As it looks east, Pak faces trouble on western front

Pakistan’s western border is being disputed by the Afghan Taliban, which has reached out to India. This loss of strategic depth makes our neighbour vulnerable to manipulation
As it looks east, Pak faces trouble on western front
Express Illustration - Sourav Roy
Updated on
4 min read

For some time now, India’s eastern front has drawn the major part of the country’s strategic focus, especially after the dramatic meltdown in Bangladesh on and after August 5, 2024. Yet, a lot has been happening on India’s immediate west too—in Pakistan and Afghanistan—that merits attention, especially because, with several interlinked issues, there is hardly any clear geographical divide in India’s strategic interests on either side.

A convergence of four challenges has considerably strained Pakistan’s strategic situation: the continuing internal political instability, severe economic challenges that constrain effective governance including national security, deteriorating security condition involving militant activities, particularly by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the fraying relationship with Afghanistan that complicates Pakistan's western border security and diminishes its influence in Kabul.

Pakistan has faced considerable political turmoil, particularly following the ouster of former PM Imran Khan in April 2022, which deepened polarisation within the country. The nature of Pakistan’s politics borders on a virtual war between parties, with the army playing the kingmaker. From mid-2022 to date, we have witnessed an unrelenting campaign to exclude the most popular personality in the Pakistan political scene despite the democratic support he obtained.

Imran was equally at fault in triggering fractious radical politics, which also intensely involved the army. To keep him out of reckoning for leadership, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison on corruption charges along with his wife, Bushra Bibi, who received a seven-year sentence. Imran’s party, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which has announced plans to appeal the verdict, is also being targeted by the army and the coalition in power to make it politically irrelevant.

However, such alignments are usually short-lived in Pakistan; this may not be the last that we are hearing of Imran and the PTI, although the reconciliatory talks the PTI had entered into are now on hold.

Politics has divided the army, too, and deeply affected the scope of governance. These actions have drawn criticism from the international community, including the US, over concerns about judicial independence and due process. As a greater irritant, Pakistan’s recent social media bill has restrained the freedom of expression in a marked way.

Meanwhile, the World Bank has approved a $20-billion, 10-year programme to support Pakistan's reforms in renewable energy, education and social sectors. The initiative complements the $7-billion facility secured from the IMF in September 2024, which focuses on economic stabilisation and structural reforms. The macroeconomic situation is showing some improvement with lower inflation, but growth is still quite restricted. The country’s forex reserves are at about $16 billion, compared to India’s $620 billion.

So, the strategic capability gap between Pakistan and India has expanded exponentially, making Pakistan that much more vulnerable to external manipulation—something quite evident from the hand it is now attempting to play in Bangladesh, allegedly at the behest of its Chinese sponsors. The vulnerability could have been partially prevented had Pakistan’s economy been in a better shape. 

In response to a surge in militant attacks and sectarian tensions, Pakistani security forces initiated a major operation recently in the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The district has been isolated since last November due to road blockages from clashes between Shiite and Sunni tribes. This adds to the difficulty of effective governance, especially when internal security challenges are characterised by militant activity, sectarian strife, legislative changes and political instability.

The TTP, garnering an advantage, has intensified attacks on the security forces, particularly from its bases in Afghanistan. This has strained Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and poses continuing security challenges.

When the Afghan Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Pakistan’s ISI wrung its hands gleefully, perceiving it as an achievement of all that it aspired to. The long-sought ‘strategic depth’ appeared close with a friendly regime in Kabul.

The Afghan territory in which militant groups such as the TTP took refuge was now conceived as ‘no-go’ for anti-Pakistan elements. Most importantly, the necessity of having two large military formations—the 11 and 12 Corps, in reserve for contingencies on the western border—would now be diluted, adding to Pakistan’s available conventional reserve forces against India. At this stage, the latter was deeply enmeshed with issues concerning its own order of battle, with formations being reoriented in operational roles from the west to the north to meet the threat in Ladakh.

However, none of Pakistan’s aspirations seem to have been met. Instead, we have witnessed an improving India-Afghanistan relationship in recent months. The Afghan Taliban views its evolving relationship with India as a strategic opportunity to enhance Afghanistan's economic development and regional integration. The Taliban has identified India as a "significant regional and economic partner".

There are avenues through which the new Afghanistan has expressed its concerns against Pakistan. The TTP has been given sanctuaries in Afghan territory, thus allowing it to carry out trans-border raids in Pakistan. The established border between the two countries along the Durand Line is being virtually derecognised. It reflects Afghanistan’s broader historical and ethnic considerations, as the border divides the significant Pashtun and Baloch populations between the two nations. Incidents have occurred where Taliban forces have intervened to halt Pakistan's border fencing work, viewing it as a unilateral action that disregards Afghan territorial claims.

What some may disagree with is that the Afghan Taliban also does not wish to play second fiddle to Pakistan in the politics of Islam. It has its own aspirations for the control of the Afghan-Pak territories under its ideological regime rather than any ISI-backed dispensation. Ironically, while Pakistan is failing to cultivate its strategic depth on the west, it is seeking links with its erstwhile and estranged eastern wing that has been an independent and progressive nation for the last 54 years.

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir

(Views are personal)

(atahasnain@gmail.com)

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