At least 3,800 people have been killed and 16,000 wounded in Lebanon since the war began in Gaza in October last year, pointless casualties torn apart by warring militias and regular armies. A ceasefire has at last been brokered by the US and France, but the longevity of any agreement in West Asia is not worth even the paper on which it is typed.
While the Gaza issue is largely understood because of the direct relationship to the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas and the energetic campaign by the Israel Defence Forces to defeat it and get maximum hostages released, much less is known about the reasons why the war in southern Lebanon began in the first place. To appreciate the geopolitical implications of war and peace in Lebanon, it is necessary to briefly delve into that background.
In 1948, with the foundation of Israel and displacement of Palestinians, many of the latter gravitated to southern Lebanon as refugees. In the 1980s, Israeli military incursions into southern Lebanon aimed to weaken the Palestine Liberation Organization, which had used this area as a base for attacks against Israel. This contributed to the destabilisation of Lebanon and Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982. Bekaa Valley was the prominent landmark of that time.
During this period, Hezbollah emerged as a militant group, later declared by the US and EU as an international terrorist group. It was formed as a proxy force post the Iranian Revolution in 1979, to give the new Iranian leadership a greater leverage over the situation in West Asia. Israel occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000. It withdrew under claims of Hezbollah pressure, which gave the latter a higher status within the Arab resistance. While ideologically aligned with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), its linkage with Iran gave Hezbollah a dominant position in the geostrategically important Levant area, the northern area between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean that links West Asia to Europe.
A chequered history exists of Hezbollah’s standoff with Israel. It includes the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war, in which neither side could achieve victory but the stalemate gave Hezbollah the status of a proxy regional actor.
Even before the Israel-Hamas war broke out, Hezbollah had been armed to the teeth by Iran through a continuous supply of missiles and rockets, which gave it the capability to reach major Israeli cities. Occasional flare-ups have occurred from time to time, keeping the area destabilized. Israel’s fear had always been that Hezbollah could use southern Lebanon as a launchpad for large-scale attacks on northern Israeli territory, particularly in the event of broader regional instability.
The Hamas attack and the events thereafter confirmed that perception as Hezbollah activated Israel’s northern front. It turned Israel’s settlements there into ghost towns, with around 60,000 civilians evacuated further south. Operationally, Hezbollah became part of the strategy to keep Israeli attention and resources divided between the south and north.
Iran's interests in Lebanon are multi-faceted, and its involvement with Hezbollah is central to its broader strategy in West Asia. Lebanon has little say in its own security affairs, which are run under the Israel-Hezbollah coordination and direction.
So, why have Hezbollah and Iran agreed to a ceasefire after all the aggression of the recent past? There could be several reasons. First, escalation control is an important factor for Iran to remain relevant to the situation in West Asia. In Iranian strategy, there are limits to escalation, clearly exemplified by the lack of response to several situations in the past such as the targeting of the IRGC leadership.
Second, it cannot be seen as the reason for the instability and widespread destruction in Lebanon. The example of Gaza perhaps dawned clear that Israel would have little remorse in differentiating between civilian and military targets, and the collateral involved in targeting Hezbollah was not a diluting factor that Israel would consider.
Third, it appears evident that there are clear limits Iran has established to the linkages it perceives between the situations in Gaza and southern Lebanon. One can influence the other only up to a point. The message seems to have gone home that Israel was unwilling to compromise as over one hundred Israeli hostages are also involved. That meant that the Lebanese front could only have limited influence on the war in Gaza.
It was better for Iran and Hezbollah therefore to establish their relevance to the extent possible and pull back to remuster and recoup their forces. Morally for Iran, a military victory is of little consequence; all it vies for is its own relevance in context of the Islamic world, where no nation has helped the Palestinian cause in as proactive a way as Iran.
The ceasefire agreement does not inspire confidence at first glance; 60 days have been given for the removal of fighters and weapons from the Blue Line, with 5,000 Lebanese troops replacing Hezbollah. The monitoring is to be done by the US and France; the specific role of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon is not known. Israel will be free to initiate action if Hezbollah attempts to re-arm itself or take any offensive action.
For Israel, a ceasefire is also a good reprieve because its war aims in the north were limited. It helps in diluting some of the severe international diplomatic criticism on the lack of Israel’s moral angle attached to collateral on both war fronts.
How far will this ceasefire hold? Iran and Hezbollah cannot afford to be quiet. Infringements with lower scope of full retaliation could be the commencement of a new strategy until a Gaza ceasefire is negotiated. A complete lack of activity will weaken Iran’s strategic relevance.
The one activity that bears maximum potential for retaliation/response by Israel is the re-arming of Hezbollah, which will be attempted through surface routes in the Levant, with the US constantly monitoring and providing information for the Israelis to respond. That could lead to Hezbollah forays into the northern Israeli town, thus re-activating the front. The unpredictability factor becomes higher because of the impending arrival of the Trump administration.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)