Adopting Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and later the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ (hikaku sangensoku) as the former prime minister Eisaku Sato announced in 1967, helped pacifist values deeply embed in the psychology of the society. The country embracing the policy of a peaceful state (heiwa kokka) led to the assumption that Tokyo would never face a war threat, let alone war itself. Given that Beijing’s military advancements in conventional, nuclear and Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) are supplemented with aggressive diplomatic posturing, Japan increasingly realises that the 1967 principles are not laws and fall within the larger umbrella of policies, which can be altered to varying degrees.
In this direction, in December 2022, a visionary National Security Strategy (NSS) naming China as the “greatest strategic challenge” was unveiled. The 36-page document is novel in many ways. The NSS also is a torchbearer of the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program.
First, it mentioned the development of “counter-strike capabilities” to “pre-empt” any attacks on Japanese soil. The document has stated that the missile attacks have become a “palpable threat” and that Tokyo will make “steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defence capabilities”. Further, the NSS outlines that “if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defences, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defence network alone”.
Thus, there are strong indications that the current interceptor-reliant missile defence system is outdated in protecting the core interests of Japan. Until now, Tokyo had maintained self-restraint on the issue, but owing to Putin’s nuclear threat and blackmailing a non-nuclear Ukraine, the initiative is well understood and also appreciated by the Japanese people. In this light, Prof. Yoichi Shimada, the advisor to late PM Shinzo Abe, had warned that a possible aggressor could replicate such tactics and Tokyo’s adversaries might resort to “political intimidation”. Such aggressors could be China or North Korea. A public debate on the development of new weapons is therefore rapidly gaining pace.
Second, the doctrine of “Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO) utilising Self Defense Forces (SDF) assets in the form of cross-governmental coordination” has also been incorporated into the NSS. It is meant to ensure safety in cases of asymmetric escalation. FDO was adopted by NATO, which advocated an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and permitted a credible response, thereby ensuring a Warfighting Equilibrium (WE). If the aggressor launches attacks, the WE requires the defender to respond flexibly by retaliating in equivalent measures or escalating to ensure a win. Thus, given the individual and the combined nuclear capabilities of China, North Korea and Russia, such posturing would make it essential for Japan to come out of its 1967 commitment of not possessing, using or hosting nuclear weapons or tactical weapons. Perhaps the “cross-governmental coordination” mentioned in the strategy might guide Japan in the coming months or years to initiate Japan into hosting such weapons.
Third, “promoting transfer of defence equipment and technology” also finds ample space in the comprehensive document. Tokyo aims to enhance its defence capabilities by coordinating with its allies and like-minded countries. Further, by FY 2027, a defence budget hike of 2% has been outlined, making it similar to the NATO standards. Japan’s Research and Development (R&D) will focus on the new and emerging areas of “cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic domains” with a view to coordinate with US, its traditional ally, and like-minded countries. It implies that Japan will open itself to deeper civil-military integration by developing technologies that are for dual purposes. It will also look at like-minded countries such as India to strengthen the freedoms of the Indo-Pacific region.
Finally, the above three points lead to a “multi-layered way by cross-domain operational capabilities” that has been meaningfully incorporated into the NSS doctrine.
It has aimed to focus on an integrated platform similar to a theatre defence system in which the principles of active defence are essential. An “active cyber defence” mandates developing and possessing offensive cyber capabilities directly linked to pre-emption. Thus, the doctrine has laid the groundwork for future directions in policy shifts and is an appreciable attempt towards comprehensive security. However, it warrants that Japan has to modify its mindset slightly. A hesitancy to do so is also reflected in the documents that suggest that first, the strategy is “exclusively defence-oriented” and second, pre-emption remains “impermissible”.
The narratives that Japanese people today discuss and debate will bring transformative changes in the coming future. Various experts suggest that if Japan changes its 1967 posturing, it will directly affect North East Asia’s security and snowball into an arms race in the region. Nevertheless, Japan would be coerced to adopt significant changes, given the evolving security environment of Asia. It might probably be left with no choice except to agree to host the tactical weapons of the US, apart from going ahead to achieve strategic and tactical independence.
There is a lot of scope for Indo-Japan defence technological cooperation, such as joint R&D between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), apart from the interagency cooperation to increase interoperability between the defence platforms of the two countries. Developing joint cyber-offensive programmes is another important area of cooperation, as the same adversary has targeted critical civilian infrastructure.
The recent ‘Veer Guardian’ joint air defence exercises send an important message to China to scale down its aggressiveness and hence are much more than “symbolic” in nature. In the coming few months, India should be ready to welcome the changes in Japanese foreign and security policy to ensure regional peace.
Dr Nishtha Kaushiki
Associate Professor, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda