The thrill of analysing military situations lies in the speed of change and how badly one can get surprised by the sheer dynamism of situations. The racy narrative of the developments over the last four or five days, ending with the ceasefire and also the breaches, made for much scope for analysis. Yet, prudence demands that any assessment of the current Indo-Pakistan scenario commence with the trigger that started it all: Pahalgam.
It was India’s collective conscience which demanded from the government retribution of a proportion that would hurt the masters of the proxies that have waged war on India for the last 36 years. It was a demand also to convey India’s political will and full strategic intent to avenge every misadventure they would undertake. Although immediacy of response was the emotive demand, the government sensibly gave itself a window sufficient to plan, wargame, gain confirmatory intelligence and build a credible deception.
The decisions of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) were in the non-military domain, correctly so, allowing the Armed Forces the space they needed. It also transpired that a credible but low-key deception plan was also progressively adopted. Even the last man on the streets of India knew that an Indian response was imminent. Yet, significantly, no one could predict when this could happen. Analysts like me gave a time window of even two to three months to keep Pakistan on tenterhooks about the deployment of its reserve formations on the ground, thus incurring a heavy economic penalty.
In a nation that is yet seeking the 24th loan from the IMF to service its previous loans from other sources, such expenditure is debilitating, as are no doubt the various military actions it is involved in. The ‘wait and starve’ strategy, although executed for just a fortnight, gained much credibility and helped achieve some surprise.
Fourteen days after the Pahalgam attack, India struck and this time all along a 700-kilometre frontage, from Bahawalpur to Muzaffarabad, 24 state-of-the-art missiles with autonomous loiter munitions rained down on nine locations in 25 minutes on the night of May 6/7.
The escalation way above Balakot involved three things. First, it was Pakistan’s heartland in Punjab, which was hit with high-profile targets such as Bahawalpur, Muridke and Sialkot, all bearing the most significant parts of Pakistan’s Jihadi-terrorist infrastructure. The same has been instrumental in ideologically motivating, headquartering, training, and even launching terrorists against India for the better part of 36 years.
Second, all these locations are close to some of the most important garrisons and cantonments which house the Pakistan Army, implying that these too are in the crosshairs of India’s transformational missile capability and could be effectively targeted with precision, with little or no collateral damage.
Third was the political will and the complete civil-military fusion on display on the Indian side with a new-found confidence in strategic communication. The balancing act was well choreographed and decisive but calibrated.
It was more important to take stock of the situation after delivery of the initial package, which was the first response to an escalation Pakistan had already conducted through the Pahalgam attack. What needed to be remembered was that the comparatively low intensity exchanges, well short of war, could be managed at that level if the civilian government in Pakistan was in control. However, as we all know, it is the Pakistan Army which is in command of that nation’s foreign and strategic policy; it has always been so ever since we can remember.
In the tenure of the previous Pakistan Army Chief, General Qamar Bajwa, one may have expected pragmatism regarding escalation. His successor, General Asim Munir, is not from that mould. He is a deeply ideologically oriented military leader whose reputation has often been dented right through his over two-year tenure. He is identified as one from whom we can expect the Musharraf approach—decisions based on irrationality more than military logic. Due to the above reasons, after the demonstration of India’s technological prowess with precision targeting, we may not have expected a quiet Pakistani response to play just sufficiently to the street and then pull back. We must remember that Pakistan’s Army reserves had already been deployed, at least in J&K, for sure.
Also, in the recent past, Pakistan has been in the process of refurbishing its artillery ammunition reserves, which were sold in bulk to Ukraine at the behest of the US last year, to secure an IMF loan. Decision makers in Pakistan needed to realise that they could take the situation to a much higher rung of escalation by their further response. They would then have no control over India’s next response cycle, and the cost could well be a comprehensive collapse. Yet, while choosing to adopt the escalation on two continuous nights, Pakistan banked on India not upping the ante beyond.
Mercifully, it was a drone and missile conflict, along with Pakistani artillery shelling of the villages in Poonch, Rajouri and Uri. If the ceasefire, reputed to have been pressured by the US at the IMF meeting, had not been arrived at, India may have reached the level of a much more unpredictable cycle of escalation, employing maritime and ground forces. Pakistan’s ability to resist the initial forays would have undoubtedly taken this to a much higher level.
There are several dangers of Pakistani miscalculation. The breaches of the ceasefire within a few hours of it coming into effect reveal that lessons are far from learnt. Pakistan must know that US intervention came, if at all, perhaps because it sensed that Pakistan was going to be hugely decimated, especially when its Nur Khan airbase was effectively hit.
The moral ascendancy gained by India through its very calibrated actions ensured that its international reputation of being an upholder of human rights was retained, if not enhanced. Pakistan, on the other hand, brought international disgrace on itself through the targeting of civilian villages and prayer houses of innocents in the same manner as the terrorist action in Pahalgam. I strongly suggest to the Government of India to declare May 10 as ‘Retribution against Terrorism’ Day. Let it be an internationally recognised calendar date, never to be forgotten.
(Views are personal)
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps;
Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(atahasnain@gmail.com)