As Pakistan appears to descend into chaos after the arrest of the former prime minister and leader of the Tehreek-e-Insaaf party, Imran Khan, and we have yet to recover from the shenanigans in Goa of Bilawal Bhutto Zardari (BBZ), the foreign minister, it is not just nostalgia that makes you look back at sobering times. There are lessons to be learnt from the past.
In May 1997, when the two newly elected prime ministers of India and Pakistan, Inder Kumar Gujral and Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, met on the fringes of the SAARC summit at Malé, the world was watching. Both leaders knew and understood that there was no quick fix to bilateral relations, no magic mantra, but that they must, in some fashion, address public expectations from their meeting.
Sharif, true to his pragmatic style, broke the ice. In chaste Punjabi, he told the Indian prime minister, "I know you can never give me Kashmir; I also know I cannot take it by force. But let us keep talking." In turn, Gujral responded, echoing the poet Ali Sardar Jafri, "Guftgu band na ho, baat se baat chale (let us continue this conversation; let this dialogue never end)."
Contrast this with the recent performance of BBZ during and after the meeting of the council of foreign ministers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Goa. Through his interventions, press briefings and select interviews, he virtually closed the door on the resumption of bilateral dialogue, and -- in response -- Dr S Jaishankar, the Indian External Affairs Minister, locked it and threw the keys away.
India's diplomatic relations with Pakistan have reached a new abyss at a time when the so-called 'land of the pure' has transformed into an unadulterated mess. In the process, three contemporary myths about Pakistan and its leadership were busted.
First, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari was an idealistic, urbane leader, inheritor of the legacy of the Bhuttos and out to carve out a niche for himself, and articulate a more 'enlightened' approach towards India. The reality is BBZ is more Zardari than Bhutto and is a creature of the more orthodox and narrow-minded sections of the establishment.
For all his failings, BBZ's Nana, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB), exercised a razor-sharp intellect. ZAB's charm was legendary, witnessed not just at Shimla in his summit meeting with Indira Gandhi. But even at his dramatic worst, as foreign minister, in his dialogue with Sardar Swaran Singh (who maintained a beatific smile even when grievously provoked), ZAB was thoughtful and forward-looking. Benazir Bhutto (until the Pakistan Army cut her wings) reached out to Rajiv Gandhi on Siachen and other issues and treated his emissaries -- including but not only Ambassador Ronen Sen -- with warmth and gracious hospitality.
In contrast, young Bilawal appeared impetuous, immature, and almost an upstart wanting to grandstand rather than have a serious conversation. His behaviour does not even meet the standards of an inebriated post-dinner squabble at Christ Church Oxford's junior common room -- the alma mater of BBZ -- leave alone the polemics of an Oxford Union debate. BBZ was interested in only addressing a domestic constituency and had little agency or political gravitas to move beyond the script.
The second myth was that the Pakistan Army had bought into normalising relations with India. Based on the widespread 'leaks' which suggested that the secret talks the Indian NSA, Ajit Kumar Doval, and his confidante, the R&AW chief, Samant Goel, had with erstwhile Army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa and the ISI head, Faiz Hameed, had yielded concrete results. This included a ceasefire at the LOC that has been sustained since 2021, and the possibility of Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting Pakistan later that year. With the departure of Bajwa, and the lack of 'control and confidence' of the current chief, Syed Asim Munir Ahmed Shah, this change in perception within the leadership of the forces seems to have been 'erased', at least for now. The Army is potentially dealing with a civil war within its frontiers and dissension within its ranks.
Finally, the belief that Pakistan's collapsing economy, its grave internal political strife marked by the groundswell in favour of Imran Khan, the robust revival of the TTP and the alienation of the Kabul regime would induce a greater sense of rationality in Islamabad, vis-à-vis India, has proven wrong.
A large section in Pakistan still believes that enmity with India is the only cement for national consolidation and that the Kashmir cause is worth fighting for until, sadly, the last Kashmiri.
Ironically, it has also been clear, for some years now, that India's MEA has been unable to comprehend the complexities of a changing Pakistan. India will realise too late, my friend, the scientist, Pervez Hoodbhoy, had warned two decades ago that it now has a "nuclear Somalia" as its neighbour. Robust if differentiated, focused but flexible multi-track responses must now define India's policy towards Pakistan's fragile and fragmented political and social structure.
India's policy has not succeeded because, while remaining a prisoner of past dogmas, it has been unable to respond to Pakistan's multiple political and social forces that need to be first understood and then addressed. There is a process of deep churning within Pakistan’s multiple "societies", which translates into schizophrenic responses on key identity issues.
As we know, the strategic community in India has traditionally been overwhelmingly supporting a policy of aggressively countering Pakistan. These are the Subedars. Only a minority, the Saudagars, have wanted to ignore and benignly neglect Islamabad or integrate it economically. A microscopic few, however, want New Delhi to be proactive in promoting peace, even to the extent of making unilateral concessions. These are the Sufis. But these strands cannot afford to remain in opposition to one another today. What is needed is for the Subedars, the Saudagars and the Sufis to come together and shape a new Pakistan policy.
India must build strong defensive and offensive capabilities to deter "asymmetric" attacks by non-state actors within Pakistan that the Pakistani establishment backs. At the end of the day, nuclear weapons will only deter nuclear weapons and, at best, a full-scale conventional war. Pakistan needs to feel -- in letter and spirit -- the costs of exporting terrorism. India must also weaken, delegitimise and isolate those who are enemies of an India-friendly Pakistan and, by implication, of a stable subcontinent.
Amitabh Mattoo is Professor, International Studies at JNU, and Honorary Professor, University of Melbourne. Founded & chaired the Chaophraya Track II dialogue with Pakistan.