Take pride in Operation Sindoor, but brace for the worst

Delhi can’t assume better sense will prevail in Rawalpindi anytime soon. After demonstrating military precision and political will with Operation Sindoor, it must prepare for a more volatile region
Take pride in Operation Sindoor, but brace for the worst
Sourav Roy
Updated on
5 min read

Two months after India struck nine known terrorist base-camps and launchpads in Pakistani territory, an analysis of the military and operational dimensions of Operation Sindoor points to certain preliminary but clear conclusions.

First, India hit hard but hit smart—in carefully calculated strikes that took place at night to avoid collateral damage to civilians. Operation Sindoor, which targeted a broader geography and a wider set of targets than any previous counter-terrorist action, was a remarkable logistical and military achievement. Despite Pakistan being on the highest alert, India succeeded in breaching its defensive lines and striking its intended targets, including eliminating some known terrorists (whose funerals witnessed high-level attendance from Pakistani military and police officials, reconfirming their complicity in terror).

India’s initial strikes deliberately avoided Pakistani military and governmental targets, in order to signal that its action was purely in reprisal against terrorism and not intended to be the opening salvo in a protracted war. It left the burden of escalation to the Pakistani military, which duly obliged, inviting additional retribution.

Second, the very terms of engagement with Pakistan have irrevocably shifted. India has shed its longstanding hesitations regarding military action, once held hostage by fears of “internationalising” the Kashmir issue. No longer will such concerns restrain the nation. India has moved beyond the familiar diplomatic process of presenting dossiers and evidence, petitioning a UN Security Council that has long allowed Pakistan to find shelter behind one of its permanent members.

The time for such diplomacy is not over, but it is no longer enough. Instead, New Delhi’s resolve to respond to terror with military force, and to manage counter-retaliatory actions, was clear and unwavering, with India signalling that it was prepared to inflict even more severe consequences if required.

Third, from swift cross-border surgical strikes in 2016 to an air strike in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in 2019, India has progressively expanded the scope of its strikes. India crossed not only the Line of Control (which the Modi Government had been careful not to breach till its 2016 surgical strike after the Uri terror attack) and the international border (which it had breached in its single strike after the Pulwama bombing), but it did so this time by hitting nine targets. In the process, Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail and its incessant threats of an uncontrolled war were ignored and unmasked. For too long, Islamabad has held both India and the world hostage to the shadow of its nuclear arsenal. India demonstrated that terrorism can meet a calibrated military response without inviting a nuclear holocaust.

India has clearly demonstrated that, in the event of conflict with Pakistan, any future sub-conventional provocations will now be met with a full-scale conventional response. The onus is now squarely on Pakistan to ensure that such provocations cease, if it wishes to avoid the consequences of India’s conventional military power.

Fourth, by placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, India has sent an unequivocal message: the costs of sponsoring terrorism can no longer be contained within the realm of symbolic reprisals. Pakistan must now face the real possibility that its actions could jeopardise the very lifeblood of its people—its water. While India has not yet shown any inclination to substantially divert these waters, the mere suggestion that the flow could be curtailed dramatically alters the dynamics between the two countries. Henceforth, the bargaining chip is no longer dialogue in exchange for peace; rather, it is Pakistan’s cessation of terrorism in exchange for India’s continued provision of water.

Fifth, the world has been sharply reminded of the persistent threat posed by radicalisation and extremism emanating from Pakistan. Operation Sindoor has refocused attention on Pakistan’s deep and continuing links to terrorism, as well as its perilous nuclear brinkmanship.

Details of the behind-the-scenes discussions between the US and Pakistan, and India’s military manoeuvres will no doubt emerge in time. However, what is indisputable is that a ceasefire would not have been achievable without the full application of military pressure by India, nor would it have been possible without India’s readiness to call a halt whenever Pakistan stepped off the ladder of escalation.

Sixth, in light of the current state of affairs, dialogue with Pakistan seems a remote possibility. Nothing substantive is likely to change in the bilateral relationship, and proposals for talks on Kashmir will likely fall on deaf ears. Kashmir is neither the root cause nor the ultimate solution to the enduring tensions between India and Pakistan. This is a myth perpetuated by Pakistan to justify its claims on Indian territory, based on nothing more than the bigoted argument that Muslims cannot live in a country with a non-Muslim majority.

Seventh, India made it unequivocally clear that any future terrorist attack would be treated as an act of war. The principle of zero tolerance for terrorism, when translated into real policy, compels Pakistan to seriously consider whether it is willing to risk a broader conflict every time it sends its proxies across the border to disrupt peace.

Eighth, though India has understandably been focused on its own economic development and high-tech growth rather than war preparations, it is clear that it cannot assume better sense will prevail in Rawalpindi. India must prepare for the worst. This entails bolstering its military capabilities, addressing diplomatic vulnerabilities, enhancing internal security measures, and readying its citizens for the inevitable cycles of violence, loss, and disorder that might follow. India must continue to adapt, prepare, and evolve its strategies in the face of an adversary that is not likely to abandon its destabilising tactics any time soon.

India's GDP is 11 times that of Pakistan, and the Indian government must not leave itself vulnerable to a military regime that stokes instability by propping up terror proxies to reinforce its domestic dominance. It is important to recognise that the Pakistani military’s overweening authority, its control over the Pakistani national budget, its historical relationships with major powers, and its strategic alliances with China and Türkiye provide it with substantial tools to sustain an armed conflict. While India enjoys overwhelming military superiority and would undoubtedly prevail in any conventional conflict, Pakistan’s ability to inflict harm, both through direct and indirect means, must not be underestimated.

India can take justifiable pride in its demonstration of resolute political will in confronting terrorism and its capacity to dismantle Pakistan’s terror infrastructure with precision, while remaining steadfast in its unity and maturity in the face of heightened emotions. At the same time, India must brace itself for an increasingly volatile security environment and a neighbourhood that has, perhaps, grown more fragile in the wake of recent events.

(Views are personal)

Shashi Tharoor is a fourth-term Lok Sabha MP, Chairman of Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, and Sahitya Akademi-winning author of 24 books

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