As the leaders of the world’s major economies confabulate in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for the annual G20 summit, unresolved geopolitical tensions continue to blight the global landscape. The war in Ukraine has just passed its 1,000th day and there is no end in sight for Israel’s genocidal conflict with the Palestinians. Escalating tensions have drawn Lebanon and Iran deeper into the West Asian turmoil.
In addition, the air in Rio’s Museum of Modern Art, the venue of the conclave, is thick with the unpredictability of US president-elect Donald Trump—a well-known sceptic of multilateralism—who will occupy the White House two months from now and host the G20 summit in 2026.
Created in 1999 in response to a series of major international debt crises, the Group of 20 aims to unite world leaders around shared economic, political and health challenges. It is an informal group representing some 85 percent of the global GDP, 75 per cent of world trade, and about two-thirds of the world’s population. Consisting of 19 countries, the European Union and the African Union (AU), it bills itself as the “premier forum for international cooperation”.
The Rio summit marks the first time the AU will participate as a full member, as it was inducted only last year during the gathering in New Delhi. Its inclusion underscores the importance of multilateral collaboration between emerging economies and developed nations.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s presence at the summit, coming soon after his participation last month in the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, will be viewed as New Delhi’s continued engagement with the Global South. “Last year, India’s successful presidency elevated the G20 to the ‘people’s G20’ and mainstreamed the priorities of the Global South into its agenda. This year, Brazil has built upon India’s legacy,” Modi said on Saturday.
With the theme ‘Building a just world and a sustainable planet’, Brazil’s G20 agenda aims to promote sustainable development and green energy, fight poverty and reduce inequality. Among other key issues are multilateral reforms, debt sustainability, bridging the global digital divide, and tackling climate change and energy transition challenges.
Brazil’s President Lula da Silva has been a vocal advocate for reforming global governance institutions like the UN and the World Trade Organization, emphasising stronger representation for developing nations. His proposal to expand the UN Security Council to include nations from Latin America, Africa, India, Germany and Japan reflects this push.
“Multilateral institutions are not adequately equipped to deal with current challenges,” said Mauro Vieira, Brazil’s foreign minister, during a meeting of G20 foreign ministers this February. The imbalance in global governance is stark: the G7 nations, with just 13 percent of the global population, control 59 percent of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank voting rights.
It will be interesting to see how far the discussions go on global governance reform, a central theme of Brazil’s G20 presidency. It was also a major theme of India’s G20 agenda last year, but has made no further progress.
The launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, a Brazilian initiative to mobilise countries and global organisations, is expected to speed up the good fight by 2030. Also high on the agenda is the unprecedented climate crisis the world is facing. The lack of progress in reaching an agreement on climate financing at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, has cast a shadow over the G20 climate talks.
Meanwhile, Trump’s resounding election win raises questions about the future of multilateralism itself. His first-term policies suggested a rejection of globalism and climate concerns, though a declining unipolar world may compel Washington to engage more strategically this time around. Interestingly, Trump’s record on G20 has been one of close engagement. He attended his first three G20 meetings starting in 2017 and vigorously pushed for his policies.
Many nations in the global south, such as India and Indonesia, are indeed close partners of the US. Yet, the fact remains that the global south is increasingly dissatisfied with Washington’s stewardship of the international system and its many failures. That dissatisfaction is reflected in its priorities at the G20.
Also, there is a possibility that even a partial withdrawal by Washington from the global commons may be construed by some actors in the global south as an opportunity to break free from power structures dominated by the West and increasingly help establish a multipolar global order less reliant on Western values. That could lead to these countries getting closer to China or Russia. Therefore, in a rising multipolar world, even a right-turning Washington may find it advantageous to forge a new bargain with the global south through forums such as the G20.
It is a historic coincidence that for four years, the G20 presidency has been with emerging economies—Indonesia (2022), India (2023), Brazil (2024), and South Africa (2025). This has amplified the voice of the global south, underscoring its rising influence in global governance.
For Brazil, hosting the summit reaffirms its role as a leader in global discourse. President Lula, after returning to power in 2023, is seeking to reposition Brazil as a prominent player in shaping international agendas, overcoming the diplomatic isolation it suffered in recent years under former right-wing President Jair Bolsonaro.
(Views are personal)
E D Mathew | Former Spokesperson, United Nations
