The carnage wrought by the Pakistani establishment and handlers in Pahalgam on April 22—killing a large number of tourists from different parts of the country, that too on the basis of religion—was the first escalatory action by Pakistan. India has responded not only in the political, diplomatic, economic and energy domains, but also by hitting terrorists and their infrastructure both in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as well as in the Punjab province of Pakistan, with the hits ranging from 30 to 100 km.
While the reaction by Pakistan and counter-reaction from India continue on the escalation matrix, something very important has happened wherein the national security strategy of India appears to have taken a new leap. The subsequent details unfold the emergence of a new India.
Pakistan has been using illegitimate means to claim Jammu and Kashmir, despite J&K having acceded into the Union of India as per norms included in the Independence Act passed by the British parliament. It invaded India in 1947, besides fighting the war of 1947-48, and the two later wars of 1965 and 1971. While Pakistan has been using terrorists right from the beginning, it gave deliberate thoughts to its J&K strategy after losing East Pakistan in 1971.
It made the terrorism a primary means of waging a proxy war in J&K, which was fully blown up 1990 onwards. It totally shattered the peace and tranquillity of the region and forced the migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley, who lost their natural habitat and wealth.
While the level of terrorism has continued since then in varying levels of intensity due to effective action by the Indian armed forces, the sanctity of the Line of Control (LoC) was largely maintained till it was violated by Pakistan in 1999, resulting in the fourth conflict between the two nations. Even under such a situation, India maintained its posture to respect the LoC and throw off Pakistani incursions.
Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army and their Inter-Services Intelligence handlers have been spearheading the proxy war in the state of J&K and elsewhere in India. They have been regularly raising the threshold of such terrorist actions. In a series of such activities, they attacked the brigade headquarters in Uri, killing close to 20 persons on September 18, 2016. India responded by launching surgical strikes at multiple locations on September 29. These strikes were launched by the ground forces, restricted across the LoC and limited to terrorist infrastructure and terrorists.
The most important high point of this strike should not be measured by the damage it caused, but by the overt support of the political establishment to such an operation—a first of its kind. This was emergence of a new India, where the political leadership displayed courage to own up such actions.
But Pakistan has never learnt its lessons despite successive losses in wars and has continued its proxy war. A major terrorist strike was made on a Central Reserve Police Force convoy on February 14, 2019, where 40 persons were killed. This was responded to by India on February 26, by launching airstrikes in the Balakot area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir—this time too, the targets were the terrorists and their launch pads.
There was a common pattern with the post-Uri surgical strikes in terms of the nature of targets being terrorists and their infrastructure, the area still being across the LoC in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and overt support of the political establishment. But a new element was also added this time—the Indian Air Force used fighter aircraft to launch these strikes across the LoC. The understanding that the LoC was to be respected according to the 1972 Simla Agreement had already been fractured by Pakistan in 1999 during the Kargil conflict. So, India’s use of airpower across the LoC was a new level of engagement that displayed our national intent as well as the posture of standing up to the Pakistani response that might have included its nuclear bluff.
While India’s response covered all the domains after the Pahalgam strike of April 22, it launched attacks targeting nine locations at around 1:20 am in the morning of May 7. These strikes took Indian response to a new threshold. While the nature of targets selected by India and the overt support of the political establishment continued, the strikes were not only limited to areas of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir across the LoC, but were also taken to the Pakistani Punjab province.
The strikes were devastating for Pakistani terrorists and their infrastructure, with the killing of a large number of terrorists, their supporters and family members, including those involved in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight 814 en route from Kathmandu to Delhi on December 24, 1999. This time, neither the rest of the world, nor the Pakistani and Indian masses needed any proof of the damages, as it was all over the place, including an acceptance by the Pakistani establishment.
India had entered a much higher orbit of national response this time, fracturing the Pakistani belief in conventional and nuclear domain in addition to decimating the Chinese equipment’s efficiency claim. The action not only demonstrated the national will to undertake punitive responsive actions on those who attempt to fracture our national fabric, but also breaking and exposing the ineffectiveness of the China-Pakistan collusion.
The main point to note is the national will to respond with enhanced intensity, wherein India opted for much stronger actions when 26 civilians were killed, as against when 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel were killed in 2019. This capacity-building, created over the years, has cemented the political courage required in the country, wherein India can opt for an even higher response when terrorist activity takes place anywhere within the borders, killing even a single person.
This national bondage with citizens with the willingness to strike opponents is a definite turning point in India’s national strategy. It’s a much-needed shift that was required to take India to the select few nations in the world having such a capability as well as the political will.
(Views are personal)
Maj Gen Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd)
Kargil war veteran and Director General,
Centre for Joint Warfare Studies