On March 11, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) hijacked the Jaffar Express, holding over 450 passengers hostage and demanding the release of some Baloch political prisoners. The hijackers set a 48-hour ultimatum, to which the Pakistan Army responded kinetically. After an intense firefight, all militants were killed; but 21 hostages and security officials also died. Or so we were made to believe.
It was one of those militant incidents where information and disinformation compete with each other for eyeballs. I was less concerned about the details of the execution of the hijacking and the counter-action, because that will take time to emerge. Till today, no one can say with any degree of certainty what the final outcome and sequence of events were. A strong disinformation campaign was waged from the portals of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations in an attempt to ensure that the truth remained grey and the Pakistan Army did not lose face.
However, the incident has only succeeded in drawing international attention towards the Balochistan issue where a struggle for justice has been going on for long, but relatively less noticed by the international community. The Baloch issue has been festering since 1948. It is centred on the grievances of the ethnic Baloch people over their political marginalisation, lack of autonomy, and the exploitation of natural resources in the province by Punjabi-dominated central government. These tensions have fuelled a decades-long separatist insurgency, with groups like the BLA demanding independence or greater self-rule, often clashing with the Pak Army. The region’s strategic importance, especially due to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port, has helped intensify this conflict.
Pakistan is in the throes of a ‘near existential’ crisis. Its current economic situation is dire with high inflation, massive debt, low forex reserves, currency devaluation, and sluggish economic growth (estimated at 3 percent). An IMF bailout has kept default at bay, but structural issues—like a narrow tax base, energy crisis and political instability—persist. The persistent economic gloom is matched by the internal and border security situations.
The western flank through which Pakistan assumed its strategic depth, is now aflame. The alignment of the Durand Line is being questioned by Afghanistan through various attempts at enforcing its will, leading to border clashes. The Tehreek–e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has returned with vengeance without any pretensions of being sponsored as a proxy of the Afghan Taliban. There is no respite from the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK), all anti-Shia groups.
In 2014, after the TTP terror attack on a Pakistan Army Public School in Peshawar on December 16, in which 132 children were killed, the army undertook a murderous kinetic counter-terrorist campaign under Operation Zarb-e-Azb for almost four years. This was in conjunction with Operation Radd-ul-Fassad, a nationwide intelligence-based operation with a focus on hunting residual terrorists, sleeper cells and urban militancy across all provinces. The combined effect of the pandemic and the mixture of high-density operations, involving almost a third of Pakistan’s active infantry formations, did somewhat stabilise the situation. However, post the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan’s breakdown of ties with Afghan Taliban and the activation of the ISK forced the ISI’s attention in different directions. The simultaneous attempt to reinvigorate terror in India’s Jammu added to the weight of responsibility on the ISI and the earmarked counter-terror forces, allowing windows of opportunity to appear for various elements. The BLA has revelled in that let-up while the TTP continues its activities with impunity.
One would have expected a strong kinetic response in the aftermath of train hijacking, but General Asim Munir has desisted from that. Undoubtedly, that would have risked further alienation of the Baloch people, enhancing the insurgency’s appeal. Yet, the other option, the untried hearts-and-minds approach, is not something that can work in the army’s favour without a political callout. Pakistan’s security-based response has invariably been kinetic, all guns blazing with no remorse for the populace. The principle of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism involving the isolation of the perpetrators has rarely been followed. During Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad, a model of neutralising networks was attempted with some success, but the enormity of sub-conventional violence in Pakistan is simply overwhelming.
There are Chinese concerns too. The BLA attack highlights vulnerabilities along the key CPEC routes and railway infrastructure. China may perceive these threats as risking investment returns and project viability, especially in Gwadar and surrounding areas. It will likely pressure Pakistan to expand the protection of CPEC assets, possibly even pushing for private Chinese security contractors or a larger role for the Chinese military under the guise of economic security—a highly sensitive issue for Pakistan. China is not going to abandon the CPEC for want of security. It will do all it takes to make it secure, and that includes a strong advisory to Pakistan to alter the approach. Is this one of the reasons that we have not had an immediate knee-jerk response from the Pakistan Army?
In response to this incident, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif convened a National Security Committee meeting, emphasising the need for national unity and a strategic approach to combat militancy. Army Chief General Asim Munir echoed this sentiment, underscoring the military’s determination to dismantle terrorist networks. The fallout of the Jaffar Express attack could spark internal friction within the Pakistan Army, putting General Munir in a tight spot between delivering security, maintaining military cohesion, and appeasing China.
There may be rising concerns in the Pakistan Army itself on the manner in which national security is being addressed. Between attempting to nurture ‘friendly terrorists’ to fight a sponsored proxy war in J&K, and countering the nasty ones who target even army families, the force has a challenge on its hands.
In trying to prevent secession by clamping down on civil unrest in Balochistan, while keeping an eye on internal dissension and preventing dilution of its stranglehold over national governance and politics, the Pakistan Army is continuously over-extending itself. Perhaps I am doing it an uncalled-for favour; showing it a mirror unto itself. Armies which extend themselves so thin invariably end in the hara-kiri posture.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)