Democracy is in decline in India, but TINA rules,” say well-off, intellectually inclined supporters of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. What is TINA? “There is no alternative.” These friends point to the improvement in India’s global standing and image. India’s economic and military power, not to speak of the size of its population, cannot be ignored or taken for granted any longer. A strong India is not only in our national interests but crucial for a stable world order. India has finally ceased punching below its weight. The credit for this, they argue, must go fairly and squarely to Narendra Modi.
True. In addition, the Modi administration’s dedication to development, efficiency, the fight against corruption, and success in righting the national narrative—all these must be acknowledged.
In his Independence Day speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort, Modi outlined the achievements of his government since 2014, promising that India would become the world’s third-largest economy in his next term. He not only spelt out his dreams for India’s Amrit Kaal, the ambrosial period until 2047 which marks 100 years of Independence from the British, but also, as is his wont, rehearsed the litany of his government’s achievements. The body language of his VVIP listeners said it all—they looked stoically bored, if not uninterested. They were the passive and captive audience. Moreover, they had heard it all before.
But they and their ilk, if asked and able to respond, would point out that every single tendency or trend to limit our freedoms today existed in the past too. In fact, things have been as bad at other times during the 75 years of our Independence and worse during the dark days of the Emergency. Also, similar attacks on democracy are prevalent right now in many non-BJP-ruled states, where appalling violence is directed at the opponents of the party in power. Journalists, academics, and even cartoonists are arrested arbitrarily; there is little respect for the freedoms guaranteed in our Constitution, let alone civil liberties and fundamental rights.
The leaders of these states are also intolerant of criticism and have similar personality cults spun around them. But these leaders and parties are not criticised as much as Modi or the BJP by Western media or the desi commentariat. On the contrary, the spokespersons or followers of these parties continually accuse Modi and the BJP of the sins that they themselves commit flagrantly. Selective or targeted criticism is, therefore, not fair.
More importantly, runs the counter-argument, there is a larger context in which “democratic backsliding” occurs nationally and internationally. And ignoring this context leads to grave errors in judgement and a significant distortion of reality.
Nationally, authoritarian and anti-democratic tendencies feed off each other, whether at the level of the Centre or state. They mimic and amplify one another, resulting in a vicious cycle of competitive despotism, all in the service of the politics of seeking and retaining power. Power at all costs and with all means—fair if possible, foul if necessary.
Internationally, the erosion of democratic values works similarly across nations and geographies. If autocratic or, as the euphemism goes, “strong” leaders have been re-elected to power in several countries, there must be a reason for this. A reason that also applies to India. These leaders, usually neo-nationalists, are seen by the majority of their population as protecting the fundamental character of their countries during a time of great stress and transition. Moreover, many, if not most, of these strong leaders, also deliver or are perceived to deliver on governance and development much more efficiently and satisfactorily than their weak and ineffective opponents.
If Modi-supporting classes offer such justifications, what about the masses? Unfortunately, most among the latter care little about “democratic backsliding”. They want the basic necessities of life—roti, kapda, makaan—and bathrooms and gas cylinders too. Better infrastructure, healthcare and national security. Less corruption. Of course, jobs. But on none of these crucial indicators does the opposition have anything better to offer.
In India, democracy means the rule of the majority. If the majority does not mind, and even endorses authoritarian trends, who is to blame? Does democracy, paradoxically, prefer to curtail its own freedom in favour of governance-effective authoritarianism?
The outcome of the polls next year will provide more concrete answers. If Modi wins with the kind of numbers that he himself is predicting, why would he change what has worked so well for him till now? But if the numbers do not result in a “brute majority”, there may be some easing of the “bulldozer mentality”.
Those crying over “democratic backsliding” must find a way to translate abstract notions of freedom into electoral costs or outcomes. Else, democracies offer few checks to determined strongmen.
In the dynamic dance of democracy, freedom is neither absolute nor static. In fact, it is only one of the many factors that account for a regime’s success or failure.
Therefore, one cannot fantasise about it or, worse, fanaticise it into a settled dogma like a religious cult. Nor rap leaders we do not like on their knuckles for not conforming to our expectations or ideas of it. Even if we try to prioritise, if not weaponise, freedom, elected martinets do not care. Nor do those who continue to vote them to power.
(Concluded)
(Views are personal)
Makarand R Paranjape
Professor of English at JNU
(Tweets @MakrandParanspe)