The effect of Donald Trump’s return to the White House is being felt in capitals all over the world. At the recently-concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the spectre of a new cold war rose once again to dominate discussions. In his ASEAN chairman’s statement, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim categorically asserted the return of a cold war to systemic interstate relations.
The reference does not augur well for the ASEAN, which has been trying to build resilience within while maintaining a degree of balance between the US and China. The second important aspect of this year’s dialogue has been the tough stand India has placed on its recent military stand-off with Pakistan following the devastating terror attack at Pahalgam. The subsequent Indian political and military action against Pakistan has highlighted what the political leadership is calling the ‘new normal’, signalling that tolerance has its limits.
Both these indicated a changed environment at the Shangri-La Dialogue, especially as they implied certain defining shifts. First, the very definition of the term ‘cold war’ and how this period will be different from the earlier cold war. Second, the Trump administration’s impact on the wider Indo-Pacific and what it expects from the region vis-á-vis the US-China rivalry. Third, the choices for ASEAN states, particularly in light of the extending US-China rivalry. And finally, how this affects the role India plays within multilateral forums and how India’s definition of the new normal affects the region.
First, the reference to a new cold war is not new. Even during the first Trump term, a National Security Strategy paper released by the administration in November 2017 clearly reiterated that the foremost threats to American interests and leadership in the global order were from China and Russia, articulating the tensions at systemic levels.
However, as opposed to the earlier cold war, this period is significantly different on two accounts. There is no longer a systemic balance where only these three states determine the course of global politics; several other countries wield both economic and military power that renders them equally significant at the systemic level. Moreover, smaller states and groupings are emerging and constantly redefining themselves to address the evolving challenges in the global order. This has led to the emergence of multiple types of groupings that are bilateral, trilateral and ones like the Quad.
Second, the kind of economic integration visible today, especially among the three most consequential global players, was not there the earlier cold war. So, while the first Trump administration saw the dominating theme of the trade war with China unfold, his second term has, so far, seen relentless flip-flops on tariff-related matters. Today, China and Russia are integral to the international economy, and their assertions will have ramifications that cut across both economic and security matters.
Interestingly, the statements made by US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Shangri-La Dialogue left little space for confidence in the US’s ability to protect its allies or offer any concrete provisions for resolving the geopolitical tensions gripping the region. Both Hegseth and Senator Tammy Duckworth’s presence at the Shangri-La Dialogue emphasised the bipartisan approach to wider issues in the Indo-Pacific, even though there was a nuanced distinction in their assessment of the administration’s options. While Hegseth articulated a greater role and commitment from the Asian allies, Duckworth’s approach on understanding the needs of different states was clearly distinct.
Third, ASEAN finds itself in a tight spot—not unusual, considering the events shaping the region. While closer ties to China is a given for most ASEAN states, the emphasis ASEAN had in terms of a duality of approach towards its economic and security ties is no longer applicable. ASEAN’s oft-repeated rhetorical statement of China being the foremost economic partner while the US would be the security player no longer holds merit in the deepening discord between the two. The bloc truly finds itself between a rock and a hard place. The impact on the group is bound to pull at the core and its centrality will undoubtedly be tested. The writings of Professor Michael Leifer of the LSE— where he indicated that Chinese irredentist claims would undermine the ASEAN—sound almost prophetic today.
Finally, is there a role for India in this emerging dynamic? India’s military response to the terror attack in Pahalgam also dominated the discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue. India’s assertions of zero tolerance and setting a new normal on the manner in which it will respond to terrorism marked a difference.
Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan articulated this difference in a clear manner at Singapore. The reference in his speech to both non-state actors and terror groups, as well as the drawing of a ‘red line’ underlined the recent events. The manner in which technology, especially unmanned systems, is now used in any form of conflict can change how states engage in warfare. The speech also reiterated the success of India’s own defence industry, which places the country as a potential security provider for the region. This new normal is a distinct shift from India’s earlier approach at most such forums.
(Views are personal)
(shankari@mail.jnu.ac.in)
Shankari Sundararaman | Professor at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University