005–2016 before LEMOA was inked; the others followed in 2018 and 2020 once the 2+2 Dialogue had been initiated and the relationship was progressing towards establishing greater trust. There were some indicators of the degree of importance the US extended to India as a strategic partner. Among these was the acceptance of India’s $5 billion S-400 deal with Russia which could have drawn the application of US legislation called Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
India’s reticence and reluctance in the earlier years may be blamed for the delays in the cementing of the India-US relationship, but the US side did not pursue this transformationally either, being fully conscious of the fact that China’s actual and real capability to militarily confront the US still lay some years away. It pushed its agenda to create the necessary trust, with setbacks from time to time. All the US administrations, from Bush Jr to Biden, appeared to have appreciated the necessity of having India as a strategic partner, but the push carried greater weight in the later years of Barack Obama’s tenure and then Donald Trump’s presidency. That is the time when the Chinese threat started to snowball, and the White Papers emanating from Beijing became more focused on China’s security needs. Most importantly, aggressive diplomacy personified by the Wolf-Warrior doctrine started to take shape.
India has never been naïve about its security needs, but over the years, its limited concerns about the Chinese threat appeared more like wishful thinking. We set up the China Study Group and started giving some importance to infrastructure on the northern borders. All this moved at the same pace as the relationship with the US. Each time the US focused on Pakistan due to its strategic requirements, there was a negative response from India and the build-up of Indo-US trust only eroded. The Indian strategic community somehow could not get over the US obsession with Pakistan. Getting out of that syndrome and flipping the priorities between India’s western and northern borders has been an achievement of the current Indian government, and due to India’s rise, the US habit of viewing India and Pakistan as a continuum has faded away. Both achievements have contributed towards taking India closer to the US in pursuit of mutual security needs.
It’s the cultivation of the Indo-Pacific as an entity, a replacement for the Asia-Pacific, which brought focus to the importance of the maritime space spreading across the littorals of the Pacific (read West Pacific) and the Indian Ocean. It was reportedly Shinzo Abe who first used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’, and the Trump and Biden administrations both found it strategically a more appropriate term.
The continued references to the Indo-Pacific suggest the US has become increasingly focused on China—further reflected in its efforts to strengthen the Quadrilateral strategic alliance that includes the US, Japan, Australia and India but which is yet to get a military orientation. The specific inclusion of the Indian Ocean region within the purview of US strategic interests in the context of China bolstered India’s strategic importance at the think tanks and foreign offices of Washington and New Delhi.
However, what may have progressively triggered a greater Indian tilt towards greater cooperation with the US was actually the 72-day standoff at Doklam in 2017 at the Sikkim border. That was an indicator of China’s intent of drawing India into confrontation along the Himalayan borders—a kind of pressure point to obviate Indian involvement in the Indo-Pacific as a part of the emerging US groupings.
Two other factors have played an influential role in shaping perceptions of the Indo-US strategic partnership in the last few years. First was the April 2020 trigger of Sino-Indian military confrontation in Ladakh, an event which continues to witness a mirror deployment of over 50,000 troops each of the PLA and the Indian Army. Our need for an exponential increase in military self-reliance and technology and that too on a fast track draws us to the US. Secondly, the Ukraine war had all the potential of making the Indo-US relationship suffer a setback.
With the Chinese threat looming, the US is also mindful of India’s compulsion of not disturbing the supply chain of equipment and spares from Russia for the largely Russian-equipped Indian Armed Forces. It has been a display of maturity by the US and some deft diplomacy on the part of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Both factors—the Ladakh standoff and the Ukraine war—have led to an understanding and appreciation of mutual security needs. It’s necessary to build on this and add more to the trust factor. The relationship will be dictated by national interests which seem to be converging quite surely. The PM’s visit will help cement this even better.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(atahasnain@gmail.com)