There is hardly a nation as beholden to and yet so vulnerable to its own geography as Pakistan. It has unnatural and contrived boundaries which have not emerged through a historical process, having been drawn one fine day and left at that. It hugely benefitted from its geostrategic location, prime among the reasons being its centricity in relation to five old civilisations that share borders with it or are in near contiguity.
The Indian civilisation, from which Pakistan has emerged, lies in the east. The Chinese civilisation, on which it relies so much, is to the northeast. There is the Central Asian civilisation to its north with the Wakhan Corridor separating the two. Then there is Iran—the ancient Persian civilisation, now the citadel of Shia Islam—to its west. The Arab civilisation exists just across the waters of the northwest Indian Ocean. It is the Arab culture that fascinates Pakistan the most, and it has attempted to project itself as a natural extension of the Arab people into South Asia. The latter is because of its obsession with Islam, of which it aspires to be a flag-bearer, perceiving it has the wherewithal to lead it.
Ironically, due to its proximity to all these regions which are civilisations in their own right, Pakistan enjoys an incredible level of strategic importance. Each has something to give it and much to take from it. The Arabs find that the only alignment for influence over the 72 million Muslims of Central Asia is through Pakistan, Shia Iran being a pariah and no friend; Afghanistan is too complex to handle.
China’s access to the Indian Ocean’s crucial north-western portion lies through the alignment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gwadar Port. India too would benefit immensely if it had access to the Central Asian Republics (CARs), something Pakistan has denied in the last 32 years. Iran has an ethnic group in common with Pakistan— the Baloch, who in Iran reside in the Sistan and Balochestan (Iranian spelling) province and in Pakistan in Baluchistan. The region is rich in minerals and is, therefore, targeted by separatists who wish to be away from the influence of both nations. Some 6 lakh Baloch also live in South Afghanistan.
The borders all tend to be volatile and the degree of volatility appears to be increasing. We may start with J&K in India. Pakistan calls it disputed and lays claim on the entire territory on grounds of the majority faith in existence. Having made no headway in resolving the border with India through war, Pakistan has chosen the most modern way of attempting to keep India militarily engaged—the use of ‘almost war’, a euphemism for a hybrid proxy war, well short of conventional war. It is happy to keep the situation festering in the hope that circumstances will change or the majority population will rise in its favour. It has been a fond hope since Partition, but in none of the conflicts has this desire fructified.
True to its character, it has failed to develop economically or socially even a region it considers disputed—Pakistan Occupied Kashmir or PoK. It stands a good chance of facing a situation of such economic and military asymmetry with its adversary that even fighting the ‘almost war’ may peter out.
That is where the first of the dangers to Pakistan’s borders lies. Pakistan should feel gratified that the government of India does not get carried away by public pressure for the return of PoK to Indian control. The Indian government is mature enough to realise that patience in such situations is a virtue. Attempts in the early millennium to draw the international border along the Line of Control in an ‘as is where is’ mode to settle the boundary did not succeed. With nationalism on a high, this border has all the potential to erupt—ceasefire or no ceasefire.
The borders with the Pamir region—the New ‘Great Game’ zone—have Central Asia, China and Afghanistan in proximity. Hunting with the hounds and running with the hare is Pakistan’s policy here, fully in the knowledge that the dynamics of this region are unique. The Uyghur in Xinjiang are militant and regularly in transit to the CARs and the Northern Areas. As Islam’s flag-bearer, Pakistan should support them and oppose the Chinese efforts to curtail Islamic practices. However, it cannot do so by geopolitical compulsion and therefore exposes itself to the pulls and pressures of either side. On the other hand, it now has competition in the form of the Taliban-led Afghanistan, where no change in political dispensation is likely for many years.
The Taliban as a force of diffusion has been actively involved in supporting Islamist groups in Central Asia and Xinjiang. It has kept the Chinese at an arm’s length on ideological issues, making the latter wary of the treatment of the Islamic people within China’s boundaries. The Taliban’s decision to up the ante on the Durand Line is to pressurise Pakistan in terms of the ambitions for Islamic leadership. It has cast its dice because it feels Pakistan does not have the moral right to leadership nor the capability due to the intense influence of both the US and China. The fight for obscurantist Islam will thus be led by the Taliban, as apparently manifest on Pakistan’s border.
That leaves the question of Iran, which has no desire to activate another border away from that with its eastern Arab neighbours and Turkey. Its border with Pakistan and Afghanistan is ridden with issues which are in the eye of the storm at most times—narcotics, gun running and human smuggling, including the movement of transnational jihadists, many of whom are mercenary in outlook. The recent spat with Pakistan may be based upon strikes by Sunni Baloch radicals from Pakistan into Iran, but the larger issue is about being boxed in by a weather-based ally of the US who is always squeezing Iran. The domination of the waters of the north-western Indian Ocean by the Pakistan Navy in partnership with the Chinese Navy also cuts options for Iran in the Gulf of Oman, the entry into the Persian Gulf. The sea borders of Pakistan are therefore also active.
Hemmed from all directions, Pakistan has to learn to optimally divide focus to each of these crucial lines and areas. Any of them can erupt to its detriment, as it has just learnt.
(Views are personal)
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps,now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(atahasnain@gmail.com)