The roots of the Iran-Israel standoff lie in the seismic shift of 1979, when the Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah and birthed a Shia regime with ambitions that aimed to claim a leadership position in the Islamic world. This ideological transformation triggered a sectarian rivalry that rallied other Sunni states to counterbalance Iran’s regional influence, the primary one being Saudi Arabia. It was also a time when Arab states were seen to be retreating from their once-strident anti-Zionist positions after repeated military defeats.
The new clergy-led Iranian regime stepped in with a fierce anti-Israel posture. Israel was cast as a symbol of Western-backed oppression—an ideological anathema. Support, over time, for militant groups like Hezbollah (Shia), Hamas, and Islamic Jihad—despite the sectarian diversity—underscores how Iran’s strategic opposition to Israel could bridge even Shia-Sunni divides. Iran today is probably more anti-Israel than all the Arab nations put together. For Iran, confrontation with Israel serves three purposes—regime consolidation, assertion of regional influence, and provision of a strategic and ideological counterweight to the Western-aligned Sunni monarchies of the Persian Gulf.
The nuclear dimension complicates this further. Iran’s nuclear programme, long a subject of global anxiety, is more than just a shield against regime change. It represents a bid to strategically balance Israel, the region’s undeclared nuclear power. While Israel remains the most prominent target in Tehran’s rhetoric, the implications of an Iranian bomb go well beyond.
The latest Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure must be seen in this context, with the idea that Israeli intelligence suspected a few weeks or even days to Iran’s overt declaration of nuclear weapon status. However, to be fair, we have had such reports earlier too, including in the context of Iraq two decades ago.
Then there is the contingency of Benjamin Netanyahu under the pressure of a pending legal action postponed because of national security contingencies. Many believe the unilateral Israeli initiation of war with Iran is linked to enhancing the contingencies. Israel employed air-launched and long-range missiles against known and suspected nuclear sites, drone facilities, missile depots, and command-and-control nodes. Its ability to damage the Natanz facility, partially above ground, is plausible. But Fordow, buried deep beneath a mountain near Qom, presents a greater challenge. It’s fortified beneath layers of rock and concrete, likely beyond the reach of even sophisticated Israeli bunker-busting munitions. Nonetheless, cyber sabotage, electromagnetic disruption and precision strikes on adjoining infrastructure would have happened.
With much of Iran’s proxy network— from Hezbollah in Lebanon to Houthis in Yemen—disrupted or degraded through prior action, Israel is now systematically targeting Iran’s conventional military infrastructure. This would include airbases, radar systems, ballistic missile launchers, drone factories, logistics hubs and military units. Such a strategy, while risky, is motivated by the belief that this is a narrow window of opportunity to impose long-term strategic costs on Iran’s ability to project power. Ensuring Iran’s proxies do not reconstitute easily will also be a challenge.
The US has not publicly joined the war, but its imprint is unmistakable. Washington’s strategic backing and coordination is a force multiplier. There are echoes here of the 2020 strike on Qasem Soleimani, in which the US and Israel closely coordinated to eliminate a high-value Iranian target.
The immediate global concern is for energy and maritime security. Even a limited conflict near the Strait of Hormuz can send oil prices surging, rattle insurance markets and provoke panic. A price rise of $10 per barrel has already been reported. Iran, despite its rhetoric, is unlikely to deliberately disrupt traffic through the strait, as it would be suicidal for its already sanctions-battered economy. Yet, calibrated retaliation, such as using proxies to harass Gulf shipping lanes or launch drone attacks near infrastructure, could be used as capability projection. If this conflict stretches beyond 10 days, global supply chains will feel the tremors. A war of over three weeks could create a full-blown energy crisis, especially for economies such as India and China.
In the broader international arena, Russia, China and Turkey all have stakes. Russia, already embroiled in Ukraine, will avoid direct entanglement. China, having recently brokered a thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia, will push for restraint— more out of economic self-interest than moral calculus. Turkey will try to play both sides, issuing rhetorical support for Palestine while maintaining quiet ties with Israel and NATO. Global multilateral forums remain ill-equipped to manage such rapidly escalating regional wars.
For India, the stakes are significant. Its energy security, maritime trade routes and diaspora interests are all in play. Israel has become one of India’s closest strategic partners, offering critical intelligence and defence support—including during Operation Sindoor. Iran also remains vital to India’s plans for regional connectivity through the Chabahar port and as a counterweight to both Pakistan and China in the western neighbourhood.
India must avoid the appearance of passive neutrality, but also refrain from overt alignment—a challenging call. Strategic autonomy remains the main consideration. Backchannel diplomacy, quiet engagement with both Tel Aviv and Tehran, and readiness to protect Indian interests in the Gulf must shape our response.
Arab countries find themselves in an awkward position. Violent containment of Iran could be counterproductive in the long run. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain, signatories to the Abraham Accords, would prefer neutrality. Yet, they would fear public unrest and a possible spillover of conflict onto their own territories. Egypt and Jordan will worry about public reaction more than state-level consequences. Overall, the Arab Street, although insufficiently supportive of the Palestinian cause, would find itself struggling for choice.
What follows now is uncertain. Iran has chosen to target Israeli urban centres, which has invited a similar response from Israel. I anticipate a subsequent Iranian drawdown, similar to the one after Soleimani’s assassination. The conflict could also drag into a prolonged suicidal exchange. However, its effects will definitely go far beyond redrawing the regional security map. The world may be witnessing just another episode in the Iran-Israel hostility, but the shaping of a new West Asian balance of power could also be on the cards.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) is the former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)