A state election that assumed national importance has witnessed the defeat of the ruling party. The Congress was returned to power in Karnataka with a clear majority. This confirms a trend that Karnataka has seen over close to four decades of the ruling party not being favoured with a majority in the next elections. Some would describe this result as an anti-incumbency vote against the state government, while others would see the result as reflecting the voters privileging the `local` over the `national`. While both these arguments merit attention, this column will argue that the Congress succeeded because of its caste arithmetic adding up. The BJP and the Congress attempted to create a rainbow social coalition of castes to cross the halfway mark. The Congress effort succeeded, while the BJP experiment fell short of what was required.
Karnataka politics has often been seen through the prism of caste calculations. The dominant castes - Lingayats and Vokkaligas, have been key players in the state. The major forward caste in the state has been the Brahmins, whose numerical strength is limited, though it does play an influential role in key parties. The non-dominant backward castes have been a force to reckon with, while the Dalits and Tribals have impacted electoral outcomes. Religious minorities have sought to be mobilised on key issues. This context is critical to understanding (and appreciating) the Congress’ victory in 2023.
The Lingayats have been largely supporting the BJP in the last two decades. They were the only party to offer a Lingayat Chief Minister candidate in B S Yediyurappa. This time around, data from the Axis-My India Poll indicates that they have retained much of the Lingayat vote, though a small chunk has moved to the Congress. The fact that the BJP did not project its sitting Chief Minister (who is a Lingayat) as their Chief Ministerial candidate and the departure of key Lingayat leaders from the BJP could have accounted for this decline.
The creditable performance of the Congress in Kalyana Karnataka (Hyderabad Karnataka) and Kittur Karnataka (Mumbai-Karnataka) regions has been because they have been able to consolidate the non-Lingayat vote (non-dominant OBCs, Dalits, Tribals and Muslims) and top it up with a slice of the Lingayat vote. In 2018, data indicates that a segment of the Non-Dominant OBC, Dalit, and Tribal vote had gone with the BJP. This time around, a section of that vote has returned to the Congress. The results in Northern Karnataka indicate the success of the rainbow social coalition that the Congress was able to stitch together.
In Coastal Karnataka, the BJP implemented its Gujarat Model of changing many sitting MLAs. The party’s new candidates reflect a balancing of the important social groups in this region. This caste combination, along with the other specific dynamics of the region, possibly led to the BJP retaining a nearly upper hand in the region. Improved performance by the Congress in this region reflects the impact of anti-incumbency against BJP candidates and a possible consolidation of the minority vote in this region with the Congress. A marginal decline in the voting in Coastal Karnataka is also indicative of a lack of interest of the committed voters of the BJP.
Bengaluru city saw a keen competition between the Congress and the BJP and the sharing of seats. This time around, what added to the complexity were two factors. A chunk of those who moved from the Congress and JDS to the BJP during the term of the earlier legislature hailed from this region. Most of them won the elections. Secondly, it could be argued that the Prime Minister’s rally over the weekend before the elections may have helped boost the BJP candidates’ chances.
The Old Mysore region saw the clear play of the caste factor. The Vokkaliga vote saw a three-way split, with the Janata Dal (S) and the Congress drawing the lion’s share with a small slice siding with the BJP. What is critical to explain the good performance of the Congress is the role of the rainbow social coalition of Non-Dominant Backward Castes, Dalits, Tribals and Muslims that it was able to garner the support of besides the Vokkaligas. The fact that the party did not declare a Chief Ministerial candidate to ensure the rainbow coalition remains in place needs to be kept in mind. Both Siddaramaiah and D K Shivakumar represented important social groups whose support was vital for the party. While the BJP also increased its vote share in this region, the steep fall of the Janata Dal(S) vote and the bulk of that moving to the Congress not only benefited the new ruling party but adversely affected the chances of BJP candidates.
The verdict, when viewed from the lens of caste calculations, indicates the success of the rainbow coalition that the Congress was able to stitch together. Its leadership, which included Congress president Mallikarjun Kharge, Siddaramaiah and Shivakumar, were instrumental in bringing together this rainbow social coalition even as the minorities tended to vote for the Congress. The caste arithmetic added up, as did the social balancing across regions.
Dr Sandeep Shastri
Director, Academics, NITTE Education Trust and National Coordinator Lokniti Network,