Interesting developments in the domain of Sino-Indian relations took place almost simultaneously last fortnight. The relationship has not been in the best of states since May 2020, when the East Ladakh standoff commenced between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army and resulted in some serious clashes at Galwan on June 15, 2020. The relationship seemed to dive only further south.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently inaugurated the Sela Tunnel, which has been bored at a cost of `825 crore and is 1.5 km long at a height of 3,000 metres, well below the height of 4,200 metres at which the Sela Pass exists. The Chinese seemed to have their age-old objection about the visit of any dignitary to Arunachal Pradesh, which they claim as their territory called Southern Tibet (or Zangnam). For the Indian PM, it was perhaps a carefully thought-out measure to assert sovereignty and project a sense of strategic confidence in the face of repeated psychological warfare. The completion of the tunnel in an area it calls its own is itself objected to by the PLA. Little does China and its official media, The Global Times, say about the entire corridor it has constructed through Gilgit-Baltistan, an area legitimately belonging to India.
Militarily, the Sela tunnel acts as a force multiplier in the speedy deployment of troops to hot war locations in the Kameng division of Arunachal Pradesh, one of the regions where the PLA and the Indian Army clashed during the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. With all-weather rapid induction of troops, the tunnel provides a psychological boost for India’s military commanders who have always had to fret over the optimum size of deployment for winter and the quantum of winter stocking of supplies and ammunition.
For the layman, it needs to be understood that on the PLA side beyond the Bumla pass north of Tawang, the Tibetan plateau opens out into rolling plains, making logistics and reinforcements the least of its problems. Almost on the same lines, Eastern Ladakh also bears for the Indian Army the challenge of the Ladakh range from Leh to the battle areas. Srinagar and Pathankot have a problem of winter connectivity to Leh through the Himalayan and the Zanskar ranges. For the PLA, Indian infrastructure development should be worrisome, but India is only doing what the PLA did 20-30 years ago and continues to do. It should also be aware that permanent locations with habitat and storage have come up in important places all along the LAC, converting it almost akin to the LoC, which is manned very densely by the Indian Army to prevent any loss of territory.
The other development is in the field of future weaponry. India tested the Made-in-India Agni-5 missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology. MIRVs consist of several reentry vehicles, each equipped to carry multiple warheads (2-10) that can be designated for various targets, spaced hundreds of kilometres apart. Alternatively, multiple warheads can target a single location.
This is different from other missile technologies, where a single missile carries only one warhead and targets only a single location. Under Project Divyastra, this is a classic Indian achievement. Only the five big powers possess this capability, which is complex enough to let the warheads be decoys for the adversary’s anti-ballistic missiles, or cause far greater destruction through delivery of nuclear munitions to multiple targets several kilometres apart.
While the US MIRV capability exists at 12,000-15,000 km, it is not just the long range but the achievement of complex technologies of reentry and multiple targeting that gives greater nuclear deterrence capability to India in a calibrated way. Although Pakistan is reported to be developing a similar capability, India’s progress is not aimed at any one adversary but a broad future range of contingencies where the possession of such capability provides inherent deterrence.
Some interesting outcomes appear evident from the successful India MIRV launch. Firstly, with the MIRV range at 5,000 km (with perhaps more to come) China’s Global Times quotes Qian Feng, a director of one of its research departments, as saying, “It particularly shows that India’s main hypothetical enemy is China, with its goal of having missile coverage over China to enhance deterrence capabilities.” What China, its leadership and military hierarchy have to realise is that India, too, is developing at a fast rate and gaining greater confidence as its economy, research and development, technology and human parameters all improve. This is natural for any nation to aspire for.
India is fully perceptive that China does not wish to see India grow and become an alternative pole in Asia. Understanding the inevitability of India’s growth, China wishes to scuttle whatever it can to delay the achievement of India’s aspiration. The actions China commenced in April-May 2020 in Ladakh have been followed by a tirade of hostility to force India to commit itself far more to its strategic security. It continues to include a mix of various measures to keep India on the defensive; the most recent being the placement of spy vessels of the PLA Navy in the vicinity of India’s maritime zone to obtain data from Indian technology tests such as the MIRV. Terming 10,000 Indian troops in Eastern Ladakh, under various stages of re-orbating, as increments on the LAC, when these troops have remained deployed here since April-May 2020, is also unfortunate.
What China needs to realise is that keeping Sino-Indian relations in the grey zone of ‘friend, adversary, partner or collaborator’ is not helpful to either nation. In a competitive world, with a young population and dynamic human capital, India has all the potential to grow beyond the threshold of a middle power; events such as landmark technological achievements will continuously contribute to China’s unfortunate perceptions, and the scope for that will increase manifold with more progress. It probably fears this happening before it has achieved its own threshold objectives, such as the re-integration of all its perceived former territories. Being a potential superpower too, it’s not easy to let go of perceptions. Can India do anything more to ease misperception and intent? It will give us more leeway for rapid growth and perhaps even collaboration. Time to think.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)