The geopolitical complexities of West Asia make it one of the hotbeds of conflict based upon territorial ambitions, political influence, economic considerations and ideological factors. Since all these domains remain dynamic, predictive analysis is always a challenge.
Three major conflict situations have highlighted the combative environment of West Asia for fairly long. These are the Israel-Palestinian, Iran-Israel and the Iran-Saudi (read Shia-Sunni) conflicts. There are subsets within these conflicts that pepper the region. For example, there is the Yemen affair that is a proxy fallout of the Iran-Saudi contestation. The Palestinian-Israel standoff is meshed with the Iran-Israel affair, with Iran’s proxies in the Gaza war zone and the Levant. In the midst of all this, there was the Syrian civil war, which dominated the West Asian security scene for almost a decade and was made worse by the presence of ISIS (Da’esh).
The presence of this ambitious and highly ruthless transnational terrorist group helped complicate the strategic environment of West Asia by many notches. Without a known sponsor and with little known about the actual ambitions of Daesh, the only way to battle it was in the physical domain. It took five years to do this, drawing the Russian, US, Iraqi, Syrian, Kurdish and Iranian armed resources into battle at different times before Daesh was defeated. West Asia remained in the throes of high instability through this period (2014-19), with little clarity on who needed to fight whom.
Is the latest Syrian revolution likely to result in something similar? There are enough reports from Eastern Syria of the potential revival of Daesh. US military resources say “The number of attacks claimed by Daesh in Iraq and Syria is on pace to more than double from last year, indicating the terrorist group is working to regain its strength”.
We need to remember that the collapse of the Syrian Army, the weakening of Hezbollah by Israel’s war of attrition against it, the apparent loss of confidence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the rapid pullout of Russian military resources from Syria has left voids for the current.
The lack of military activity and the absence of a rush to fill the voids is apparently a strategy by most powers to assess what exactly is happening in this core centre of conflict zones. It is only Israel that has taken advantage of the lull to strike the depots and military storage resources of the former Syrian Army where mostly Russian and Iranian equipment was stored. This was to offset the possibility of the employment of this equipment, including possible chemical weapons, against Israeli interests.
The new rulers of Syria, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have been different to the normal run of rebel forces in West Asia that usually were the promoters of lawlessness, chaos and turmoil. It will be interesting to see the model of governance that HTS establishes. Early talk of a secular model may be for social media attraction. The proof has to be on the table soon enough.
HTS has deeply committed to liquidating the presence and influence of the Iran-Hezbollah combination and perhaps Russia as well in Syria. Yet, it has an Islamist orientation that poses potential dangers to Syrian minorities—especially Alawites and Christians. Syrian governance falling into the hands of a fundamentalist group containing foreign fighters perhaps still harbouring transnational terrorist sentiments is not something that can be discounted.
Daesh as the undeclared strongest non-state entity in the region could be looking towards contesting the ownership of Syria. That could either lead to an HTS-Daesh conflict or an understanding since they are not far removed from each other ideologically. The elements that successfully battled Daesh last time were the Iraqi Shia militias. We have no reports on the relationship of HTS with the militias, nor on the current military capability of the latter. In the context of recent unexpected military victories and defeats, one could expect surprises all over again.
Iraqi Shia militias, particularly those aligned with Iranian interests, have played a significant role in the region. These militias, such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, have maintained operations in Syria despite Iraq's internal stabilisation. They were vital to Iran's regional strategy and had been deployed to bolster the Assad regime, particularly in areas like Aleppo, Latakia, and Damascus. With the loss of these areas, it does not seem the militias are in any form to play a major role in the immediate future.
The importance of a Turkey-US joint strategy to keep the Levant area stable and free of terrorist activity becomes a virtual necessity. However, this is subject to the US rescinding its support to the Syrian Kurdish rebels, who played some part in Assad’s defeat and flight out of Damascus. The Turks will not play ball with any Kurdish organisation becoming a beneficiary of the results of cooperation.
For Russia and Iran, most doors seem shut. While Russia’s chief interest is on Syria to support its foothold on the Mediterranean coast and remain a significant player in the West Asia imbroglio, for Iran it’s a question of re-establishing its proxy war strategy. Till the Assad regime lasted, both strategies could be served but no longer. Both powers will have to decide the inter se priority between territory and proxy war.
For Israel, it’s a win-win thus far. It can focus on Gaza while keeping an eye on Syria and Lebanon. Logically, the capability of both Hamas and Hezbollah would have degraded substantially. The military success of Israel must aim at ending conflict rather than creating the potential for the reignition of the multiple contests in West Asia.
The last of the conflicts, Iran-Saudi, which is ideological in nature, could be re-ignited if sectarian conflict begins in Syria. This is an opportunity for big powers to prevent any such conflict. However, the weakening of Iran could be a deliberate strategic intent that may initiate dynamics that remain extremely unpredictable for now.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)