Last August, I wrote about four general elections that had happened across Southeast Asia in 2022 and 2023. The four countries covered—the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Cambodia—showed an increasing sense of democratic deficit in the region. Much of the literature on the nature of political structures in Southeast Asia refer to the regional states as quasi-democratic or hybrid democracies, where the constant pulls and pressures of democratic processes are coupled with authoritarian ruling elites.
These elites have often been seen to have links to either the military governments that held power earlier (the Philippines); groups supporting huge conglomerates and business enterprises (Thailand); some form of single-party rule (Cambodia); or have had turbulent political coalitions based on racial politics (Malaysia).
The February 2024 elections in Indonesia added to the indication of a democratic slide in the region’s politics. As Indonesia completes 25 years of democracy—with the first vote in the post-Suharto period taking place in 1999—this year’s electoral process marked a watershed in understanding how its transition evolved.
In the post-Suharto period, Indonesia’s transition took place in what is popularly known as the reformasi (reform) period, which remains distinct from the earlier phase of democratic governance it enjoyed prior to the 1965 coup d’etat. To understand how democracy evolved in the country, it is imperative to see how its political order has been reshaped during critical periods.
The years 1949 to 1957 was a phase of consolidation following independence from the Dutch, which was the country’s first brush with parliamentary democracy. By 1957, when the situation across the archipelago became intense due to challenges from outer islands and resistance to government policies, Sukarno stated Western models of parliamentary democracy were not compatible with the “soul of Indonesia”, an allusion to the Javanese concept of power, which is hierarchical in nature.
This led to the policy of a Guided Democracy, in which Sukarno included all elements of society in a bid to ensure opposition to policies were reduced by increasing the stakes of various groups such as labourers, peasants and groups considered left-of-centre. While this was not clearly a sanction for left-leaning politics, in some quarters it was seen as mollycoddling of the left. This approach was considered more Indonesian in character, gotong rojong, which basically meant mutual cooperation. However, the period was complex, with highly centralised power and political chaos leading up to the elimination of the Partai Kommunis Indonesia in 1965.
The 1965 coup d’etat ushered in the New Order (Orde Baru) regime, backed by the military, and followed a developmentalist agenda while clamping down on political rights, with the pancasila as the state’s philosophy; it lasted till the 1998 refomasi in the aftermath of Suharto’s fall.
From 1999, the reversion to multiparty democratic model has been fraught with challenges, particularly on how the formation of coalition governments tests the political process. While reformasi has ushered in a democratic shift, the complexities of power-sharing pose the problem of deteriorating norms. First, a multiparty system with a common political ideology is lacking, leading to the movement of political elite between parties. While it helps in cobbling coalitions to retain power, it often limits the capacity of the legislature to move forward on key issues, particularly where differences in ideology emerge.
The February elections were among the largest voting exercises in the region, as polls for national, provincial and district-level representations were held simultaneously, electing approximately 20,000 representatives. Among the parties with a strong presence are the PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) led by Megawati Sukarnoputri; former President Joko Widodo held two terms in office through the PDIP.
The other significant players are the Democrat Party, to which former President Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono belonged; the National Awakening Party, ideologically at the centre with pancasila and pluralism as its founding principles; the Golkar party, a remnant of the military’s political ambitions and helps in sustaining coalitions like the one led by Widodo.
A few things stand out after February. First, the unstinted support given by Widodo to newly incumbent President Prabowo Subianto. It is Jokowi’s son Gibran Rakabuming Raka who was Prabowo’s running mate; while Gibran was formerly affiliated with the PDIP, he ran as an independent this time. Meanwhile, Subianto, a former general and son-in-law of Suharto, was also a commander of the Kopassus, the army special forces implicated in human rights violations during Suharto’s rule. What is likely to emerge is a nationalistic leadership that will focus on domestic issues.
There is likely to be a continuation of the free and active foreign policy that Indonesia always follows. Steady progress is expected of its bilateral ties with India. On regional issues, ASEAN will be at the core of foreign policy projections. On maritime issues in Indonesian waters and economic zones, there will undoubtedly be a strong stand. With Widodo in the backdrop and Gibran as vice president, the coalition will seek to continue the amalgamation of different parties to support the president. Another phase of coalition politics awaits.
(Views are personal)
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)
Shankari Sundararaman | Professor at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University