The flavour of the new festive season is obviously Sino-Indian rapprochement and for good measure. Over four years of negativity left a bitter taste in the mouth, after a reasonably flourishing and, dare one say, improving relationship we witnessed from 2014 to 2020. The temptation for analysts is to jump straight into the details of the agreement announced on October 21, 2024 and indulge in the favourite pastime of monitoring the implementation down to the move of the last soldier and the words uttered in an army-to-army meeting at the LAC.
It’s actually suffice just to leave this with the broad understanding that the two areas thus far untouched by the engagement between the Corps Commander level talks—Demchok and Depsang—have been addressed to facilitate disengagement and subsequently allow patrols to revisit the areas to which they have been prevented. It’s a fairly significant development, about which speculation is bound to remain until a detailed report, along with field visits by the media, is transparently brought out by the government.
The issue on which we need the fuller consensus is the understanding that what has transpired between India and China in relation to some of the border areas is not a transformational development, as there is no guarantee how far this process will go, given China’s propensity to treat foreign relations as a collection of episodic instances, some positive and some negative. It’s of far more import to understand where the change in China’s heart came from and how this episode of Sino-Indian relations will be viewed by the Chinese leadership and think tanks.
Just remember the border may see a restoration of the April-May 2020 status with existence of all the reserve forces and wherewithal slightly removed and not too far from the LAC; infrastructure development obviously cannot be rolled back. Yet, what cannot be restored overnight is the trust evolved between the two nations, and the confidence of potential diplomatic last resort in crises, if not by apex level consensus.
The factors that influenced the developments in Sino-Indian relations are related to the geopolitical effects of the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, the emerging division of the world order into a virtual East-West configuration, the flagging Chinese economy, and the potential rise of India as a swing state with a power aspiration of its own. More than these is the broad perception China carries about India being a potential obstacle to its rise to higher geopolitical status.
It is the latter that probably unnerved China in 2020. I have often written, ad nauseum, that the Doklam face off, transformational modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces, the calibrated strikes across the LoC in 2016 and 2019 and the proactive removal of Article 370 gave China a message that it misunderstood. India was definitely seeking its own place under the sun, but not in any offensive way. China perceived it as a potential challenge to its strategic position. The Ladakh adventurism was never meant to be a ground manoeuvre for military advantage; it was just a message that China calibrated in a most awkward way.
What changed in four years and more was perhaps not just a Chinese desire but mutual strategic need. The economic necessity for China had started manifesting in a strategic desire for markets that would not be accessible if the relationship did not keep pace. India had already taken action to partially exclude China as a player; perhaps that had begun to finally hurt.
Improved bilateral relations can lead to increased trade, benefiting China's economy. China can invest in India's growing infrastructure, technology and manufacturing sectors, generating returns and deepening economic ties. The development process in India is set on a long course; a stable relationship between India and China can only be helpful towards the cause of continuous boost to the Chinese economy, along with that of India.
In strategic terms, a guaranteed Indian hostility against China in issues related to Sino-US relations can be considerably diluted in future situations if India straddles lesser options instead of being seen to be inextricably strategically aligned to the US. India has handled its approach towards the emerging world order with reasonable finesse. On both the raging wars, Ukraine and Gaza, it has maintained an equidistant stance without any emotive response. It understands the nuances well and has not got itself embroiled in any capacity.
Even becoming an interlocutor is not something it should embroil itself in a hurry. Although that status may get it a higher status in international geopolitics, it could also be potentially embarrassing in its future relationships.
China is hugely concerned about its future status as a potential superpower. India is not the sole obstacle to this aim, but it is indeed a significant factor in China's strategic calculus. It’s not as if an overnight return to bonhomie in Sino-Indian relations can be achieved. Chinese strategic thinking will need to realise that its clash of interests with another nation such as India may be self-perceived. The benefit of being members of two international groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS can travel upon both India and China in quantum terms if they have a conciliatory approach.
The responsibility of rebuilding trust lies in larger measure with China as the triggers towards breakdown in relations came from its direction. That is where the border issues between the two come in. A decade of stability at the borders without provocations and complete mutual respect for the stance of both sides will help in ensuring future resolution.
That could well be wishful thinking because it's not just bilateralism at play. Considering its own rising strategic significance, India will necessarily be drawn into many other dynamics of big power issues now that it sits at the higher table. It won’t be easy meandering a safe path through this, one that caters purely for our interests. Can path-breaking initiatives follow without disturbing the equation? That is the challenge for both nations.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)