India has seen a dramatic improvement in its patent-granting process, moving from fewer than 10,000 patents annually in 2016-17 to over 1,00,000 patents in 2023-24.
This surge in patent approvals, driven by extensive reforms and increased efficiency in the patent office, signifies a significant transformation in India’s intellectual property landscape.
However, caution is necessary when interpreting these figures. The rising number is often mistakenly taken as a direct measure of innovation. Yet, the patent for a sealed crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich in the US from 1999 showcases how trivial and mundane “inventions” can dilute the true purpose of patent protections. This example starkly illustrates that not all patents drive meaningful technological progress.
According to Fisch, Sandner and Regner (2017), and Danish, Ranjan and Sharma (2020), relying solely on patent filing numbers as a metric for innovation is not just misleading, it’s deceptive. Without ensuring the quality matches the quantity, the integrity of the system is at risk, turning a potentially innovative ecosystem into a repository of the mundane.
When low-quality patents covering non-novel or obvious inventions are granted, they disrupt the system’s foundational purpose—to incentivise innovation while balancing the costs of monopoly distortions. Although such patents may appear harmless due to their likely invalidity, their uncertain enforceability creates deadweight losses and distorts incentives for genuine research and development (R&D). This shifts the patent system from a stimulant to a deterrent of innovation.
Additionally, the ease of obtaining patents for marginal inventions leads to a fragmentation of intellectual property rights, elevating the costs of accessing and utilising knowledge, potentially depressing further investment in R&D. This is particularly detrimental in sectors involving complex technologies where innovation is often cumulative.
As noted by Gideon Parchomovsky in the “patent paradox”, the modern system is shaped by incentives that inadvertently promote the issuance of low-quality patents. This paradox highlights a trend where increasing numbers of patent applications are filed despite their often negative economic and innovative value.
Applicants often draft vague patents to maintain flexibility for future technological or market changes, leading to poorly defined boundaries. This can result in extensive litigation to determine their scope and validity, imposing significant costs on all involved and creating barriers within the innovation ecosystem. Additionally, patent offices, burdened by high volumes of applications and limited resources, may prioritise speed over thoroughness.
Moreover, the patent paradox reflects strategic behaviours among firms, especially in competitive sectors, where companies accumulate patents not to protect real innovations but to hinder competitors. This can stifle competition and innovation, contradicting the patent system’s intent to foster and protect genuine inventions.
Further, in India, educational institutions often prioritise increasing their patent outputs to boost Academic Performance Indicator (API) scores for faculty promotions, sometimes at the cost of patent quality. This emphasis on quantity over quality arises because API scores, which influence faculty career advancements, encourage filing numerous patents, regardless of market relevance. As a result, patents often represent minor modifications rather than significant advancements.
To effectively address the delays in patent processing, recent administrative reforms and the increased hiring of patent examiners have improved the handling of the sheer volume of applications—however, more than these measures is needed to overcome the core challenges in the system. Patentees must be provided with strong incentives to pursue patents that meet the rigorous criteria of patentability. Without these changes, our efforts to reform the patent application process will fail to achieve meaningful progress.
Wagner (2009) has developed an incentive framework for ensuring high-quality patents. Key reforms include enhanced early analysis of patent claims, where patent offices should draft detailed administrative opinions on claim scope at the initial stages of the review process. This early clarity reduces the incentive for patentees to defer clarity, ensuring well-defined patent scopes and intents.
Adjusting cost structures by increasing application and maintenance fees also deters speculative filings by making the financial investment significant enough to consider a patent’s potential value and validity carefully. Additionally, introducing minimum disclosure requirements ensures that applications include comprehensive technical details and demonstrate novelty and non-obviousness, which prevents vague and overly broad claims.
Creating incentives for third-party observations enhances the scrutiny of patent applications by leveraging external expertise, leading to more robust patent grants. Implementing or enhancing post-grant review processes adds a layer of risk by allowing further scrutiny after patents have been granted, acting as a deterrent against low-quality filings. Linking patent approval to assessments of technological impact and market utility ensures patents contribute meaningful advancements.
Given that India has already addressed the volume of patents, it is crucial to shift focus towards improving their quality.
(Views are personal)
Aditya Sinha
Officer on Special Duty, Research, Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister