Considering Donald Trump’s hostility and the universal aversion of the US towards Iran, one could have expected that military action against Iran’s suspected nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, Parchin and elsewhere would be one of the early priorities of Trump 2.0. That belief is not without reason. Israel probably has a well-rehearsed plan to take some of the facilities out, although, without US assistance, that may not be entirely possible.
The strategic environment of West Asia has swung dramatically in Israel’s favour quite decidedly after the targeting of the Hamas and Hezbollah leadership and downfall of the Assad government in Syria. Iranian proxies are at their weakest, except perhaps the Houthis in South Yemen, who are under attack by the US, with Operation Rough Rider having commenced on March 15.
The spectre of Iran’s nuclear programme has loomed large for almost three decades. Recent tensions have reignited the debate over whether the US should launch a military strike on the nuclear facilities. It’s a fact that a very different strategic setting has welcomed Trump in 2025 than the one he left in 2020. There are two wars being waged over fairly elongated periods in Ukraine and Gaza, but both are indecisive in their final strategic impact.
The anathema that existed between Iran and the Saudis has diluted to some extent, thanks to some clever diplomacy by the Chinese and the reform-oriented approach of Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Saudi army chief has just visited Iran after many years and a rapprochement could well be underway.
Internally, the ayatollahs haven’t been this weak ever. Public support for Iran’s clerical establishment has been waning, influenced by economic hardships, perceived governmental corruption and social restrictions. While the regime maintains control through security apparatuses and suppression of dissent, the underlying societal tensions persist, posing risks to long-term stability. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ entrenchment in political structures has led some analysts to describe Iran as a ‘garrison state’, where military entities wield substantial power over civilian affairs.
The Iranian rial has lost over 90 percent of its value since the US withdrew from the nuclear deal in 2018. Inflation is persistently high. Iran is outside the international financial system that supports credit cards, thus making even tourism extremely difficult. Iran’s oil exports have dropped from 2.5 million barrels a day to under 1 million at times due to sanctions. As energy accounts for a majority of government revenues, this has led to budget deficits and social service cuts. High inflation, a weak private sector and foreign disinvestment have led to chronic unemployment, especially among young graduates. Many Iranians have been pushed into poverty and public frustration is rising.
Given the latent internal turbulence, are US strategic planners veering towards perceiving an impending meltdown of Iran? It needs to be recalled that Iran has deepened economic and military ties with China and Russia, including long-term strategic agreements, to offset Western isolation. These have kept it from sinking deeper into the economic morass. Iran has also incentivised self-reliance and innovated on market mobility. To any pragmatic observer, the shift in the Iranian leadership’s stance would appear evident, because whatever it may have been able to do is in survival mode. Yet, the situation is grey and not tilted towards the US taking one or the other action—war or diplomacy.
Negotiations on Iran’s overall status—the sanctions, the nuclear plan and more—appear to be favoured, without sounding defeatist. That status would find favour in the US-Israel camp for many reasons. Despite their aggressive rhetoric and hardline postures, both Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu have enough reasons to prefer negotiations over direct military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Among those is the fact that Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is dispersed, hardened and, in some cases, underground (Fordow). Even a successful strike might only delay Iran’s progress by a few years—not destroy the programme entirely, although claims to the contrary exist among US-Israeli planners. Iran could rebuild, and possibly with greater secrecy and determination and, this time, with support from China and Russia.
Targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure bears the risk of initiating a third inconclusive and extended war in a region where the strategic and economic impact would be almost unbearable for the world. Although none of the Arab/Gulf states have extended support about using their air space for a joint US-Israel aerial action against Iran, a strike could trigger retaliation, including unpredictable geopolitical alignments that would follow. Missile barrages into Israel would be guaranteed, however effective they might be. There could be attacks on the few US troops in Iraq and Syria, and strikes on the Saudi oil infrastructure or Red Sea shipping lanes, severely affecting international trade and movement of oil at a time the international economy is facing major challenges.
An attack could ignite a multi-front war that neither Israel nor the US wants right now. Trump’s 2024 campaign focused on ‘America First’. Avoiding entanglements abroad was the crux of his foreign policy formulation. He was extremely critical of his predecessor, Joe Biden, for having led the US into warlike commitments without adequate efforts to prevent them.
A war with Iran could tank markets, spike oil prices and undermine economic stability—a big issue for US voters. For Netanyahu, Israel is dealing with internal divisions and war fatigue. A war with Iran would stretch military resources and risk national morale.
The Atlantic Council, a US-based think tank, has written, “...to incentivise Iranian cooperation, the US should be prepared to ease some sanctions in return for a qualitative change in Iranian funding and arming of its proxies”. Trump may find that a nuanced diplomatic approach could deliver much more than the bluster his administration brings to the situation.
The risks, costs and uncertainties of war make diplomatic engagement a more attractive first option. A pre-emptive strike without international backing would fracture the already-challenged NATO unity, increase China-Russia-Iran coordination and trigger a global backlash. Diplomacy could buy time, rally domestic and international support to pressure Iran under the altered circumstances, and shift the onus to Iran to concede or de-escalate.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps;
Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)